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Preface
For a successful conduct of monetary policy, the monetary authority must have an accurate
assessment of how its policy decisions are transmitted through the economy. This requires
a sound knowledge of the underlying structural processes at work through which monetary
policy unfolds. Moreover, a good understanding of the transmission channels of monetary
policy and whether they are changing over time helps to evaluate the extent to which
earlier policy decisions have influenced the economy. A great number of studies assess
the monetary transmission mechanism. It represents one of the most largely studied
areas of monetary economics. With regard to the empirical analysis of the monetary
transmission mechanism, Vector Autoregression approaches (VARs) have become one of
the most widespread tools by economists. In particular, VARs are used to evaluate the
importance of monetary policy disturbances for business cycle fluctuations. Since the
seminal work by Sims (1972), Sims (1980) and Sims (1986), VAR models have been used
extensively on this subject.1 The literature generally documents a temporary reduction
in output, with a peak after about one year following a monetary tightening. Prices seem
to respond with a delayed decline and then fall permanently.
However, the typical VAR maintains the assumption of constant coefficients over time.
This assumption seems quite restrictive and should thus be tested. This is particularly
relevant for the discussion of possible changes in the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism. As Canova (2007) describes, one can think of these changes in two ways: first, as
abrupt switches which can be accounted for by structural breaks2 or, second, as models
with continuously evolving parameters which account for gradual changes over time. Stud-
ies incorporating continuously evolving parameters in a VAR include for example Cogley
1Beginning, e.g., with Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Sims (1992), Evans and Marshall (1998) and
Christiano et al. (1999) for the US, and Van Aarle et al. (2003) and Peersman and Smets (2003) for the
Euro Area.
2Structural breaks can be addressed by Markov switching or regime switching VARs (see e.g. Paap
and Van Dijk (2003), Sims and Zha (2006) and Koop and Potter (2006).
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(2005) and Primiceri (2005). Cogley (2005) employs a time-varying parameter VAR and
additionally accounts for stochastic volatility in the variances. But the simultaneous rela-
tions between the variables are still assumed to be constant. Primiceri (2005) allows for a
fully time-varying variance covariance matrix as well as for time-varying VAR coefficients.
He develops the salient Bayesian time-varying parameter Vector Autoregression approach
(TVP-VAR).
This line of research serves as the starting point of my thesis, which aims to provide
further empirical evidence on a better understanding of how monetary policy shocks
are transmitted through the economy. This thesis consists of three main chapters, all
contributing to the literature on monetary policy transmission. In chapter I, I assess
the time-varying impact of an unconventional monetary policy shock in Japan. Chapter
II addresses how a conventional monetary policy and also an exchange rate shock are
evolving across time in Poland. Chapter III focuses on the Euro Area by employing a
standard VAR and a nonlinear VAR. It assesses the impact of a conventional monetary
policy shock and its possibly different influence before and after the financial crisis.
Before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008 which induced the financial crisis and
led to the worst global recession since the 1930s, the intellectual and empirical basis for
conducting monetary policy seemed well founded and robust. The main goal of mon-
etary policy was to achieve low and stable inflation. For pursuing their price stability
objective, the monetary authorities’ policy framework was inflation targeting and its key
policy instrument was the short-term interest rate. Nowadays, the conduct of monetary
policy in advanced economies based on this framework generally is referred to as con-
ventional monetary policy. This way of conducting monetary policy basically has not
been challenged until the outbreak of the financial crisis. In the wake of this turmoil and
its aftermath, inflation rates have been falling below the generally accepted and desired
levels. Many central banks in advanced economies responded by cutting interest rates
to historically low levels and by embarking on unconventional policies. In addition to
inflation targeting, the monetary policy objective has shifted more and more to secure
financial stability. However, according to Tinbergen’s Law, a central bank needs at least
as many instruments as it has policy targets. Therefore, monetary authorities started
to extend their set of policy instruments by considering additional macroprudential mea-
sures. Furthermore, with short-term interest rates close to zero or even at the Zero Lower
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Bound (ZLB), central banks have little room for further meaningful reductions of their
policy interest rates to provide additional monetary stimuli. Therefore, an important
tool for macroeconomic stabilisation and for escaping deflation might soon or already has
become obsolete. Under such circumstances, the use of unconventional monetary policy
tools to support economic and financial stability is increasingly taken into consideration
by many central banks. This includes, for example, unorthodox measures like credit and
quantitative easing. The nature and magnitude of the macroeconomic effects of such
unconventional measures is of great interest to central banks, but historical evidence on
unconventional measures is rare. However, for a successful conduct of monetary policy, it
is crucial to learn from the experiences made within the past few years and to shed light
on the efficiency of unconventional monetary policy.
A comprehensive summary of the growing literature which assesses the quantitative effects
of unconventional policies on the economy is given by Joyce et al. (2012). It is generally
a challenge to isolate the impact of an unconventional policy as there exist many other
contributory factors driving the economy. For example, at the same time as central
banks embarked on monetary easing, fiscal authorities were trying to stimulate demand.
Furthermore, other countries implementing similar measures may have induced spillover
effects. Given these difficulties, a wide range of methodologies has been applied in order
to assess the impact of unconventional policy measures. With regard to the estimation
framework, these methodologies can be generally divided into three branches.
The first strand is based on the so called ‘plug-in’ approach. Into standard macroeconomic
models estimates of the effect of unconventional policies on asset prices are implemented
(see Chung et al. (2012) among others).3 For instance, Chung et al. (2012)) provide evi-
dence that unconventional policies undertaken by the Federal Reserve possibly influenced
output and inflation. However, as Kimura and Nakajima (2013) argue, (a) this approach
rests on ‘plugged-in’ estimates coming from separate empirical studies on the response
of financial markets and (b) it cannot differentiate between two different transmission
channels, the portfolio rebalancing channel and the signaling channel, which may lead to
3Two of the first studies evaluating the Federal Reserves’ large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) and
its influence on asset prices are Gagnon et al. (2011) and Wright (2012). The Bank of Japan’s policy
is studied among others by Kimura and Small (2006) and Ueda (2012). Meier (2009) and Joyce et al.
(2011) focus on the Bank of England’s policy. These studies trace the effect of unconventional policies on
asset prices and find that it has been successful in reducing medium and long-term interest rates. Their
estimates can then be plugged into standard macroeconomic models, such as the FRB/US model (see
Chung et al. (2012) among others).
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a possible estimation bias.4
The second strand of literature is based on the structural model provided by the DSGE
framework in order to assess the different influences of long- and short-term interest
rates on the real economy. For example, Kiley (2012) and Chen et al. (2012) employ a
structural model and account for financial market segmentation. They claim that the real
economy is less affected by term and risk premiums than by short-term interest rates. Note
that on the one hand, it appears useful to trace the influence of unconventional policies
based on structural models that allow for a clear definition of transmission channels. On
the other hand, there are numerous ways on how financial market segmentation can be
incorporated.5 Therefore, these approaches are crucially driven by the assumed underlying
structure. So far however, it seems that we do not have enough information about all
possible specifications and which one characterises the best structure of financial market
segmentation (Kimura and Nakajima (2013)).
The third strand of research refers to the structural VAR. This constitutes a data-driven
approach, which imposes very little theoretical structure on the data. It can be used
to establish important stylised facts on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
The transmission is evaluated by means of impulse responses. Within VAR models,
several papers explicitly account for the possibility of a ZLB. As the historic evidence
on economies close to or at the ZLB is rare, many studies focus on Japan. It is well
known that the Japanese economy has been stuck in a liquidity trap since the mid-
90s. Since then the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has implemented various different strategies to
fight the ZLB and to provide economic stimuli. For example, Fujiwara (2006) employs a
Markov switching VAR to analyse if there are structural breaks in the Japanese monetary
transmission mechanism due to the ZLB. Iwata and Wu (2006) use a VAR model with
constant parameters and model the policy interest rate as a censored variable. In contrast,
Nakajima et al. (2011) refer to a TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility and the interest rate
4The portfolio rebalancing channel captures a compression of term premiums and the signaling channel
a lowering of expected short-term interest rates. For further details on the incorrect assessment which
may arise due to possible biases and uncertainties in the coefficients refer to Hamilton and Wu (2012)
and Bauer et al. (2012)). Regarding the effects of the two channels refer to Stein (2012), Kiley (2012)
and Chen et al. (2012).
5Consider for example Kiley (2012) and Chen et al. (2012). Both models are based on two types
of agents. One agent is assumed to trade both long- and short-term bonds. The difference arises with
respect to the second agent. Kiley (2012) assumes that the second agent has only access to short-term
bonds and in contrast, Chen et al. (2012) assume that the second agent only trades long-term bonds.
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as a censored variable.6
In the beginning of 2001, the BoJ changed the operating target from the call rate to the
outstanding current account balances held by banks at the BoJ. Since then they have
been using this measure for providing support to the financial markets. This measure
expanded the overall size of the BoJ’s balance sheet and, consequently, the monetary
base. The respective increase in the monetary base is also reflected in an accumulation
of bank reserves. This is also referred to as Quantitative Easing (QE) (see Lenza et al.
(2010) for more details).7 As these bank reserves have become the key monetary policy
instrument in Japan, it is crucial for policy makers to learn about its effectiveness. Studies
that explicitly trace the effect of a QE shock are, for example, Kimura et al. (2003) by
means of a semi-TVP-VAR and Kimura and Nakajima (2013) by means of a TVP-VAR
with stochastic volatility which is additionally combined with a latent threshold model.8
However, these studies are based on recursive identification for identifying a QE shock.
This identification can be quite restrictive especially in a model with quarterly data. The
use of sign restrictions generally imposes fewer assumptions on the simultaneous relations
between the variables. For example, Kamada and Sugo (2006) and Franta (2011) use sign
restrictions for Japan. Franta (2011) appears to be the first work with sign restrictions
in a TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility. He implements different sign restrictions to
account for the differences in the conduct of monetary policy in Japan between 1981 and
2010.9 Note that the monetary policy shock is the only identified shock in his analysis.
This may not be sufficient as it is likely that other disturbances, e.g., business cycle
fluctuations, enter the identified monetary policy shock. This highlights the importance
of identifying further shocks. Moreover, his analysis is still silent on the recent influences
of Japanese monetary policy as his estimation horizon lasts until 2010 only. The recent
period of Japanese monetary policy is of particular interest to central banks around the
6Their estimation horizon ranges from 1980Q1 until 2008Q3. They find a visible and declining effect
on CPI following a call rate increase until the end of the 80s and a price puzzle for the beginning of the
90s. Thereafter, the effect seems to be insignificant. The negative effect on output is significant until
2002.
7Note that the Fed, the BoE and the ECB also use their balance sheet for providing financial support.
In the period before the financial crisis, financial support was also given by changing the composition of
their balance sheets, but the overall size basically remained the same. Since the financial turmoil however,
they have induced an expansion of the overall size of their balance sheets.
8Kimura et al. (2003) focus on a positive monetary base shock for the period 1985Q2 until 2002Q1.
Kimura and Nakajima (2013) focus on a bank reserve shock for the period ranging from 1981Q2 until
2012Q3.
9His results indicate a difference in the transmission mechanism between ‘normal’ times and the QE
periods. However, he does not seem to find visible differences during the ZLB period.
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world, because the BoJ has adopted various strategies to fight the ZLB since the middle
of the 90s. More specifically, they introduced a Zero-Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP) at the
end of the 90s, from 2001 to 2006 they implemented the first Quantitative Easing Policy
(QEP) and since 2013, they have been trying to combat the ZLB more aggressively with
the so-called ‘Abenomics’ monetary policy easing strategy. Empirical evidence on the
recent period is still rather scarce. Against this background, it is important to shed more
light on the transmission of monetary policy.
In chapter I of my dissertation, I fill these gaps. It is joint work with Dr. Sebastian Watzka
(LMU) and can be seen as the main chapter of my thesis. We use an identification scheme
based on sign restrictions to study if the transmission of the QE shock has changed over
time. Besides a QE shock, two business cycle disturbances, a demand and a supply shock,
are identified. This allows us to avoid that business cycle disturbances enter the identified
QE shock and to evaluate the quantitative importance of the QE shock relative to the
other disturbances. We use relatively agnostic sign restrictions to incorporate the ZLB
of short-term interest rates into a TVP-VAR. This identification scheme is based on the
New Keynesian model of Eggertsson (2011). These restrictions were first implemented
by Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) in a Bayesian VAR (BVAR). We employ the TVP-
VAR as it proved useful in previous studies analysing the monetary policy transmission
in Japan. For example, among others, Nakajima (2011) shows that it is important to
account for time variation. Our analysis also confirms the importance of using a TVP-
VAR. Furthermore, as far as we are aware, this work is the first to trace a QE shock
during the ‘Abenomics’ period based on a VAR setting. Our results show that both the
effect on output and on inflation have become stronger and longer lasting over time. More
specifically, the inflation response in 2013, a year likely to be strongly influenced by the
current ‘Abenomics’ strategy shows a significant permanent increase in inflation following
a QE shock. In contrast, the responses during the period of the ZIRP and the QEP only
confirm an initially positive effect on prices. For output, we see a visible effect in 2013,
but insignificant effects during the ZIRP and the QEP. Next to Japan, our findings are
also of particular interest to other advanced economies with short term interest rates at
the ZLB.
Chapter II of my dissertation is related to chapter I with respect to the methodological
approach. It traces the effect of a conventional monetary policy shock in Poland one of
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the most important emerging countries in Eastern Europe. In addition to the monetary
policy shock, it investigates the effect of an exchange rate shock. It is joined work with
Dr. Olga Arratibel (ECB) and was published in January 2014 in the refereed Working
Paper Series of the ECB. Poland’s economy experienced several structural changes during
the last decades. These include, e.g., the increasing trade openness, partly driven by the
integration into the European Union, the shift from exchange rate targeting to an inflation
targeting strategy and, more recently, the global financial crisis. These structural changes
seem to strongly motivate a flexible estimation framework which allows for the possibility
of time variation. Our approach follows the TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility and we
provide empirical evidence that the impact of a monetary policy and an exchange rate
shock has indeed varied over time from 1996Q1 to 2012Q3.
There are numerous studies employing VAR models for tracing the influence of both
monetary policy and exchange rate shocks in Central and Eastern European countries
(CEEs). A comprehensive summary is given by Égert and MacDonald (2009). Studies
assessing the influence of monetary policy decisions are among others Darvas (2009) and
Jarociński (2010). Darvas (2009) uses a semi TVP-VAR with recursive identification for
the period from 1993Q1 to 2008Q2.10 Jarociński (2010) uses a structural BVAR with
a combination of sign and zero restrictions for four CEE countries (including Poland).
However, his approach does not allow for assessing whether the shocks have time-varying
effects. Studies focusing on the exchange rate pass-through in Poland by means of a
standard VAR with recursive identification include, e.g., Bitans (2004) and Ca’Zorzi et al.
(2007).11
This avenue of research serves as the starting point of my second chapter. It aims to pro-
vide empirical contributions to a better understanding of how monetary policy decisions
and exchange rate changes have affected the Polish economy, which can be considered as
a small open economy. Our work contributes to the literature with an explicit analysis
whether there are time-varying effects following a monetary policy or an exchange rate
shock in Poland. We employ a combination of sign and zero restrictions for identifying
our two shocks. As far as we are aware, our study is the first to estimate a TVP-VAR
with stochastic volatility for Poland and to provide evidence on which econometric frame-
10The approach allows for time-varying coefficients but assumes a constant variance. Following a
monetary tightening, he finds visible effects on both GDP and CPI which become stronger over time.
11The approach by Bitans (2004) is based on two samples (1993-1999 and 2000-2003). Following an
exchange rate shock, he estimates a larger pass-through on prices for the first sample.
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work is the best approach for tracing the impact of monetary policy and exchange rate
shocks in Poland. Four main findings stand out: (1) Our analysis confirms the impor-
tance of using a TVP-VAR. (2) Overall, the Polish economy seems to have become more
resilient to monetary policy and exchange rate shocks over time. More specifically, (3) a
monetary tightening has a visibly declining effect on GDP. Since 2000, absorbing such a
shock has become less costly in terms of output, notwithstanding some reversal since the
beginning of the financial crisis. With regard to prices, we estimate a stronger decline
during the first half of our sample, when Poland experienced high inflation. (4) Following
the exchange rate shock, defined as an appreciation, we see a changing effect on output
over time. The price responses confirm the general finding of the literature of a slightly
decreasing pass-through across time.
Chapter III also focuses on the effect of a conventional monetary policy shock. It inves-
tigates the Euro Area transmission mechanism. Especially against the background of the
recent financial as well as the Euro crisis, which pose a great challenge to the conduct of
monetary policy, it is crucial to understand the effect of monetary policy decisions. More
specifically, most of the studies analysing the effect of a monetary policy shock in the Euro
Area employ standard VAR approaches based on synthetic Euro Area data from 1980 on-
wards (see Van Aarle et al. (2003) and Peersman and Smets (2003)). During this time,
a common central bank and hence a common monetary policy was not yet established.
Studies tracing monetary policy effects for the Euro Area include, e.g., Weber et al. (2009)
and Cecioni et al. (2011).12 Cecioni et al. (2011) employ a BVAR with recursive identifi-
cation or sign restrictions using Euro Area data from 1999M1 to 2007M7 or to 2009M8.
They estimate a temporary decline in output and a permanent fall in prices following
a monetary tightening. With a comparison between the two sample periods (until 2007
or 2009), they try to shed light on whether there are differences in the transmission of a
monetary policy shock due to the financial crisis. Their results do not confirm a visible dif-
ference. However, as generally argued in the literature, the global financial crisis induced
a rethinking of monetary policy frameworks. For the ECB, Gerlach and Lewis (2010)
provide empirical evidence for a policy shift after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
Against this background, it emphasises the importance of a sample split in September
12Weber et al. (2009) investigate whether the creation of the Euro Area influenced the monetary
transmission mechanism by means of a standard VAR with recursive identification. Their Euro Area
data covers the period from 1999Q1 until 2006Q4. Following a monetary tightening, GDP temporarily
declines and prices show a delayed response, but then stay permanently negative.
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2008. Therefore, the study by Cecioni et al. (2011) might not thoroughly account for the
possible differences in the transmission mechanism.
Against the background of scarce evidence on the possible influence of the financial crisis
following a monetary policy shock, it is important to shed more light on the Euro Area
transmission mechanism. Therefore, I analyse whether there are possible differences in
the influence of monetary policy before and after the global financial crisis by employing
a VAR framework with recursive identification. I split the data in September 2008, the
time of the outbreak of the financial turmoil. The pre financial crisis sample analyses
the Euro Area transmission in ‘normal’ times from January 1999 until September 2008.
The post financial crisis sample ranges from October 2008 until December 2014.13 To
my knowledge, this is the first approach using a standard VAR for the post financial
crisis period. Furthermore, I provide new empirical evidence on the Euro Area mone-
tary transmission mechanism by employing a nonlinear VAR model. More specifically,
a standard linear VAR mixes the influence of an unexpected increase in the policy rate
and an expected decrease which is not implemented (Hamilton and Jorda (2002)). Since
these two expectations have a very different influence on the economy, it is important
to differentiate between them. I address this point by following the empirical framework
of Hamilton and Jorda (2002). Furthermore, I extend Hamilton and Jorda’s (2002) ap-
proach by implementing exogenous variables into the nonlinear VAR specification. This
controls for changes in world demand and inflation. My estimates show that (1) it seems
important to differentiate between unexpected and expected policy changes which show
very different effects concerning the monetary policy transmission. (2) Compared to the
linear VAR, an unexpected increase in the policy rate has larger and longer lasting effects
on output and inflation. This result is especially pronounced for the pre financial crisis
sample. (3) As expected, the expected interest rate change reveals a rather minor and in-
significant impact. (4) The influence of a monetary policy shock during the post financial
crisis sample seems to be less strong. This suggests that monetary policy has become less
effective in the post financial crisis period.
The three chapters analyse the monetary policy transmission in three very different
economies. The results of each chapter deliver fresh and interesting insights into the
13Against the background of a rather short sample period from October 2008 until January 2014, it
becomes necessary for the time series estimation to extend the post financial crisis sample until December
2014.
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transmission mechanism of conventional as well as unconventional monetary policy de-
cisions and help economists and policy makers to improve their understanding of the
influence of their decisions on the economy.
All three chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and include their own introduc-
tions and appendices such that they can be read independently.
Chapter 1
Are there Differences in the
Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing
at the Zero-Lower-Bound in Japan
over Time?∗
1.1 Introduction
Using a time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) framework, we study
the changing effectiveness of the Bank of Japan’s Quantitative Easing policies over time.
It is well known that the Japanese economy has been stuck in a liquidity trap since the
mid-90s. Since then the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has adopted various different strategies to
combat the recession and stimulate the economy. We use a time-varying VAR framework
with stochastic volatility to analyse how the effects of a Quantitative Easing (QE) shock
have changed over time and when it was possibly effective.
We specifically analyse the so-called Zero-Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP) from 1999 to 2000,
the Quantitative Easing Policy (QEP) from 2001 to 2006, and most recently the so-called
‘Abenomics’ monetary policy easing strategy implemented under current BoJ Governor
Haruhiko Kuroda and carried out under the political leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Sebastian Watzka (LMU).
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To identify a QE shock, we follow Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) and use a new sign
restriction approach when the economy is stuck at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). To allow
for time variation in the impulse responses, we embed this identification strategy in the
TVP-VAR framework of Primiceri (2005). With this approach we are seeking to shed
light on the changing nature of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Japan
during these different monetary policy stances.
We investigate whether the impact of a QE shock has varied over time in Japan through
a marginal likelihood estimation which compares a constant coefficient VAR with our
TVP-VAR. Our research confirms that the TVP-VAR is indeed a better fit for Japan and
that a QE shock estimated for the Japanese economy does in fact have changing effects
over time. In particular it seems that the effects on both real GDP and core CPI have
become stronger and longer lasting over time. More specifically, the response for prices in
2013, a period probably highly influenced by the ‘Abenomics’ program, stays permanently
significant. This is in contrast to the responses under the ZIRP and the first QE program.
During these periods only an initial significant effect is observed. Regarding GDP, we
estimate again a significant impact during the time of the ‘Abenomics’ strategy, whereas
during the ZIRP and the first QE program no significant impact is reported. Generally,
these findings are also supported by our variance decomposition analysis. Especially since
2013, the relative importance of QE shocks has increased. These effects are likely to be
driven by some extent by the current ‘Abenomics’ program.
Our results are interesting not only for Japan, but also for other advanced economies with
nominal interest rates close to zero or at the ZLB. The recent financial crisis has by now
been going on for five years, by some already labeled as ‘Great Recession’. It started with
housing market bubbles bursting in the US, UK, and some Euro Area countries. Problems
in highly leveraged banking sectors followed, and policy interest rates were subsequently
lowered to historically low levels of virtually zero. A severe deleveraging of the private
sector is currently hitting the real economy of most advanced countries. Inflationary
pressure has generally been subdued. Hence, the current experiences of most advanced
economies pretty closely mirror the Japanese experience. It is against this background
that our study on the effectiveness of the QE policy in Japan sheds light on the potential
effects of recently implemented QE policies in the US, the UK, and possibly the Euro
Area.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1.2 gives an overview of
related literature on Japan, Section 1.3 quickly summarises the Japanese monetary policy
developments, Section 1.4 describes the setup of our empirical model, Section 1.5 briefly
summarises the marginal likelihood results and Section 1.6 discusses our results. It is
divided into the four following subsections. Subsection one presents our results on a
QE shock. Subsection two briefly reports the effect of other business cycle disturbances.
Subsection three outlines results on a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) and
subsection four links our results to the underlying theoretical framework of Eggertsson
(2011). Section 1.7 discusses our robustness checks and section 1.8 finally concludes.
1.2 Survey of Related Literature for Japan
Vector autoregression models (VAR) are a widely used tool for analysing the monetary
policy transmission, also for Japan. These include for example Miyao (2002), who intro-
duces the benchmark VAR model for estimating the impact of monetary policy during
1975 to 1998. Since it is likely that the transmission mechanism varies over time, more
flexible models, accounting for time variation, are becoming increasingly a focus of re-
search. For example, Kimura et al. (2003) estimate a VAR with time-varying coefficients
for the period between 1971 and 2002. Still, their approach relies on a constant variance.
In contrast, Nakajima (2011) employs a time-varying VAR (TVP-VAR) and allows for
stochastic volatility in the variance covariance matrix.1
An important issue which is increasingly being discussed in the literature, is the monetary
policy transmission when nominal interest rates are close to zero or even at ZLB. In
these situations, central banks have only very little room for decreasing their short-term
policy rates. Therefore, the impact of monetary policy is unlikely to operate through the
conventional interest rate channel. Instead central banks then typically operate through
what is now called ‘forward guidance’ or increases in the monetary base through some form
of ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE). Within the VAR framework, several papers deal explicitly
with the ZLB for Japan and investigate the monetary policy transmission during these
periods. Fujiwara (2006) uses a Markov switching VAR model for the period of 1985
1His sample is based on data ranging from 1977Q1 until 2007Q4. Following an increase in the call
rate, he reports a fall in prices until the mid 90s and thereafter a small price puzzle. Further, he finds a
visible effect on output.
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to 2004 to investigate whether there are structural breaks in the impact of monetary
policy due to the introduction of the zero nominal interest rate. Kamada and Sugo
(2006) estimate a monetary policy proxy which can take on negative values to account
for a whole range of different policy measures. Iwata and Wu (2006) model the nominal
interest rate as a censored variable in a VAR model with constant coefficients. Nakajima
et al. (2011) employ a TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility and in addition consider the
nominal interest rate to be a censored variable.
It should be noted that since the beginning of 2001, the BoJ does not use the call rate as
their operating target but the outstanding current account balances held by banks at the
BoJ. Since this measure is the key monetary instrument in Japan, it is of importance to
learn about its effectiveness. For example, Kimura et al. (2003), Kimura and Nakajima
(2013) and Hayashi and Koeda (2014) trace the effect of such a QE shock. Hayashi
and Koeda (2014) employ a regime switching SVAR for the period from 1988 until 2012
and find a visible effect on output and inflation following a QE shock. In contrast are
the findings by Kimura et al. (2003) and Kimura and Nakajima (2013). Kimura et al.
(2003) use a TVP-VAR with a constant variance from 1985Q2 until 2002Q1. For the
ZLB periods they do not estimate a significant effect on output and prices. Kimura
and Nakajima (2013) employ a TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility and combine it with
a latent threshold model from 1981Q2 until 2012Q3. Following a QE shock, they also
report a non-visible effect on both output and inflation. However, these studies use a
recursive identification scheme for identifying a QE shock. As it is generally argued,
this can be rather restrictive especially in a model with quarterly data. By referring to
sign restrictions, usually less restrictions need to be imposed. For example, Kamada and
Sugo (2006) and Franta (2011) incorporate sign restrictions to identify an unconventional
monetary policy shock at the ZLB for Japan. Kamada and Sugo (2006) use Uhlig (2005)’s
sign restricted VAR together with a special ‘intermediate’ monetary policy variable which
is not a proper monetary policy instrument like the call rate or base money, but still
closely related to the monetary policy instrument. Their sample spans from 1978 to April
2005. Franta (2011) uses the TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility but with altering sign
restrictions to account for differences in the conduct of monetary policy in Japan between
1981 and 2010. He finds differences in the monetary policy transmission between the
QE policy period and ‘normal’ times. However, he does not report visible differences to
a QE shock during the ZLB periods. Note that he only identifies the monetary policy
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shock. This may not be sufficient since it does not ensure that other disturbances, such as
e.g. business cycle fluctuations (demand or supply shocks), enter the identified monetary
policy shock. Moreover, he does not capture the recent influence of the ‘Abenomics’
strategy. Against the background of still rather scarce empirical evidence on the recent
period in Japan, it is crucial to provide more details on the monetary policy transmission.2
We hope to fill these gaps. More specifically, we use a relatively agnostic framework for
analysing QE shocks when interest rates are close to zero. We employ a novel identification
scheme based on sign restrictions to incorporate the ZLB of short-term nominal interest
rates. These sign restrictions were introduced by Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) in a
BVAR to identify a QE shock when the economy is stuck at the ZLB.3 Next to the QE
shock, two business cycle disturbances, a demand and a supply shock, are identified for two
reasons: (1) for avoiding that business cycle disturbances enter the identified QE shock
and (2) for evaluating the quantitative importance of the QE shock relative to the business
cycle shocks and how they have changed across time. Our estimation is based on the TVP-
VAR with stochastic volatility, introduced by Primiceri (2005). Among others, Nakajima
(2011) underlines the importance to allow for time variation. Also our analysis confirms
the importance of a time-varying approach by means of a marginal likelihood comparison.
Furthermore, as far as we are aware, this work is the first one to address the influence of
a QE shock on key macro economic variables during the ‘Abenomics’ period. based on
a VAR setting. Interestingly, the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies4 has
been extensively studied on financial market effects, but there exists only a small body
of empirical literature on real economic influences. It is against these backgrounds that
our paper provides new interesting insights, not only for Japan, on the macro economic
effects of QE shocks and whether they vary over time.
2See Hausman and Wieland (2014) for an exception
3This identification scheme is based on the New Keynesian model of Eggertsson (2011). See Appendix
section D for a summary on the most important aspects of the Eggertsson model.
4Note, our focus is on the influence of QE as to other non-standard measures of unconventional
monetary policy tools. The literature (see e.g. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) and Bernanke et al.
(2004) among others) generally divides unconventional monetary policy tools into three categories: (1)
commitment to future policy stances, (2) QE, and (3) credit easing. A combination of these tools defines
the term unconventional monetary policy.
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1.3 Overview of Japanese Monetary Policy develop-
ments
This section briefly reviews the key developments of Japanese monetary policy over the
last two decades. For a thorough discussion please refer to Mikitani and Posen (2000),
Ugai (2007) and Ueda (2012). The bursting of the Japanese stock market bubble and the
accompanying period of economic distress can be seen in Figure 1.1. The stock market
was rising dramatically until around 1990. This went together with a rapid increase in
industrial production under fairly low and constant rates of inflation. Realising that the
elevated stock and land prices seemed out of touch with fundamentals the BoJ did in fact
continuously increase the call rate.
Optimism turned into pessimism around 1990/1991 with both stock and land prices start-
ing to fall rapidly. The Japanese economy was finally falling into deep recession. Japan
had entered what is by now labeled ‘Japan’s lost decade’. Whilst Japanese GDP grew by
an average rate of 3.9% per year in the pre-1991 period, growth slowed down to only 0.8%
post-1991. Meanwhile the usually low Japanese unemployment rate more than doubled
while the core inflation rate steadily trended below zero since 2000.
Figure 1.1: Industrial Production, Consumer Price Index and NIKKEI Stock Index
Shaded areas: 1999-2000 ZIRP, 2001-2006 1st QE period, 2013-end ‘Abenomics’ period
The initial response of the BoJ to the bursting of the asset price bubbles and the recession
was rather slow and not very aggressive (Jinushi et al., 2000). In fact, Figure 1.2 shows
that the call rate was high until 1992/1993 and decreased only very gradually until it
reached 0.5% in the course of 1995.
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Figure 1.2: Bank of Japan Short- and Long-Term Interest Rates
Shaded areas: 1999-2000 ZIRP, 2001-2006 1st QE period, 2013-end ‘Abenomics’ period
From February 1999 to August 2000, the BoJ officially introduced its so-called ‘Zero
Interest Rate Policy’ (ZIRP) when it lowered the call rate to 0.03% (see Figure 1.2). It
also tried to steer market expectations by adding commitments to its policy statements
indicating that it would keep the call rate low for a longer time.
After a short-lived economic recovery and following the worldwide bursting of the IT-
stock market bubbles, the BoJ introduced a more aggressive policy program. From March
2001 until March 2006 it implemented the so-called ‘Quantitative Easing Policy’ (QEP)
which consisted of three main elements: (i) the operating target was changed from the
call rate to the outstanding current account balances held by banks at the BoJ,5 (ii) to
commit itself to continue providing ample liquidity to banks until inflation stabilised at
0% or a slight increase, and (iii) to increase the amount of outright purchases of long-term
Japanese government bonds.6 The monetary development and the effect of the BoJ’s QEP
measures can be seen in Figure 1.3. We plot that part of the monetary base that relates to
the current account holdings of banks at the BoJ. The figure shows the enormous increase
in those reserves during the QEP period and later again when the recent financial crisis
hit. At the same time the figure plots the evolution of the broader monetary aggregate
M2 which can be seen not to be reacting in any obvious manner to the increases in bank
reserves.
Most recently, the BoJ implemented its part of the so-called ‘Abenomics’ program. ‘Abe-
5Current account holdings is the technical label for Japanese bank reserves being held at the BoJ.
6See the thorough survey by Ugai (2007) for more details.
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Figure 1.3: Monetary Aggregates in Japan
Shaded areas: 1999-2000 ZIRP, 2001-2006 1st QE period, 2013-end ‘Abenomics’ period
nomics’ essentially stands for a broader package of three different policy measures (also
called the three arrows): monetary policy, fiscal policy and structural reforms of goods
and labor markets. Concerning the arrow of monetary policy, Shinzo Abe, after hav-
ing been elected prime minister in December 2012, appointed Haruhiko Kuroda as BoJ
Governor in March 2013.
The most important monetary policy decision was then to raise the BoJ’s inflation target
from 1 to 2%.7 The BoJ then basically committed itself to achieving this inflation target
as soon as possible and not later than within two years. This was officially phrased in
the BoJ’s ‘Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing’ policy statement which laid
out the details of how the new inflation target is going to be implemented. Essentially,
the BoJ will conduct money market operations so that the monetary base will increase
at an annual pace of about 60-70 trillion yen. Further specifics are a maturity extension
of the BoJ’s holdings of Japanese Government Bonds and its commitment to continue
expanding the monetary base until inflation stabilises at its 2% target. Although the
preliminary evaluation of this much more expansionary monetary policy stance is widely
regarded as supportive for the growth stimulus to the Japanese economy, it is unclear
how these measures will play out in the medium and longer run (see also Hausman and
Wieland (2014) for a preliminary evaluation of ‘Abenomics’).
Having these macroeconomic and monetary developments in mind we next present our
identification strategy based on the reasonable assumption that the BoJ since 1995 did
7The BoJ previously was given an inflation target of 1% in February 2012.
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not conduct its monetary policy through the call rate anymore - which was constrained
by the ZLB - but by changing the reserve holdings of banks at the BoJ.
1.4 Empirical Model
We use the TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility to trace the reaction of key eco-
nomic variables to QE shocks over time. Our empirical approach closely follows Primiceri
(2005) and Nakajima (2011).8 The advantage of this framework is its flexibility to deal
with the changing nature of the monetary transmission mechanism. This is particularly
important for a country like Japan where monetary policy underwent significant changes
in its stances.
The TVP-VAR model has both time-varying coefficient matrices as well as time-varying
covariance matrices. The varying coefficients account for possible nonlinearities or time-
variation in the lag structure of the model and the varying variance covariance matrices
capture possible heterosecedasticity of the shocks and nonlinearities in the simultaneous
relationships among the variables.
We estimate the following VAR model:
yt = ct +B1,tyt−1 + . . .+Bl,tyt−l + ut, t = 1, . . . , T (1.1)
where yt is a n x 1 vector of endogenous variables; ct, is a n x 1 vector of time-varying
intercepts; Bi,t, is a n x n matrix of time-varying coefficients with lag length i = 1, . . . , l;
and ut, is a n x 1 vector of residuals. Ωt describes the time-varying covariance matrix of
ut, which can be decomposed into:
V AR(ut) ≡ Ωt = A−1t ΣtΣ′t(A−1t )′. (1.2)
Where At is a time-varying lower triangular matrix and Σt is a diagonal time-varying
8Further related studies are Franta (2011) and Canova and Ciccarelli (2009).
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The time-varying VAR can then be rewritten as:
yt = X ′tB˜t + A−1t Σtεt, (1.4)
X ′t = I
⊗
[1, y′t−1, . . . , y′t−l],
where B˜t is a stacked vector containing all coefficients of the right hand side of equation
1.1. V AR(εt) = In and the operator
⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
The dynamics of the time-varying parameters (Bt and At) are following a driftless random
walk, whereas the covariance matrix (Σt) evolves as a geometric driftless random walk:
Bt = Bt−1 + νt, (1.5)
αt = αt−1 + ξt, (1.6)
logσt = logσt−1 + ηt, (1.7)
where αt is a stacked vector of the lower triangular coefficients of the matrix At and the
standard deviation σt is the vector of the diagonal elements of the matrix Σt. The vector
of innovations [ε′t, ν ′t, ξ′t, η′t] is assumed to be jointly normally distributed with variance-
covariance matrix:
V AR(εt, νt, ξt, ηt) =

In 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 W
 , (1.8)
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where In is an n dimensional identity matrix andQ,S andW are positive definite matrices.
S is assumed to be block diagonal and in order to reduce the dimensionality of the
estimation, we restrict W to be a diagonal matrix.
1.4.1 Priors
For evaluating posteriors, prior distributions need to be specified. For the calibration of
these priors, we use a training sample based on the period from 1980Q1 to 1995Q4 (see
Appendix A) and run an OLS estimation on a fixed-coefficient VAR model.
The OLS point estimates (BˆOLS) and four times their variance specify the mean and the
variance of B0. We assume the same specification for the prior distribution of the simul-
taneous relation matrix A0. The prior mean for the log standard errors is the log of the
OLS point estimates (σˆOLS), and the prior covariance matrix is specified to be 4 · In. The
priors for the initial states of the time-varying VAR-parameters B0, A0 and logσ0 follow
a normal distribution. The hyperparameters Q, S and W are the covariance matrices
of the innovations (see equations 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7). Matrices Q and S are distributed
as an independent inverse-Wishart and W is assumed to follow an inverse-Gamma prior
distribution. In summary:
B0 ∼ N(BˆOLS, 4 · V (BˆOLS)),
A0 ∼ N(AˆOLS, 4 · V (AˆOLS)),
logσ0 ∼ N(σˆOLS, 4 · In),
Q ∼ IW (k2Q · τ · V (BˆOLS), τ),
W ∼ IG(k2W · (1 + dim(W )) · In, (1 + dim(W ))),
Sb ∼ IW (k2S · (1 + dim(Sb)) · V (Aˆb,OLS), (1 + dim(Sb))),
where τ has the size of the training sample, Sb with the index b refers to the correspond-
ing blocks of a particular equation and Aˆb,OLS denotes the respective blocks of AˆOLS.9
The degrees of freedom for W and Sb are specified as one plus its respective matrix di-
mension. The size of the training sample defines the degrees of freedom for Q. Finally,
the parameters kQ = 0.01, kW = 0.1 and kS = 0.01 define prior beliefs about the de-
gree of time variation in the parameters, covariances and volatilities. For example, for
9The system consists of three blocks with the respective size: 2, 3 and 4.
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the OLS estimation of the covariance matrix of the VAR coefficients, we allow for 1%
(kQ = 0.01) of uncertainty surrounding the V (BˆOLS) estimates to time variation (Kirch-
ner et al. (2010)).10
We conduct a formal model selection since there are no economic reasons for choosing one
(kQ, kW , kS) combination over another. Posterior probabilities for a set of 18 models are
estimated based on the reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo (RJMCMC) method
(see Primiceri (2005)).11 The selection of kQ, kW and kS delivers a posterior probability for
one combination which is almost one. Table 1.9 in the Appendix C reports the posterior
probability estimates for the set of 18 models.
1.4.2 Identification and Estimation
So far, we have outlined the estimation strategy for a reduced form VAR which is esti-
mated using Bayesian methods for the sample from 1996:Q1 to 2013:Q4. For maintaining
the degrees of freedom, two lags are used. For approximating the posterior distribution,
40, 000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler are used and we drop the first 20, 000 iterations
for convergence. For breaking the autocorrelation of the draws, only every 10th iteration
is kept. Our final estimates are therefore based on 2, 000 iterations. The sample auto-
correlation functions of the draws die out rather quickly. Furthermore, the convergence
diagnostics reveal satisfactory results (a detailed overview is given in Appendix J).
To identify a QE shock, we follow Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) and use their sign
restriction approach when the economy is stuck at the ZLB. Essentially the idea is to let
the variables of interest, in particular real GDP, unrestricted, whilst imposing relatively
mild sign restrictions on the remaining variables. In addition to real GDP, the real
effective exchange rate is left unrestricted as it might give us some indication of whether
QE works through depreciation and the stimulating effects on exports. The sign restriction
to identify the QE shock is imposed on bank reserves held at the BoJ, which have been
the key monetary operating instrument of the central bank since 2001. More specifically,
a QE shock is defined as a 1% increase in bank reserves. We restrict the price level to
respond non-negatively to a positive QE shock. Since the price level is empirically known
10As a sensitivity check, we also experimented with other value combinations of these coefficients. The
responses obtained are robust to those presented.
11The set of 18 models are constructed from all possible combinations of kQ = {0.01; 0.05; 0.1}, kW =
{0.001; 0.01} and kS = {0.01; 0.025; 0.1}.
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to move sluggishly, we also allow for a zero impact effect.12
In addition to the QE shock, we identify two business cycle disturbances: a positive
demand and a positive supply shock. These are identified for two reasons: (1) to avoid
that disturbances in business cycle fluctuations enter the identified QE shock and (2)
to evaluate the explanatory power of the QE shock relative to the demand and supply
shocks. The aggregate demand and supply shocks are identified according to the New
Keynesian predictions of an economy at the ZLB (see Appendix D for a short overview of
the Eggertsson (2011) model).13 All sign restrictions are binding for three quarters after
the shock. Table 1.1 summarises the restrictions.
Table 1.1: Sign Restrictions
QE Shock DE Shock SP Shock
Impact 0
Prices K = 3 ≥ > ≤
GDP K = 3 ? ≥ <
Reserves K = 3 > ? ?
Exchange Rate K = 3 ? ? ?
Further restriction K = 3
∣∣∣GDPCPI ∣∣∣ > 1 ∣∣∣GDPCPI ∣∣∣ < 1
Note: ? denotes no restriction, > defines a positive effect of the respective shock on the variable,
vice versa for <. K = 3 indicates that the restriction horizon is three quarters. |GDP/CPI| denotes
the absolute value of the ratio between the GDP response and the CPI response.
For implementing the sign restrictions, we slightly modify the model specified in equations
1.4-1.7. So far, it is based on the recursive identification. We additionally specify an
orthonormal rotation matrix Gt, i.e., G′tGt = In. The model in equation 1.4 can then be
rewritten as
yt = X ′tB˜t + A−1t ΣtG′tGtεt = X ′tB˜t + A−1t ΣtG′tε˜t. (1.9)
ε˜t = G′tεt denotes the new shocks and the respective variance is V ar(ε˜t) = GtInG′t. We
use the QR decomposition for finding Gt. Since we have a four variable VAR, Gt is a 4 x
12Ideally, we would include more variables to shed more light on the transmission mechanism, but are
limited here by degrees of freedom problems from our estimation method.
13Because the main focus in this study is on the effects of QE on the macro economy, we will not
go into a detailed discussion of any of the other shocks here. For a thorough overview of the demand
and supply shocks, please refer to Eggertsson (2011) and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). For a brief
summary on the identification strategy of the demand and supply shocks, refer to Appendix D.1.
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QR (θ [1, 1])
...
. . . QR (θ [1, 4])
. . . ...
QR (θ [4, 1]) . . . QR (θ [4, 4])
 . (1.10)
In a first step we draw a 4 x 4 matrix, θ, from the N (0, 1) distribution. Step two: we
take the QR decomposition of θ and construct the Gt matrix. This algorithm calculates
a candidate structural impact matrix. Step three: it is checked whether this matrix is
in line with the sign restrictions. Step four: if it satisfies the restrictions it is stored.
Otherwise another θ is drawn from the standard normal distribution and we repeat the
procedure from step two.
1.5 Empirical Evidence of Time Variation in Japan:
is there any?
As a first step, we search for formal econometric evidence on whether the impact of
a QE shock in Japan has changed across time. In particular, we calculate marginal
likelihood estimates for a traditional constant-coefficient VAR model and our time-varying
parameter (TVP-VAR) model with stochastic volatility.14 The model that yields the
largest marginal likelihood fits the given data best. We follow Nakajima et al. (2011)
and use the modified harmonic mean estimator of the marginal likelihood due to Geweke
(1999).15 The log marginal likelihood value for the TVP-VAR, -557.5, is higher than the
marginal likelihood estimate for the constant VAR, -700.062, suggesting that the TVP-
VAR model with stochastic volatility is indeed a better model for Japan than the constant
VAR.
14Prior for the constant parameter VAR: B ∼ N(0, 4× I), α ∼ N(0, 4× I), σ−1 ∼ Gamma(2, 0.02)
15For a detailed description of the harmonic mean estimator, please refer to Nakajima et al. (2011). The
marginal likelihood calculation is based on the priors and number of lags as specified above. Additionally,
we have to specify the parameter τ . We follow Nakajima et al. (2011) and set τ = 0.99.
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1.6 Results of the TVP-VAR
In what follows, section 1.6.1 presents the estimated median impulse responses of the QE
shock (see also Appendix E). A key focus is on the different effects following the same QE
shock over the different monetary policy stances of the BoJ during the entire ZLB period.
It also includes an analysis on the posterior probability for the difference in the impulse
responses. Section 1.6.2 shortly summarises the key findings of the demand and supply
shocks. For evaluating the quantitative importance of the QE shock relative to the two
business cycle disturbances, we present a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)
in section 1.6.3. Section 1.6.4 briefly links our results to the theoretical framework of
Eggertsson (2011). The time-varying posterior estimates of the covariance matrix are
presented in Appendix G and Appendix J summarises the estimation on convergence
diagnostics.
1.6.1 Impulse Responses to Quantitative Easing Shocks
Figure 1.4 presents the median impulse responses (over 17 quarters and the time period:
1996:1-2013:4) to a 1% increase in reserves in the given period across the sample.16
We clearly see that a QE shock has time-varying effects. Regarding the effect of a QE
shock on prices, they exhibit time variation across our sample. The response of prices has
been restricted to increase for three quarters following the QE shock, so the immediate
rise is by construction (Figure 1.4a). The positive impact seems to be significant after four
quarters and for eight quarters from 2006 onwards (Figures E.5a and E.5b in Appendix
E plot the evolution of the responses at the 4th and 8th quarter with percentiles).17 The
long run impact on prices appears to change across our sample. More specifically, during
the ZIRP from 1999 to 2000, the cumulative effect on prices seems to be close to 0.05%
after three years. Since 2000, the long run impact seems to strongly decrease in size. Note
that in August 2000 the ZIRP ended. From 2002 onwards, the long run impact appears to
increase again. This effect may mirror the introduction of the first QE program in 2001.
In 2003Q3 the effect on prices stand at about 0.15% after three years. Overall, our results
16The impulse responses are conditional on the current parameters from the relevant quarter. In the
case where t+ Thor > T the parameters from the last quarter are used for convenience.
17These figures give the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution of the impulse responses
as these confidence bands are standard in the literature. Based on the normality assumption, these
percentiles refer to one-standard error bands (see also Uhlig (2005)).
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suggest that the changes in the transmission mechanism of a QE shock may capture the
end of the ZIRP and the beginning of the first QE program respectively. It is very likely
that these monetary policy decisions influenced the economy.18
Figure 1.4: Time-Varying Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
(a) Prices (b) GDP
(c) Reserves (d) Exchange Rate
Median impulse responses to a 1% reserve shock.
Following a QE shock, real GDP initially increases for most of the periods and after
1999 the cumulative effect on output seems to be positive. More specifically, during the
ZIRP from 1999 to 2000 the initial response of GDP seems to become stronger. With
18The BoJ implemented its ZIRP from February 1999 to August 2000 and the first QE program
between March 2001 and March 2006. Note that we cannot explicitly control for the monetary policy
stances in our estimation method. However, it is very likely that these episodes considerably influenced
the transmission mechanism of QE shocks. The estimated changes in our impulse responses seem to
occur exactly during these periods.
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the end of the ZIRP, in the end of 2000, the initial response of GDP appears to weaken
substantially. Since 2002, we see a reversal of this trend: output seems to become initially
more responsive from about −0.2% in 2002 to 0.2% in 2003. Between 2004 and 2006, the
initial impact of the QE shock has a positive effect on output of about 0.3% after four
quarters. Especially the medium term and long run impact of the QE shock seems to be
stronger from 2004 onwards (Figure 1.4b). The significance of this increase is also reported
in Figures E.5a and E.5b (Appendix E). This positive significant impact on output also
seems to hold for the year 2013. Interestingly, we can conclude that QE shocks appear
to become visibly more effective as an output stimuli from 2006 onwards (Figures E.5a
and E.5b). This is in contrast to the findings of Kimura et al. (2003) and Kimura and
Nakajima (2013). However, also Franta (2011) finds an initial positive and significant
impact on output. In line with our results, also Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) estimate
a significant impact on output after about two years.
Note that from about 2008 to 2011, the CPI and GDP responses seem to be larger
compared to the other periods. A possible explanation might be that the global financial
crisis in 2007/2008 led to a world-wide recession. This recession was to a large extend
driven by a decline in aggregate demand. Under such conditions of insufficient aggregate
demand - as opposed to structural problems of the economy - monetary policy tends to
have a large effect. Our results possibly reflect this situation.
Finally, following a QE shock, the real effective exchange rate seems to initially depreciate
(Figure 1.4d).19 While the response of the exchange rate to a QE shock is insignificant
thereafter, it is only since recently that the depreciation stays significant until about one
year following the shock (Figures E.5a and E.5b). This finding suggests that a QE shock
during the ‘Abenomics’ strategy leads to a somewhat longer depreciation of the Yen. The
depreciation may in turn stimulate economic activity at the ZLB.
Comparison of impulse responses at different points in time
For a better illustration of the difference in the impulse responses to a QE shock across
time, we also present Figures 1.5a and 1.5b. These allow for a comparison of impulse
responses at specific points in time. Figure 1.5a plots the median impulse responses at
1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3. The period around 1999Q4 reflects the environment under
19A negative value of the real effective exchange rate response reflects a depreciation of the Yen.
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the ZIRP period, 2003Q3 under the influence of the first QE program and 2013Q3 under
the influence of the current economic policies advocated by Shinzo Abe. The three differ-
ent time periods for the comparison are chosen arbitrarily within each monetary policy
stance. Figure 1.5b plots the impulse responses at 2003Q3 and 2013Q3 with percentiles.20
In terms of prices, as we described above, the positive and significant effect at the long
run is visible in Figure 1.5b below. In contrast, the estimated impact of a monetary
base shock in Kimura et al. (2003), Nakajima et al. (2011) and Kimura and Nakajima
(2013) does not reveal a strong effect on prices. However, their results could be biased.
Kimura et al. (2003) use a time-varying coefficient VAR but with a constant variance
covariance matrix. Since the simultaneous relation matrix is time invariant in this case, it
could lead to an underestimation of the shocks (see Primiceri (2005) for further details).
In contrast, Nakajima et al. (2011) and Kimura and Nakajima (2013) use a fully time-
varying VAR which allows for stochastic volatility. However, their results could be driven
by the recursive identification system. In accordance with our findings are the results
by Franta (2011) and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). Both approaches apply sign
restrictions and estimate an initial positive and significant impact on prices. Contrary to
Franta (2011), our results and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) also confirm a permanent
significant increase in prices.21
Especially for the medium term and long run responses on both prices and GDP, there
seems to be a significant difference between 2003Q3 and 2013Q3 (Figure 1.5a). The
confidence bands in Figure 1.5b reveal a stronger significant impact of a QE shock in
2013Q3 compared to 2003Q3 and 1999Q4. More specifically, the effect on prices seems
to be permanent in 2013Q3, whereas the impact in 2003Q3 becomes insignificant after
seven quarters. Following a QE shock on GDP in 2013Q3, we estimate a positive and
significant impact after seven quarters. Compared to 2013Q3, the effect on GDP in
2003Q3 is completely insignificant. Regarding the exchange rate, a QE shock leads to a
somewhat longer depreciation in 2013Q3 than for example during earlier periods. This
finding suggests that, in contrast to earlier policy programs by the BoJ, the ‘Abenomics’
strategy seems to have an impact on the exchange rate. These results are also supported
20Figure F.6 in Appendix F presents the average impulse response functions during the three respective
monetary policy stances (ZIRP, first QE program, ‘Abenomics’). They show that the arbitrarily taken
periods (1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3) reveal the same findings as the average response during the three
monetary policy stances.
21See Table 1.6 to 1.8 in Appendix B for a more detailed overview of the results obtained in other
studies focusing on the monetary policy transmission in Japan.
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Table 1.2: Posterior probability for the difference in the impulse responses to a QE
shock at different time periods
Horizon 1 Q (%) 4 Q (%) 8 Q (%) 12 Q (%) 16 Q (%)
HICP
1999/2003 9.5 44.6 43.7 46.7 48.6
1999/2013 9.2 52.5 53.7 61.0 64.5
2003/2013 9.2 52.5 53.7 61.0 64.5
GDP
1999/2003 36.8 40.6 46.4 49.4 50.5
1999/2013 9.4 41.7 66.1 67.4 66.6
2003/2013 9.4 41.7 66.1 67.4 66.6
Res
1999/2003 46.0 47.1 46.4 47.6 48.0
1999/2013 67.2 70.1 60.5 51.4 47.6
2003/2013 67.2 70.1 60.5 51.4 47.6
ExR
1999/2003 34.5 37.5 39.8 40.3 40.6
1999/2013 31.2 26.1 22.0 20.0 25.9
2003/2013 31.2 26.1 22.0 20.0 25.9
Note: Difference in impulse responses at the time periods 1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3 for one,
four, eight, 12 and 16 quarters ahead.
by our analysis on the posterior probability for the difference in the impulse responses.
We consider the statistical difference in the impulse responses between different time
periods by calculating the ratio of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo draws (MCMC) of
the responses between two time periods. More specifically, we estimate the posterior
probability that the response at one given time period (first considered response) is smaller
than at another given time period (second considered response). We consider again the
three time periods referred to above and present the posterior differences in the impulse
responses to the QE shock in Table 1.2. Posterior probability values close to 50% indicate
a weak difference between the two periods. Values above (below) 50% imply that the first
response is smaller (bigger) than the second response. Regarding prices, we estimate a
strong difference in the initial responses of the three considered time periods as well as in
the long run responses in 1999/2013 and 2003/2013, whereas the responses in 1999/2003
are quite similar in the long run. More specifically, values above 60% for 12 and 16 quarters
ahead in 1999/2013 and 2003/2013 indicate a strong difference in the impulse responses.
The estimated response in 2013Q3 is larger than in 2003Q3 or 1999Q4. Following a QE
shock on GDP, a strong posterior difference is reported for all initial responses of the
Are there Differences in the Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing at the
Zero-Lower-Bound in Japan over Time? 30
three considered time periods as well as for the time periods 1999/2013 and 2003/2013
from eight quarters ahead. The difference between 1999 and 2003 seems to be again very
small in the long run. The evidence for time variation of the exchange rate responses is
rather strong between all compared time periods. The responses in 2013 confirm a larger
depreciation of the exchange rate than in 2003 and 1999.
Generally, our results suggest that a QE shock during the recent ‘Abenomics’ period seems
to lead to a larger impact on output, prices and the exchange rate than during the ZIRP
or the first QE program. A theoretical discussion of our results, based on the Eggertsson
(2011) model, follows in section 1.6.4 below.
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Figure 1.5: Responses at Different Time Periods to a QE Shock
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Median impulse responses to a 1% QE shock at 1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Median impulse responses (solid line) to a 1% QE shock with 16-th and 84-th percentiles (dashed line)
of the posterior distribution at 2003Q3 (blue) and 2013Q3 (green).
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1.6.2 Impulse Responses to Demand and Supply Shocks
The impulse response functions for the demand and supply shocks are given in the Ap-
pendix H, Figures H.10 and H.11. Primarily, we identify these two shocks for (1) evaluat-
ing the explanatory power of the QE shock compared to the demand and supply shocks
(see section 1.6.3 for details on the variance decomposition analysis) as well as (2) for
ensuring that these business cycle fluctuations do not enter the identified QE shock. In
the following, a brief overview of the main effects of the demand and supply shocks is
given.
The responses of CPI and GDP is initially restricted to be positive following a demand
shock, thus the immediate increase is by construction. More specifically, CPI rises by up
to 2% in 1999Q4 and 2003Q3 and stays significantly above zero for a much longer period
than restricted. Generally, this effect also holds for 2013Q3 except that it converges a bit
faster back to the zero line. Turning to GDP, it becomes insignificant after the restriction
horizon. Reserves and the exchange rate seem to respond insignificantly to a demand
shock.
Figure H.11 plots the impulse response functions following a supply shock. By comparing
the absolute size of the initial CPI and GDP responses to the demand and supply shocks in
Figures H.10 and H.11, the determining sign restrictions can be seen. Following a demand
shock, CPI is restricted to respond less strong than GDP and vice versa following a supply
shock. The responses of CPI and GDP are as expected significantly negative. The impulse
responses remain significant after the restriction horizon. Following a supply shock, we
report a non visible effect on reserves and the exchange rate.
Overall, the transmission mechanism of the demand and supply shocks is similar to the
findings of Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013).
1.6.3 Results on the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) allows us to analyse the explanatory
power of the QE shock relative to the other structural shocks. We use the close-to-median
impulse responses in this section for assessing the relative quantitative importance of our
three structural shocks. This procedure generates the impulse responses which are closest
to the median impulse response functions. By using the close-to-median impulses, we
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ensure that the variance shares add up to one as well as the orthogonality of the identified
shocks. Table 1.3 summarises the estimated forecast error variance shares of all variables
for each of the three identified shocks, for the horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16 quarters as
well as for the time periods 1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3. The last column of each time
period gives the sum of the variance shares of every endogenous variable over all identified
shocks.
To give an example, overall, our three shocks account for up to 98% of the GDP variability
in 1999Q4.22 More specifically, the QE shock explains up to 36% of the GDP variability
in 1999Q4 and decreases substantially for 2003Q3. But the explanatory power on GDP
in 2013Q3 is considerably larger than during the first QE program in 2003. Also 2013Q3
seems to have an overall larger explanatory power than during the ZIRP in 1999Q4.
Regarding the quantitative importance of the QE shock on prices in 2003Q3, it does not
appear to play a major role, explaining only 3% to 7%.23 However, especially at longer
horizons it seems that the variance shares for prices are higher in 2013Q3 and 1999Q4
compared to 2003Q3, accounting for up to 22% of the variability in 2013Q3.
The demand shock accounts for a non-negligible part of the variability in GDP with
variance shares of up to 47% in 2003Q3. Similarily for the variance shares of CPI to a
supply shock, these range from 48% to 10% in 2003Q3. It seems that the explanatory
power of the demand shock on CPI and GDP decreases from 2003Q3 to 2013Q3 vice versa
for the supply shock. As expected, the QE shock confirms the relatively important role on
the variability of reserves; variance shares range from 49% to 47% in 2013Q3. In contrast,
the other two identified shocks are of minor importance for the reserve variability. These
findings are also in line with Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013).
Summing up, in 2013Q3, a QE shock seems to explain a larger variance share of both
CPI and GDP. The relative importance of the QE shock in 2013Q3 on prices increases
at longer horizons compared to 2003Q3. Also for GDP, the explanatory power of the QE
shock is substantially higher in 2013Q3 than in 2003Q3. These measures possibly mirror
the effects of the current ‘Abenomics’ program and support our previous findings.
22The sum would equal one when next to the three identified shocks also the unidentified disturbance,
the exchange rate shock, is added.
23Generally, relatively low numbers where also estimated by Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). How-
ever, as Peersman and Straub (2006) illustrate, sign restriction approaches often lead to rather small
variance shares for some variables.
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Table 1.3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
1999Q4 2003Q3 2013Q3
Variable Horizon QE DE SU Sum QE DE SU Sum QE DE SU Sum
CPI 4 quarters 8 28 49 85 3 34 48 86 16 16 48 81
8 quarters 17 51 25 93 6 45 22 74 16 36 35 86
12 quarters 22 58 15 95 7 48 14 69 18 42 29 89
16 quarters 25 59 12 96 7 51 10 69 22 41 26 89
GDP 4 quarters 36 46 16 98 2 42 11 55 44 29 12 85
8 quarters 34 46 16 96 3 44 10 57 45 22 13 81
12 quarters 35 46 15 96 3 46 10 59 47 17 16 79
16 quarters 36 45 15 96 5 47 10 61 46 16 17 79
Res 4 quarters 90 9 1 100 1 0 1 2 49 15 10 74
8 quarters 89 8 2 99 2 1 2 5 47 17 11 76
12 quarters 88 7 3 99 5 1 2 8 47 17 12 76
16 quarters 87 7 4 98 8 2 2 12 47 17 12 76
ExR 4 quarters 7 14 28 49 71 4 20 95 48 12 17 77
8 quarters 11 14 35 59 54 3 26 83 47 12 18 78
12 quarters 12 13 36 61 52 3 27 82 47 13 18 77
16 quarters 12 13 36 62 50 4 26 80 46 14 18 78
Note: Variance shares of the QE shock, the demand and the supply shock. Entries are in percent.
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1.6.4 Theoretical Discussion of our Results
Based on Eggertsson’s (2011) model, we briefly discuss potential reasons why the observed
effect of a QE shock in 2013 seems to have a significantly stronger impact on prices and
GDP than in 2003 or 1999.
In the Eggertsson (2011) model, the economy at the ZLB has an upward sloping aggregate
demand curve in inflation. That is, higher inflation expectations increase output because,
for a given nominal interest rate, the real interest rate decreases due to a higher inflation
rate. This stimulates consumption and thus output (refer to Appendix D for a brief
summary of the Eggertsson (2011) model). As Krugman (2000) and Eggertsson (2011)
illustrate, for fighting the liquidity trap, monetary policy needs to raise expected inflation
through a credible commitment to expand the current and future money supply. This in
turn will increase the current price level and thus current output. For these real effects
to occur, two aspects have to hold: (1) the monetary expansion needs to be perceived
by the markets as sustainable and (2) the central bank will not revert to normal practice
of stabilising prices as soon as the recession is past. If the central bank cannot credibly
promise to be irresponsible, the monetary expansion will be ineffective for fighting the
liquidity trap (see subsection D.3 for the effect of a credible monetary policy expansion).
Figure 1.6 presents the development of Japanese inflation expectations. The development
of the expectation of a higher inflation rate within the next six months and for a rise
in inflation for one year forward suggest a respective increase during the three monetary
policy stances of the BoJ (Figure 1.6a). As Figure 1.6b shows, since 2013 expected
inflation increased substantially with a pronounced increase in expected inflation between
2 and 5% as well as more than 5%. This can also be confirmed by looking at the overall
development of the expected inflation one year forward (Figure 1.6b). Moreover, also the
medium and long run inflation expectations in Figure 1.6c reveal a considerable increase
since the beginning of the ‘Abenomics’ strategy. Therefore, inflation expectations appear
to be rising on the whole within the last year. Moreover, since the introduction of the
‘Abenomics’ strategy, also the overall index on consumer prices as well as the core price
index already experienced a substantial increase (see Figure 1.6c). For example, the
annual growth of CPI increased from −0.7% in April 2013 to 1.6% in December 2013.
Based on Eggertsson (2011) theory, one can argue that the current development in in-
flation expectations possibly mirrors that markets believe in a sustainable expansionary
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monetary policy under the ‘Abenomics’ program and thus to have considerable real ef-
fects.24 This is also in line with the findings of Hausman and Wieland (2014). More
specifically, they describe that, compared to the first QE program, the ‘Abenomics’ strat-
egy seems to be perceived as non-temporary since the broad money supply experienced a
remarkable growth since 2013 compared to the period under the first QE program. This
is precisely what one would expect from a more credible monetary policy change. A per-
ceived non-temporary QE program leads to expected lower future real interest rates since
expected inflation rises. This in turn increases credit demand and thus induces money
creation in the banking sector. Thus, the increase in the broad money supply (see Figure
1.7 for the differences in monetary base growth between the two programs). Therefore, a
credible commitment to future money expansion may successfully fight the liquidity trap
whereas temporary changes in the monetary base may fail to accomplish this.25
However, it should be stressed that it is still far too early to conclusively judge on the
effectiveness of ‘Abenomics’. Thus, our results should be seen as a tentative and prelim-
inary evaluation of the short-term effects of ‘Abenomics’, much in the line and spirit of
Hausman and Wieland (2014).
24Figure 1.6b also indicates a rise in consumers’ inflation expectations for the period between 2007 and
2009. Based on Eggertsson’s (2011) theory, this increase may reflect that markets believe in a credible
monetary policy expansion during this period as well leading to a rise in prices and output. Note that
following a QE shock, we estimate a significant impact on prices and GDP after two years since 2006
(compare Figure C.2b).
25As Hausman and Wieland (2014) outline, the first QE program was perceived as temporary. Al-
though the broad money aggregate M3 increased after the beginning of the first QE program, the increase
was rather small. As for example Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson (2011) (among others) argue, if QE
is perceived to have temporary effects, it will only have small or no influence on expected real interest
rates and the broad money supply.
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Figure 1.6: Japanese Inflation Expectations
(a) Expected Inflation within the next 6 months and 1 year forward
Medium term expectations of a higher inflation rate within the next 6 months (red dashed line), Source:
ZEW Financial Market Survey; Expectations for rise in inflation 1 year forward (blue solid line), (incl. 1
person HH.), consumer confidence, not sa, Source: Cabinet Office Japan; Shaded areas: 1999-2000 ZIRP,
2001-2006 1st QE period, 2013-end ‘Abenomics’ period
(b) Details on Expected Inflation 1 year forward
Expectations for rise in inflation 1 year forward, (incl. 1 person HH.), consumer confidence, not sa,
Source: Cabinet Office Japan; Shaded areas: 2001-2006 1st QE period, 2013-end ‘Abenomics’ period
(c) Medium and Long Run Inflation Expectations and Inflation Development
Medium (Consensus forecast) and long run (ESP forecast) inflation expectations (annual average, %
change). ESP forecast excludes the effects of the consumption tax hikes. Source: BoJ’s Monthly Report
of Recent Economic and Financial Developments, May 2014, BoJ. Percentage change from a year ago for
CPI and core CPI. Source: St. Louis Fed. Shaded areas: 2001-2006 1st QE period, 2013-end ‘Abenomics’
period
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Figure 1.7: Money Growth during the first QE- and ‘Abenomics’ program
(a) Narrow Money (M1) (b) Broad Money (M3)
Comparison of money growth (M1 and M3) between the first QE program and the ‘Abenomics’ period.
Month 0 denotes March 2001 for the beginning of the first QE program and December 2012 for the
‘Abenomics’ period. Source: BoJ
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1.7 Robustness Checks
The key focus of this paper is the investigation of the impact of a QE shock over time.
Therefore, we concentrate in the following primarily on the QE shock. For reasons of
clarity, we present the main figures of our robustness results in Appendix I. More detailed
robustness results can be obtained upon request.
1.7.1 Close-to-median model
The median of the posterior of impulse responses determined by sign restrictions combines
responses across different models. As a first robustness check, we investigate whether our
results are sensitive to the close-to-median presentation. This procedure gives the impulse
response that is the closest to the median impulse response. Figure I.12 in Appendix I.1
plots the median as well as the close-to-median impulse responses for the three time
periods 1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3 to a QE shock. It can be seen that the close-to-
median responses are very similar to those based on the median.26
1.7.2 Robustness Checks on Priors
Strictly speaking, one can argue that the ZIRP from 1999 to 2000 is not an official
QE policy. For a robustness check, we exclude this period from the estimation sample.
Hence, the training sample is extended and based on data from 1980Q1 until 2000Q4.
The results confirm those outlined in this paper. Since the TVP-prior could suffer from
over-parameterisation, we use as an additional robustness check a hierarchical prior for
B0. It joins the Minnesota prior with the TVP-prior. The Minnesota prior allows for a
shrinkage and thus reduces the risk of over-parameterisation. The results also support
the findings presented in this paper.27
26Results on the close-to-median impulse responses of the demand and supply shocks resemble the
findings based on the median responses as well. Results can be obtained upon request.
27The robustness results on the priors can be obtained upon request.
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1.7.3 Robustness Checks on Identification
We attach special importance to robustness checks on the alteration of the identification
of our structural shocks. In the following, we present three variations in the identification
scheme.
Table 1.4: Sign Restrictions - alternative identification I
QE Shock DE Shock SP Shock
Impact 0
Prices K = 3 ≥ > ≤
GDP K = 3 ? ≥ <
Reserves K = 3 > ≤ ?
Exchange Rate K = 3 ? ? ?
Further restriction K = 3
∣∣∣GDPCPI ∣∣∣ > 1 ∣∣∣GDPCPI ∣∣∣ < 1
Note: ? denotes no restriction, > defines a positive effect of the respective shock on the variable,
vice versa for <. K = 3 indicates that the restriction horizon is three quarters. |GDP/CPI| denotes
the absolute value of the ratio between the GDP response and the CPI response.
First, since we use a rather agnostic identification in our benchmark model, we check
whether our results to a QE shock are sensitive to an additional restriction on reserves
following a demand shock. We assume that reserves respond negatively (≤ 0) to a demand
shock for the first three quarters (Table 1.4). This additional restriction does not lead to
changes in the transmission mechanisms of the QE and supply shocks (compare Figure I.13
for the impact of the QE shock).28 Following a QE shock, prices increase significantly
in the long and short run in 2013 whereas the impact in 2003 stays significant only
until about two years after the shock. GDP starts to increase significantly after about
two years. In contrast, the GDP response in 2003 is insignificant. Also the impact of
the demand shock confirms our results presented, except for reserves. More specifically,
we observe an insignificant response of reserves in our benchmark specification, while,
the additionally imposed restriction in this identification scheme leads by definition to a
slight significant decrease in reserves following a demand shock. The effect on the other
endogenous variables is unaltered. In the light of this finding, we can assure to credibly
distinguish the QE shock from the demand shock in our benchmark model.29
28Results on the demand and supply shocks can be obtained upon request.
29With the additional restriction on reserves in this section, we specify a stronger assumption on the
differences between the transmission of the QE shock and the demand shock. This ensures to credibly
distinguish between the QE and the demand shock. As this sensitivity check leaves the estimated effect
on output, prices and the exchange rate compared to the benchmark model unchanged, it assures that
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Second, again starting from our benchmark model we now assume a zero restriction on
impact on GDP following the QE shock (see Table 1.5). Thus, CPI and GDP are both
restricted to have a lagged response to a QE shock. Figure I.14 in Appendix I.3 shows that
our results for the time periods 1999Q4 and 2003Q3 are basically insensitive to this change.
For 2013Q3 we observe a slightly more visible effect on CPI and GDP. The responses
seem to be stronger and longer lasting than under the benchmark identification scheme.
Using a zero restriction on impact seems natural. However, against the background of
quarterly data and the analysis of unconventional monetary policy shocks, imposing a
more conservative identification scheme with a zero restriction on GDP might be too
restrictive. Therefore, we recommend to stay agnostic on the initial impact on GDP
following a QE shock.
Table 1.5: Sign Restrictions - alternative identification II
QE Shock DE Shock SP Shock
Impact 0
Prices K = 3 ≥ > ≤
Impact 0
GDP K = 3 ? ≥ <
Reserves K = 3 > ? ?
Exchange Rate K = 3 ? ? ?
Further restriction K = 3
∣∣∣GDPCPI ∣∣∣ > 1 ∣∣∣GDPCPI ∣∣∣ < 1
Note: ? denotes no restriction, > defines a positive effect of the respective shock on the variable,
vice versa for <. K = 3 indicates that the restriction horizon is three quarters. |GDP/CPI| denotes
the absolute value of the ratio between the GDP response and the CPI response.
Third, we employ a more traditional identification scheme and use a recursive identi-
fication based on monthly data with six lags. The ordering of our variables follows:
yt = CPIt, Outputt, Rest, ExRt, where output refers to industrial production in the
monthly version. These restrictions are implied by more traditional VAR studies such
as Kimura et al. (2003) and Nakajima et al. (2011). Figure I.15 in Appendix I.4 sum-
marises the respective results. They basically confirm those presented in this paper. The
impact of the QE shock leads to a more pronounced increase in prices and output for
2013Q3 compared to the responses in 2003Q3 or 1999Q4. Note that the significance of
the price response vanishes for 2003Q3 and it remains only slightly significant between
about one until two years in 2013Q3. As before, the output response in 2003Q3 stays
we credibly distinguish the QE shock from the demand shock in our benchmark model.
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insignificant and we observe a significant response in 2013Q3 between one and three years
after the shock.
1.7.4 Robustness Checks on Data
Since many studies on the Japanese economy use output gap as an output measure, we
reestimate our analysis and substitute GDP with output gap.30 The results confirm those
presented above. However, we abstain from using it due to its forward looking nature
and the difficulty in general for estimating the Japanese output gap.31 Results can be
obtained upon request.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper uses a new kind of sign restriction in a TVP-VAR framework. It allows to
analyse the impact of QE shocks over time when the economy is close to or at the Zero
Lower Bound (ZLB). Our findings show that the reaction of macroeconomic variables in
Japan to a QE shock has, indeed, varied over time. Especially GDP and prices reveal
considerable time-varying effects across our sample from 1996 until 2013. Overall, our
results suggest that the impact on GDP and prices, following a QE shock (1% increase in
reserves), has become stronger and longer lasting over time.
More specifically, a comparison of the three considered time periods (1999Q4, 2003Q3 and
2013Q3)32 shows that GDP responds significantly in 2013Q3 to a QE shock whereas in
2003Q3 and 1999Q4 the response is insignificant. Turning to prices, we generally report
a visible response following a QE shock. Note that compared to 1999Q4 and 2003Q3, the
price response in 2013Q3 stays permanently significant.
Regarding the relative explanatory power of a QE shock, we observe that a QE shock
seems to explain a larger variance share of prices in 2013Q3 compared to 1999Q4 and
2003Q3. Also for GDP, the explanatory power of the QE shock is considerably higher in
2013Q3 than in 2003Q3. The generally more pronounced effects in 2013 possibly mirror
30Output gap of the total economy, seasonally adjusted, quarterly series, source: OECD.
31See Hausman and Wieland (2014) for a detailed discussion.
32The three time periods are chosen arbitrarily within each monetary policy stance of the BoJ. They
refer to the ZIRP, the first QE program and the ‘Abenomics’ strategy respectively.
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the influence of the current ‘Abenomics’ program. However, it should be noted that it
may still be too early to make a definite evaluation on the effectiveness of ‘Abenomics’.
Thus, our findings should be taken as a preliminary assessment on the short-term effects
of ‘Abenomics’.
We would like to stress the robustness checks conducted for testing the consistency of our
results. The use of the TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility is also supported by a marginal
likelihood estimation based on the modified harmonic mean estimator that compares the
TVP-VAR with a constant BVAR. Moreover, a sophisticated model selection algorithm
is used to ensure the correct specification of the prior beliefs about the amount of time
variation. Further, we implement several checks on the prior specifications, identifications
and data. Additionally, we reestimate the impulse response functions based on the close-
to-median responses. Our results presented in this paper seem to be largely insensitive to
these alterations.
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A Data sources
This paper uses quarterly data on Japan and covers a time horizon between 1980:1 and
2013:4. We estimate the model in detrended levels. Like Sims et al. (1990) state, this
accounts for possible discrepancy which may arise in case of incorrectly assumed coin-
tegration restrictions. Also, if there are unit roots in the data, it will not influence the
likelihood function, since nonstationarity is of no concern in a Bayesian framework (see
Sims and Uhlig (1991) for further discussions). In the following, the used time series are
described:
Gross domestic product (GDP): Log of real gross domestic product (2010=100),
seasonally adjusted, quarterly series. Source: Datastream.
Core Consumer prices (CPI): Log of core consumer price index, all items less food
(also less alcoholic beverages) and energy (2010 = 100), monthly index converted to a
quarterly series (averaging over three respective months), not seasonally adjusted. Source:
Datastream.
Reserves (Res): Log of monetary base (reserve requirement rate change unadj.), in hun-
dreds of millions Japanese Yen, average outstanding amounts, current prices, seasonally
adjusted. Monthly series converted to a quarterly series (averaging over three respective
months). Source: Bank of Japan.
Exchange rate (ExR): Log of Japanese Yen real effective exchange rate index
(2010=100), trade weighted exchange rate, CPI deflated, not seasonally adjusted.
Monthly index converted to a quarterly series (averaging over three respective months).
Source: Bank of Japan.
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Figure A.1: Quarterly Data, Japan
(a) GDP in levels (b) GDP, yearly growth rate
(c) Core CPI in levels (d) Core CPI, annual rate of change
(e) Res in levels (f) ExR in levels
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B Literature Overview of VAR-studies on Japan
Table 1.6: VAR-Literature Overview of Monetary Transmission in Japan














- Benchmark VAR,QE shock (pos-
itive): CPI positive significant; IP
during first 12 month negative in-
significant thereafter positive and
slightly significant; exchange rate
initially depreciates, insignificant
- Pre 1995 period VAR with call
rate, MP shock (negative): CPI and
IP increase significantly; exchange
rate initially appreciates signifi-
cantly, then depreciates significantly
- also estimate price and output



















- Comparision of pre ZIRP with
QE: IP positive and significant for
two quarters, similar response for
both periods; CPI initially posi-
tive for QE, pre ZIRP no effect
- Comparision of ZIRP and QE:
no difference between two peri-
ods for IP and CPI responses
- Comparision Financial Crisis: no
difference between crisis periods for

















- VAR, monetary base shock
(positive): CPI and GDP
gap increase but insignificant
- VAR, interest rate shock (posi-
tive): CPI increase significantly;
GDP gap decreases insignificantly
- TV-VAR, monetary base shock
(positive): CPI increases stronger
in 1985Q2; in 2002 no impact
visible; GDP gap no impact visible
for 1985 and 2002
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Table 1.7: VAR-Literature Overview of Monetary Transmission in Japan




























- Call rate shock (nega-
tive) if not QE period:
CPI until mid 90s
positive (slightly signif-
icant at some periods),
thereafter insignificant;
GDP until end of 90s
positive significant,
thereafter insignificant
- Bank reserves shock
(positive) during QE
period: CPI and GDP
positive but insignificant
- Long term IR shock
(negative) during QE and
not QE period: CPI and
GDP positive, significant
until beginning/mid 90s
















base period Feb 2004:
inflation increases sig-
nificantly between 8-12
months after shock; GDP
increases significantly



















Call rate shock (positive):
CPI decreases until end of
80s, gets significant after
1 year, increases in begin-
ning of 90s significantly
(price puzzle), decreases
again in the beginning of
00s insignificantly; IP de-
creases, for 2002 insignifi-
cant, before significant af-
ter 5 months
Are there Differences in the Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing at the
Zero-Lower-Bound in Japan over Time? 48
Table 1.8: VAR-Literature Overview of Monetary Transmission in Japan



















- Call rate shock (posi-
tive): CPI (price puzzle





- Bond shock (positive):
CPI initially since 1995
no impact, at 1 year
horizon negative impact
across sample; GDP
gap since 1995 no im-
pact, at 1 year horizone
slightly negative and
after 2 years positive















- MP shock with bond
(positive): CPI until
mid 90s initially positive
(price puzzle) then neg-
ative, since mid 90s in
medium-term/long run
no impact; GDP gap until
mid 90s strongly nega-
tive, thereafter no impact
- MP shock with call rate
(positive): CPI, price
puzzle less evident, de-
cline until mid 90s, there-
after slightly positive;
GDP gap initially nega-
tive across whole sample,
medium term/long run
negative until 2000
- also estimate price and
output shock
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C Posterior Probability Estimates for kQ, kW and kS
Table 1.9: Posterior Probability Estimates for kQ, kW and kS based on the
RJMCMC Method
Model kQ kW kS Posterior probability
1 0.0100 0.0100 0.0010 0
2 0.0500 0.0100 0.0010 0
3 0.1000 0.0100 0.0010 0
4 0.0100 0.0250 0.0010 0
5 0.0100 0.0250 0.0100 0.02
6 0.0100 0.1000 0.0010 0
7 0.0100 0.1000 0.0100 0.994
8 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0
9 0.0500 0.0250 0.0010 0.0007
10 0.0500 0.0250 0.0100 0.0003
11 0.0500 0.0100 0.0100 0
12 0.0500 0.1000 0.0010 0.0027
13 0.0500 0.1000 0.0100 0
14 0.1000 0.0250 0.0010 0
15 0.1000 0.1000 0.0010 0
16 0.1000 0.1000 0.0100 0
17 0.1000 0.0250 0.0100 0.0003
18 0.1000 0.0100 0.0100 0
Note: Posterior probability estimates are based on the reversible jump Markov chain Monte
Carlo method for the set of 18 models. These are constructed from all possible combinations
of kQ = {0.01; 0.05; 0.1}, kW = {0.001; 0.01} and kS = {0.01; 0.025; 0.1}.
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D Eggertsson (2011) Model
In the following, we briefly summarise the New Keynesian model of Eggertsson (2011).33
A negative preference shock moves the economy to the ZLB and induces a fall in output.
After this shock, the economy reverts back to its steady state with probability 1− µ. It
stays at the ZLB with probability µ. Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule
and is approximated by:
it = max
{
0, ret + φpipit + φY Yˆt
}
(1.11)
with ret denoting the exogenous shock, pit the inflation rate and Yˆt the output gap. φpi
and φY are the respective Taylor rule coefficients. The 0 in equation 1.11 accounts for the
ZLB state. Monetary policy can then be written to have the following form:
it = reH for t ≥ T e
it = 0 for 0 < t < T e,
where reH refers to the negative preference shock in the non-recession state and T e depicts
some stochastic date when the economy returns back to its steady state. In the case of
the binding ZLB (t < T e), the AD and AS equations34 are given by:
AD YˆL = µYˆL + σµpiL + σreL (1.12)
AS piL = κYˆL + βµpiL, (1.13)
where L denotes the recession state, reL the negative preference shock in the recession
state and σ, κ > 0 and 0 < β < 1.
Note that for the case of a multiperiod recession, where the ZLB is binding for more than
one period (µ > 0), both the aggregate demand and supply curve are upward sloping
in inflation. The peculiar case of an upward sloping demand curve occurs since, for a
given nominal interest rate, the real interest rate increases due to a lower inflation rate
today which implies lower expected inflation (µpiL < 0).35 Higher real interest rates
33The notation follows Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013).
34AD and AS are respectively referring to aggregate demand and aggregate supply
35At the ZLB, the central bank cannot reduce its nominal interest rate to offset the deflationary
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are contractionary and induce aggregate demand to fall because current consumption
is relatively more expensive than future consumption. Thus, households increase their
current savings for future consumption. This in turn reduces current output. Therefore,
inflation and output are both upward sloping (compare Figure D.2).
Figure D.2: The Effect of Multiperiod Recession at the ZLB in Eggertsson (2011)
D.1 Why the AD curve is steeper than the AS curve
Rewriting the AD and AS equations in 1.12 and 1.13 and solving for piL gives:




AS ′ piL = κYˆL(1−βµ) (1.15)
If the slope coefficients of the AD and AS curves are the same, both curves are parallel.
Eggertsson calls this a deflationary black hole:
1− µ
σµ
= κ1− βµ or (1− βµ)(1− µ) = σµκ.
In this case no solution exists. For a liquidity trap equilibrium to exist, the following has
to hold:
(1− βµ)(1− µ) > σµκ.
pressure.
Are there Differences in the Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing at the
Zero-Lower-Bound in Japan over Time? 52
This is satisfied for a sufficiently low probability µ of staying at the ZLB. When µ increases,
the AD curve becomes flatter and the AS curve steeper. Eggertsson (2011) assumes µ to
be small enough so that the deflationary black hole does not occur.
D.2 Identification of the demand and supply shocks
The usual identification strategy for demand and supply shocks does not hold if the
nominal interest rate is at the ZLB. We briefly outline important aspects of how aggregate
demand and supply shocks are identified as well as passed through in the Eggertsson (2011)
model.
For identifying the demand from the supply shock at the ZLB, we use the Eggertsson
assumption that the AD curve is steeper than the AS curve. Therefore, a positive demand
shock increases output gap more than inflation. Vice versa for a positive supply shock.
The sign restrictions in Table 1.1 capture this aspect by restricting the ratio of the output
and inflation variables to be larger than one in absolute terms for the demand shock. The
opposite holds for the supply shock. Furthermore, a positive demand shock is restricted
to increase output and inflation (Figure D.3a), whereas a positive supply shock is defined
to decrease both variables (Figure D.3b).
Figure D.3: Aggregate Business Cycle Shocks
(a) Demand Shock (b) Supply Shock
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D.3 Effects of a credible expansion of monetary policy at the
ZLB
Eggertsson (2011) models a monetary expansion as an increase in future money supply.
Monetary policy is assumed to follow:
it = max
{
0, ret + pi∗ + φpi(pit − pi∗) + φY (Yˆt − Yˆ ∗)
}
, (1.16)
where pi∗ denotes the inflation target and the long run output target is given by Yˆ ∗ =
(1− β)κ−1pi∗. A large pi∗ corresponds to a larger future growth rate in money supply. To
see the effect of a higher pi∗, we rewrite the AD and AS equations for the recession state
when the ZLB is binding:
AD′′ YˆL = µYˆL + (1− µ)Yˆ ∗ + σµpiL + σ(1− µ)pi∗ + σreL (1.17)
AS ′′ piL = κYˆL + βµpiL + β(1− µ)pi∗, (1.18)
If pi∗ = 0 is raised to pi∗ > 0, the AD curve moves to the right and the AS curve to the
left (see Figure D.4). An increased inflation target for t ≥ T e leads to a fall in the real
interest rate in t < T e. This in turn increases current consumption and thus stimulates
current output. Note that next to higher expected inflation in t ≥ T e, a higher pi∗ also
induces a higher inflation rate at all periods in which the ZLB is binding (Figure D.4).
Figure D.4: Effect of a credible inflation commitment at the ZLB
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E Impulse Responses to a QE Shock at the 4th and
8th Quarter
E.1 Estimation at 4th and 8th Quarter
Figure E.5: Impulse Responses at Different Horizons
(a) Responses at the 4th quarter to a QE
Shock
(b) Responses at the 8th quarter to a QE
Shock
Median impulse responses (blue solid line) to a 1% QE shock with 16-th and 84-th per-
centiles (grey area) of the posterior distribution of the responses at the 4th and 8th
quarter, respectively.
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F Average of the QE Shock for ZIRP, QE- and ‘Abe-
nomics’ program
Figure F.6: Responses at Different Time Periods to a QE Shock
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Average of the median impulse responses to a 1% QE shock during ZIRP, first QE- and ‘Abe-
nomics’ program.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Average of the median impulse responses (solid line) to a 1% QE shock with 16-th and 84-
th percentiles (dashed line) of the posterior distribution during the first QE- and ‘Abenomics’
program.
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G Time-Varying Posterior Estimates of the Stochas-
tic Covariance
The time-varying variance-covariance matrix of the residuals is decomposed as
A−1t ΣtΣ′t(A−1t )′ and comprises two matrices: (1), the time-varying matrix Σt which de-
notes the diaogonal matrix of the variances of the structural shocks εt and (2), the time-




1 0 0 0
αpiy,t 1 0 0
αpir,t αyr,t 1 0
αpie,t αye,t αre,t 1

where pit denotes inflation, yt GDP, rt reserves and et the exchange rate. More specifically,
αre,t captures the simultaneous impact of a reserves shock on the exchange rate.
Concerning Σt, not much time variation is visible. Figure E.6 below shows the estimated
stochastic volatility of the structural shock on GDP, prices, reserves and the exchange rate.
It plots the posterior mean and the 16th and 84th percentile of the standard deviation
of the shock. The second matrix, the time-varying simultaneous relations are plotted in
Figure G.9. The simultaneous effects are clearly time varying for almost every element in
this matrix.
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Figure G.7: Estimated Stochastic Volatility of the Structural Shocks
Figure G.8: Volatility of the Structural Shocks
Posterior mean (solid line), 16-th and 84-th percentiles (in grey) of the standard deviation
of residuals of the CPI, GDP, reserves and exchange rate equation.
Figure G.9: Posterior Estimates for the Simultaneous Relation α˜it
Posterior estimates for the simultaneous relations. Posterior mean (solid line), 16-th and
84-th percentiles (in grey).
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H Impulse Responses to a Demand and Supply
Shock
H.1 Demand Shock
Figure H.10: Responses at Different Time Periods to a DE Shock
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Median impulse responses to a 1% DE shock at 1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Median impulse responses (solid line) to a 1% QE shock with 16-th and 84-th percentiles (dashed
line) of the posterior distribution at 2003Q3 (blue) and 2013Q3 (green).
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H.2 Supply Shock
Figure H.11: Responses at Different Time Periods to a SP Shock
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Median impulse responses to a 1% SP shock at 1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Median impulse responses (solid line) to a 1% SP shock with 16-th and 84-th percentiles (dashed
line) of the posterior distribution at 2003Q3 (blue) and 2013Q3 (green).
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I Robustness of the Results
I.1 QE shock based on Close-to-Median Impulse Responses
Figure I.12: Impulse responses to a QE shock
(a) 1999Q4 (b) 2003Q3
(c) 2013Q3
Note: Solid lines denotes the median impulse responses to a 1% QE shock, grey area the
16-th and 84-th percentiles of the posterior distribution of the responses. The red dashed
lines plot the responses based on the close-to-median model.
Are there Differences in the Effectiveness of Quantitative Easing at the
Zero-Lower-Bound in Japan over Time? 61
I.2 QE shock based on Alternative Identification I
Figure I.13: Responses at Different Time Periods to a QE Shock
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Median impulse responses to a 1% QE shock at 1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Median impulse responses (solid line) to a 1% QE shock with 16-th and 84-th percentiles (dashed
line) of the posterior distribution at 2003Q3 (blue) and 2013Q3 (green).
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I.3 QE shock based on Alternative Identification II
Figure I.14: Responses at Different Time Periods to a QE Shock
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Median impulse responses to a 1% QE shock at 1999Q4, 2003Q3 and 2013Q3.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Median impulse responses (solid line) to a 1% QE shock with 16-th and 84-th percentiles (dashed
line) of the posterior distribution at 2003Q3 (blue) and 2013Q3 (green).
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I.4 QE shock based on Alternative Identification III
Figure I.15: Responses at Different Time Periods to a QE Shock (Cholesky)
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Median impulse responses to a 1% QE shock at 1999M11, 2003M8 and 2013M8.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Median impulse responses (solid line) to a 1% QE shock with 16-th and 84-th percentiles
(dashed line) of the posterior distribution at 2003Q3 (blue) and 2013Q3 (green).
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J Convergence Diagnostics
This section gives convergence diagnostics of the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm.
We follow Primiceri (2005) to calculate the convergence diagnostics. These autocorre-
lations measures are based on the Econometric Toolbox illustrated by LeSage (1999).
For space reasons, the convergence diagnostics are only given for estimates of the point
2013Q3.36
We refer to three measures of convergence diagnostics: (i) 10-th-order sample autocor-
relation of the draws; (ii) inefficiency factors (IFs) for the posterior estimates of the
parameters, it is an estimate of (1 + 2∑∞k=1 ρk), with ρk as the k-th-order autocorrelation
of the chain, adequate estimates are below or above the value of 20; (iii) and the Raftery
and Lewis (1992) diagnostics, calculating the necessary number of runs to obtain a certain
precision (the desired precision = 0.025, necessary probability for obtaining this precision
= 0.95, calculated for the 0.025 quantile of the marginal posterior distribution).
J.1 Convergence Diagnostics of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Algorithm
The (a) panel of Figure J.16 refers on the horizontal axis throughout the points 1-36 to
B (time varying coefficients), points 37-42 correspond to A (time varying simultaneous
relations), and points 43-46 refer to Σ (time varying volatilities). Respectively, the hy-
perparameter panels (b), (c) and (d) of Figure J.16, relate throughout the points 1-1296
to Q, points 1297-1332 to S and points 1333-1348 to W .
We start with a short summary of the 10-th-order autocorrelation. It is useful to scrutinise
the autocorrelation function of the draws, to evaluate how well the randomly selected chain
mixes. For an efficient algorithm, the draws need to be independent from each other. This
is verified by low values of the autocorrelation function (see Figure J.16a and J.16b). The
autocorrelation estimates for Σ exhibit some correlation indicating inefficiency (see below
for discussion).
The diagnostics concerning the inefficiency factors (IFs) calculates values very much below
20, thus suggesting efficiency. An overview is also given in Table 1.10 below. Concerning
36Compared to other points in time, the respective estimates are very similar.
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the IFs of A and B, the statistics show very low estimates. However, the IFs referring
to Σ indicate some inefficiency. Considering the higher dimensionality of our problem,
however, these results seem satisfactory (Kirchner et al. (2010)). Also Franta et al. (2011)
illustrate that some inefficiency should be of a minor concern when the total number of
runs required by the Raftery and Lewis (1992) statistics is well below the actual number
used in this study. As can be seen in Figures J.16a and J.16d, the suggested number
of iterations is below the actual number used. Furthermore, the impulse responses are
calculated with respect to normalised shocks, hence, the inefficiency problem should not
matter (Franta et al. (2011)).
To sum up, the total number of suggested iterations is far below the number used in
this paper and, on average, we obtain satisfying IFs as well as autocorrelation estimates.
Hence, the convergence diagnostics are sufficient.
Table 1.10: Distribution of the Inefficiency Factors
Median Mean Min Max 10-th Percentile 90-th Percentile
A 1.1341 2.173 0.9536 6.7792 0.9812 4.5915
B 2.335 3.1415 0.7967 10.4348 1.4623 4.9349
Σ 136.1581 132.7426 106.3865 152.2678 104.035 151.5319
Overview of the inefficiency factors (IFs) for the posterior estimates of different sets of time varying
parameters. A: time varying simultaneous relations; B: time varying coefficients; Σ: time varying
volatilities.
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Figure J.16: Convergence Diagnostics
(a) Convergence Diagnostics for A, B and Σ (b) 10-th-order Autocorrelation for Q, S and W
(c) IFs for Q, S and W (d) Raftery & Lewis tot. no of runs for Q, S and W
Panel (a) refers on the horizontal axis throughout the points 1-36 to B (time varying coefficients), points
37-42 to A (time varying simultaneous relations), and points 43-46 to Σ (time varying volatilities). The
hyperparameters in panels (b), (c) and (d) relate throughout the points 1-1296 to Q, points 1297-1332
to S and points 1233-1348 to W .
Chapter 2
The Impact of Monetary Policy and
Exchange Rate Shocks in Poland:
Evidence from a Time-Varying VAR∗
2.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, Poland has experienced significant structural changes in its
economy. For instance, increasing trade openness, partly stimulated by integration into
the European Union, the shift from exchange rate targeting to an inflation targeting
strategy1 and, more recently, the influence of the financial crisis may have led to changes
in the transmission of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks. This highlights the
importance of a flexible estimation framework that accounts for the possibility of time
variation.
A large number of papers have analysed the impact of monetary policy and exchange
rate shocks on key macroeconomic variables with standard techniques also in the case of
Poland. More recently, however, a flexible estimation framework that accounts for the
possibility of time variation has received attention. Taking this into account, this paper
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Olga Arratibel (ECB).
1The introduction of inflation targeting in 1998 helped to curb inflation, which was
much higher in the 90s than in the last 10 years (Figure A.1d). For more informa-
tion on Poland’s monetary policy strategy, see Medium-term strategy of monetary policy (1999-
2003) and Monetary policy strategy beyond 2003 published by the National Bank of Poland.
http://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?f=/en/publikacje/o_polityce_pienieznej/strategia_po_2003.html
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follows the Bayesian time-varying VAR (TVP-VAR) approach with stochastic volatility
developed by Primiceri (2005). We investigate whether the impact of monetary policy
and exchange rate shocks has varied over time in Poland through a marginal likelihood
estimation which compares a constant coefficient VAR with our TVP-VAR. Our research
confirms that the TVP-VAR is indeed a better fit for Poland and, hence, that there is
time variation in the impact of the shocks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
the first attempt to estimate a Bayesian TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility for Poland
and to provide formal evidence on which modeling approach is the best suited tool for
analysing the impact of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks in Poland.
The main empirical findings are: (1) output seems more responsive to an interest rate
shock (100 basis points interest rate increase) at the beginning of our sample, when this
translates into a cumulative output cost of about 1% after two years in 1996. Notwith-
standing some reversal since the beginning of the global financial crisis, from 2000 to 2007,
a monetary policy shock is less costly to absorb with the output loss declining to about
0.4% after two years in 2004. The exchange rate shock (1% appreciation of the zloty) has
also a time-varying effect on output. From 1996 to 2000, output seems to decline, whereas
between 2000 and 2008 it has a positive significant effect. Thereafter, this effect on output
mitigates. (2) Prices appear more responsive to an interest rate shock during the first half
of our sample, when Poland experienced high inflation. Prices decline by about 1.4% after
two years between 1996 and 1998, when the impact of the shock is the largest. In 2012,
prices decline by 0.2%. During this period, the shock has the smallest impact on prices.
The pass-through to consumer prices of an exchange rate shock seems to decrease slightly
across time. The same exchange rate shock is also estimated for import and producer
prices. It seems that the magnitude of the exchange rate shock on import prices is larger
than on consumer or producer prices, confirming a decrease along the pricing chain.2
Overall, the findings confirm the importance of using a time-varying framework and sug-
gest that the Polish economy has become more resilient over time to monetary policy and
exchange rate shocks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. A brief literature overview is given in
2The decrease along the pricing chain, that is a stronger exchange rate pass-through on import
prices than on consumer or producer prices, has been found in other studies using similar methodologies.
Factors affecting the exchange rate pass-through are macroeconomic factors (such as the inflation rate
and inflation persistence) and microeconomic factors (like menu costs, the size of the non-tradable sector,
or the structure of imports), see e.g. Bitans (2004) for further details.
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section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes the econometric model and estimation strategy. Section
2.4 briefly summarises the marginal likelihood results. The results of the TVP-VAR are
presented in section 2.5. Section 2.6 summarises our robustness checks and section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 General Survey of Related Literature
Initial applications of VAR models revealed counter-intuitive results, such as the price
puzzle3 and other anomalies (Sims (1992)). A number of proposals have been made to
tackle these issues.4 In particular, identification schemes have been widely applied. In a
small open economy like Poland, the price puzzle may arise when estimating monetary
policy shocks. In that case, the sign restriction approach, as used by Faust (1998), Canova
and Pires Pina (2000), Canova and de Nicoló (2002) and Uhlig (2005), is relevant. For
our work on Poland, we follow Franta et al. (2011) (see Section 1.4.2).
Although relevant for our research, the above mentioned literature maintains the assump-
tion of constant coefficients over time (Koop and Korobilis (2010)). This is a strong
assumption because economic time series are driven by evolving features. As laid down
in Canova (2007), one can think of these changes in two ways. First, as abrupt switches
that can be addressed by structural breaks5 and, second, as models with continuously
evolving coefficients which capture gradual changes over time.
Allowing for stochastic volatility, but still assuming constant VAR coefficients, Uhlig
(1997) introduced time variation into the VAR model. Alternatively, Cogley and Sargent
(2001) developed a VAR model with drifting coefficients and a constant variance. Cogley
(2005) accounted for stochastic volatility in the variance covariance matrix, but simul-
taneous relations among variables were nevertheless non-time-varying in his model. The
salient approach by Primiceri (2005) allows the entire variance covariance matrix of the
shocks as well as the coefficients to be time-varying.6
3The price puzzle denotes the counter intuitive response of a rise in inflation after a monetary policy
tightening.
4For instance, Sims (1992) and Christiano et al. (1999) suggest to include further price variables for
overcoming the price puzzle. Bernanke et al. (2005) account for an even richer data set (FAVAR).
5In this case, two possible models which could be applied are Markov switching or regime-switching
VARs (Paap and Van Dijk (2003), Sims and Zha (2006), Teräsvirta (1994) and Koop and Potter (2006)).
6Following Primiceri (2005), who estimates the impact of monetary policy shocks for the US, Benati
and Mumtaz (2005) apply the TVP-VAR with sign restrictions for the U.K. Other examples of this TVP-
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Regarding empirical studies on Poland, there are a number of papers based on VAR meth-
ods that estimate monetary policy and/or exchange rate shocks in Central and Eastern
European countries (CEEs). An excellent summary is given by Égert and MacDonald
(2009). Examples of a standard VAR to examine the impact of monetary policy shocks
are Creel and Levasseur (2005) and Lyziak et al. (2012). An analysis based on time-
varying coefficients and contemporaneous restrictions via the standard recursive ordering
is done by Darvas (2009). However, he does not account for changes in the variance
covariance matrix of the shocks and, instead of a Bayesian approach, he applies a maxi-
mum likelihood framework. Jarociński (2010) estimates a structural Bayesian VAR with a
combination of sign and zero restrictions. He compares the monetary policy transmission
of four CEE countries (including Poland) to that of five Euro Area countries. However,
his approach is based on constant coefficients and does not allow for conclusions on the
evolution of the impact of the shocks across time. Concerning studies on the exchange
rate pass-through in Poland, Coricelli et al. (2006) make use of a cointegrated VAR while
Ca’Zorzi et al. (2007) use a standard VAR with recursive identification. Bitans (2004)
also estimates a recursive VAR but on two different subsamples for Poland (1993-1999
and 2000-2003). Finally, Darvas (2001) uses an error correction model which accounts for
time variation in the parameters but not in the variance matrix.
Our paper contributes to this literature with an examination of whether the impact of
monetary policy and exchange rate shocks has varied across time in Poland. By allowing
for time variation in the parameters and in the variance covariance matrix, we are able
to analyse changes in the impact of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks across
time. Given the significant structural and institutional changes experienced by the Polish
economy over the last few decades, it is particularly important to take the possibility
of such time variation into account. As far as we are aware, this work is the first one
to address this matter and to apply a Bayesian TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility to
monetary policy and exchange rate shocks as well as to provide formal evidence on which
modeling approach is the preferred tool for analysing the effect of such shocks in Poland.
VAR literature are Baumeister et al. (2008) for the Euro Area and Nakajima et al. (2011) for Japan. A
growing number of papers also estimate TVP-VARs to analyse dynamics in, for example, fiscal policy
(Kirchner et al. (2010), Pereira and Lopes (2010)), oil prices (Baumeister and Peersman (2008)) and
exchange rates (Mumtaz and Sunder-Plassmann (2010)).
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2.3 Empirical Model
Our empirical approach closely follows Primiceri (2005). It is a multivariate time series
framework with time-variation in the coefficients as well as in the covariances of the
residuals. Varying coefficients capture possible nonlinearities or time-variation in the lag
structure of the model. Furthermore, the varying variance covariance matrix accounts
for possible heteroscedasticity of the shocks as well as nonlinearities in the simultaneous
relationships between the variables.
We estimate the following VAR model:
yt = ct +B1,tyt−1 + . . .+Bl,tyt−l + ut, (2.1)
where t = 1, . . . , T ; the vector of endogenous variables yt is of the size n x 1; ct, the
vector of time-varying coefficients which multiply constant terms is of the size n x 1; the
time-varying coefficients Bi,t, with the lag length i = 1, . . . , l, have the size n x n; and
ut, size n x 1, are unknown heteroscedastic shocks with time-variation in the covariance
matrix of the residuals Ω. The stochastic covariance matrix of the residuals ut is factored
as
V AR(ut) ≡ Ωt = A−1t Ht(A−1t )′,with Ht = ΣtΣ′t. (2.2)




σ1,t 0 . . . 0
0 σ2,t
. . . ...
... . . . . . . 0




1 0 . . . 0
α21,t 1
. . . ...
... . . . . . . 0
αn1,t . . . αn(n−1),t 1

(2.3)
The time-varying VAR can then be summarised as:
yt = X ′tB˜t + A−1t Σtεt, (2.4)
where Xt = I
⊗[1, y′t−1, . . . , y′t−l], B˜ = vec([ct, B1,t, . . . , Bl,t]) and V AR(ε) = In.
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The possibility of time-variation in At in equation 2.4 permits the shock to one endogenous
variable to have a time-varying effect on the other variables in the system. This is a
crucial aspect for modeling simultaneous relations among variables. It provides a flexible
approach for estimating the transmission mechanism of structural innovations, particular
important for transition economies like Poland.
The dynamics of the time-varying parameters (Bt and At) are following a driftless random
walk, whereas the covariance matrix (Σt) evolves as a geometric driftless random walk:
Bt = Bt−1 + νt, (2.5)
αt = αt−1 + ξt, (2.6)
logσt = logσt−1 + η, (2.7)
where αt is a vector, stacked by rows, of only non-zero and non-one elements of the
matrix At and the standard deviation σt is a vector containing the diagonal elements







 ∼ N(0, V ), with V =

In 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 W
 , (2.8)
where In is an n dimensional identity matrix andQ,S andW are positive definite matrices.
S is assumed to be block diagonal, implying that the parameters of the simultaneous
relations among variables are restricted to be independent. The respective n − 1 blocks
of S relate each to separate equations.
Specifying the underlying dynamics on the basis of the random walk provides a flexible
framework. It allows to capture the evolution of different parameters coming from policy
and structural changes in the economy.
2.3.1 Priors
VARs are not parsimonious models. Usually the estimation of VAR models require a
large amount of parameters which can easily add up to a few hundred. Without prior
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information, it is almost impossible to obtain precise estimates.7
To specify the priors, we use a training sample based on the whole sample 1996Q1-
2012Q3 (see Appendix A). We follow Canova (2007) and Canova and Ciccarelli (2009),
who motivate this approach when a separate training sample is not available.8 Therefore,
we run an OLS estimation on a fixed-coefficient VAR model for calibrating our priors.
The mean and the variance of B0 are, respectively, the OLS point estimates (BˆOLS) and
four times their variance. The same holds for the prior distribution of the simultaneous
relation matrix A0. For the log standard errors, the prior mean is specified as the log of
the respective OLS point estimates, whereas the prior covariance matrix is restricted to be
In. The hyperparameters Q, S and W are the covariance matrices of the innovations (see
equations 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7). Matrices Q and S follow the inverse-Wishart prior distribution
and we follow Cogley and Sargent (2005) for defining W , which is based on the inverse-
Gamma prior distribution. Furthermore, we restrict the matrix W to be diagonal for
reducing the dimensionality of the estimation.
B0 ∼ N(BˆOLS, 4 · V (BˆOLS)),
A0 ∼ N(AˆOLS, 4 · V (AˆOLS)),
logσ0 ∼ N(σˆOLS, 4 · In),
Q ∼ IW (k2Q · τ · V (BˆOLS), τ),
W ∼ IG(k2W · (1 + dim(W )) · In, (1 + dim(W ))),
Sb ∼ IW (k2S · (1 + dim(Sb)) · V (Aˆb,OLS), (1 + dim(Sb))),
where τ has the size of the training sample, Sb refers to the respective blocks of S and
Aˆb,OLS denotes the respective blocks of AˆOLS. The parameters kQ = 0.05, kW = 0.1 and
kS = 0.01 specify prior beliefs about the amount of time variation in the estimates of
the coefficients, covariances and volatilities. For example, for the OLS estimation of the
covariance matrix of the VAR coefficients, we allow for 5% (kQ = 0.05) of uncertainty
surrounding the V (BˆOLS) estimates to time variation.
In order to justify our selection of kQ, kW and kS, we do a formal model selection. Posterior
7In a VAR model, the number of free parameters increases substantially with the number of en-
dogenous variables and lags (e.g., for a VAR with four variables and two lags, Q comprises 666 free
parameters).
8For robustness, we also estimate the priors on a subset of the sample (1996Q1-2007Q4). Please refer
to Section 2.6 for further details.
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probabilities for a set of 18 models are estimated9 based on the reversible jump Markov
chain Monte Carlo (RJMCMC) method (see Primiceri (2005)). The selection of kQ, kW
and kS delivers a posterior probability for one model which is almost one. Table 2.4 in
the Appendix B reports the posterior probability estimates for the set of 18 models.
Regarding the degrees of freedom forW and Sb, they are defined as one plus the dimension
of each matrix. For Q they are set equal to the size of the training sample.
2.3.2 Estimation
So far, we have outlined the estimation strategy for a reduced form VAR which is esti-
mated using Bayesian methods for the sample from 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q3. For maintaining
the degrees of freedom, two lags are used. For approximating the posterior distribution,
40, 000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler are used and we drop the first 20, 000 iterations
for convergence. For breaking the autocorrelation of the draws, only every 10th iteration
is kept. Our final estimates are therefore based on 2, 000 iterations. The sample auto-
correlation functions of the draws die out rather quickly. Furthermore, the convergence
diagnostics reveal satisfactory results (a detailed overview is given in Appendix F).
To identify monetary and exchange rate shocks10 we follow Jarociński (2010), Franta et al.
(2011), Farrant and Peersman (2006) and An and Wang (2011). We assume an open econ-
omy with a flexible exchange rate and allow for simultaneous responses among monetary
policy and exchange rate shocks.11 Furthermore, our exchange rate shock restrictions are
consistent with the uncovered interest rate parity condition.12
In order to identify the shocks, some restrictions are assumed and imposed on the impulse
responses, both at the time of the impact as well as in the first and second period (see
Table 2.1). We use zero and sign restrictions as follows13:
9The set of 18 models are constructed from all possible combinations of kQ = {0.01; 0.05; 0.1}, kW =
{0.001; 0.01} and kS = {0.01; 0.025; 0.1}.
10An extensive amount of literature focuses on the identification of monetary policy shocks. For a
review refer to Christiano et al. (1999)
11This applies also to the beginning of our sample, before Poland adopted a free floating exchange
rate regime.
12The uncovered interest rate parity condition states that interest rate differentials account for ex-
pected changes in the exchange rate.
13Faust (1998), Canova and de Nicoló (2002) and early versions of Uhlig (2005) were quite influential
for the application of sign restrictions. For instance, Artis and Ehrmann (2006) use a SVAR and identify
monetary and exchange rate shocks applying short-run zero restrictions.
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• No simultaneous response of GDP and prices either to a monetary policy or exchange
rate shock.
• A monetary policy shock (100 basis points (BPs) rise in the policy interest rate)
leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
• An exchange rate shock (1% rise in the exchange rate) is associated with a decrease
in the interest rate and an exchange rate appreciation.
Table 2.1: Sign Restrictions
MP Shock ExR Shock
Lag 0 0 0
GDP Lag 1 ? ?
Lag 2 ? ?
Lag 0 0 0
Prices Lag 1 ? ?
Lag 2 ? ?
Lag 0 ≥ ≤
Interest Rate Lag 1 ≥ ≤
Lag 2 ≥ ≤
Lag 0 ≥ ≥
Exchange Rate Lag 1 ≥ ≥
Lag 2 ≥ ≥
Note: ? denotes no restriction, ≥ defines a positive effect of the respec-
tive shock on the variable, vice versa for ≤.
For implementing the sign restrictions, we need to slightly modify the model specified
in equations 2.4 - 2.7. So far, it is based on the recursive identification scheme. We
additionally specify an orthonormal rotation matrix Gt, i.e. G′tGt = In The model in
equation 2.4 can then be rewritten as
yt = X ′tB˜t + A−1t ΣtG′tGtεt = X ′tB˜t + A−1t ΣtG′tε˜t. (2.9)
ε˜t = G′tεt denotes the new shocks and the respective variance is V ar(ε˜t) = GtInG′t.
Technically, the sign restrictions are implemented using the QR-decomposition method
for finding Gt. We have a four variable VAR, implying a 4 x 4 Gt matrix. Due to zeros
in the first two rows of the sign restriction matrix, the decomposition is restricted to the
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 QR (θ [1, 1]) QR (θ [1, 2])
QR (θ [2, 1]) QR (θ [2, 2])

 . (2.10)
In a first step, we draw a 2 x 2 matrix, θ, from the N (0, 1) distribution. In a second
step, we take the QR decomposition of θ and construct the Gt matrix. This algorithm
calculates a candidate structural impact matrix. In a third step, we check whether this
matrix is in line with the sign restrictions. Finally, in a fourth step, if the matrix satisfies
the restrictions it is stored; otherwise, another θ is drawn from the standard normal
distribution and we repeat the procedure from the second step.14
This form ensures the respective zero restrictions on GDP and prices, so that the structural
shocks to monetary policy and the exchange rate do not simultaneously influence GDP
and prices.
2.4 Empirical Evidence of Time Variation in Poland:
is there any?
As a first step, we search for formal econometric evidence on whether the impact of
monetary and exchange rate shocks in Poland has changed across time. In particular,
we calculate marginal likelihood estimates for a traditional constant-coefficient vector
autoregressive (VAR)15 model and our time-varying parameter (TVP-VAR) model with
stochastic volatility. The model that yields the largest marginal likelihood fits the given
data the best. We follow Nakajima et al. (2011) and use the modified harmonic mean
estimator of the marginal likelihood due to Geweke (1999).16 The log marginal likelihood
14Maximum number of possible draws for θ is 100. In case a candidate structural impact matrix is
not obtained, we move to the next iteration of the Gibbs sampler. On average, 19 values of θ have to be
drawn to generate the structural impact matrix that satisfies all sign restrictions. The fraction in which
the structural impact matrix does not satisfy the sign restrictions is only 4.49%.
15Prior for the constant parameter VAR: B ∼ N(0, 4× I), α ∼ N(0, 4× I), σ−1 ∼ Gamma(2, 0.02).
16For a detailed description of the harmonic mean estimator, please refer to Nakajima et al. (2011). The
marginal likelihood calculation is based on the priors and number of lags as specified above. Additionally,
we have to specify the parameter τ . We follow Nakajima et al. (2011) and set τ = 0.99.
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value for the TVP-VAR, 356.852, is higher than the marginal likelihood estimate for the
constant VAR, 173.675, suggesting that the TVP-VAR model with stochastic volatility is
indeed a better model for Poland than the constant VAR.
2.5 Results of the TVP-VAR
In what follows, sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 present, respectively, the estimated median im-
pulse responses of the monetary policy and exchange rate shocks (see also Appendix C)
and include an analysis on the posterior probability for the difference in the impulse re-
sponses. In section 2.5.2, we also substitute the HICP index with an index of import
prices or producer prices to analyse the pass-through of an exchange rate shock on these
price levels (the respective Figures are given in Appendix D). The time-varying posterior
estimates of the stochastic covariance matrix are presented in Appendix E and Appendix
F summarises the estimation on convergence diagnostics.
2.5.1 Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks
Figure 2.1 presents the median impulse responses (over 17 quarters and the time period:
1996:1-2012:3) to a 100 basis points (BPs) interest rate increase in the given period across
the sample. This monetary policy shock has the expected impact on GDP (↓), prices (↓),
interest rate (↑) and exchange rate (initially ↑).
We clearly see that a monetary policy shock has time-varying effects. Specifically, the
decline in real GDP after a monetary policy shock is stronger in the beginning of the
sample, while since 2000 until 2008 it is weaker. More specifically, between 1996 and 1998
the cumulative output loss stands at about 1% after eight quarters compared to only 0.4%
in 2004Q3 (Figure 2.1a). These results are similar to those found by Lyziak et al. (2012)
in a structural VAR accounting for boom/bust cycles. Our results may partly reflect the
adoption of an inflation targeting framework by the Polish central bank in 1998 and the
fact that a more credible central bank is generally able to achieve its inflation objective
at lower output costs, see also Darvas (2009). Since the beginning of the financial crisis
in 2008, real GDP seems to react somewhat stronger again, but this effect is nevertheless
insignificant (Figures C.2a, C.2b).
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Figure 2.1: Time-Varying Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
(a) GDP (b) Prices
(c) Interest Rate (d) Exchange Rate
Median impulse responses to a 100 BPs monetary policy shock.
Regarding the effect of a monetary policy shock on prices, they exhibit a very large
degree of time variation across our sample. In line with the theory, prices decrease after
a monetary policy shock (Figure 2.1b). The impact on prices seems to be strongest
between 1996 and 2001, a period during which Poland experienced high inflation (Figure
A.1d). The largest accumulative effect is estimated at about 1.4% in 1996Q4 after eight
quarters. A possible explanation for this time variation could be that, at the beginning
of our sample, the central bank managed to curb inflation significantly and bring it down
to a more moderate rate. This may have contributed to enhancing the central bank’s
credibility and explain the weaker impulse responses from 2004 onwards. At the end of
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the sample in 2012Q1 the median impulse response decreases to about 0.3% after four
quarters.
The effect of the monetary policy shock on the interest rate is particularly stable since
2002 (Figure 2.1c). Interestingly, this effect has not changed since the beginning of the
global financial crisis.
Finally, the impact of a monetary policy shock on the nominal effective exchange rate
is, as expected, initially positive (Figure 2.1d). Furthermore, this shock seems to be
absorbed much more quickly since 2004. This is in contrast to Darvas (2009) who, in a
setting that accounts for time-varying coefficients in a VAR with recursive identification
and a constant variance covariance matrix, estimates rather stable impulse responses of
the exchange rate over time. This leads him to conclude that there is time variation
mainly in real GDP. In contrast, our results reveal time variation next to GDP, also in
prices and in the exchange rate.
Comparison of impulse responses at different horizons and points in time
The evolution of the responses at the 4th and 8th quarter with their percentiles is given
in Figures C.2a and C.2b in Appendix C. In terms of real output, a monetary tightening
has a negative significant effect at the 8th quarter horizon at the end of the 90s, while it
does not have any significant impact afterwards. The same holds for the effect on prices
for the 4th and 8th quarter. Concerning the interest rate, the impact of the monetary
policy shock converges to zero after two years (see Figures C.2a and C.2b). The influence
on the nominal effective exchange rate seems to be different across time (Figures C.2a
and C.2b), converging more quickly towards zero from 2004 onwards.
For a better illustration of the difference in the impulse responses to a monetary policy
shock across time, we also present Figures 2.2a and 2.2b. These allow for a comparison
of impulse responses at specific points in time. Figure 2.2a plots the median impulse
responses at 1996Q3, 2000Q1 and 2012Q1. The three different time periods for the com-
parison are chosen arbitrarily. The period around 1996Q3 reflects the environment under
the exchange rate targeting regime, 2000Q1 under inflation targeting and 2012Q1 under
the influence of the financial crisis. Figure 2.2b plots the impulse responses at 2000Q1
and 2012Q1 with percentiles. Especially for the price impulse responses, there seems to
be a strong difference between 2000Q1 and 2012Q1. This result is also supported by our
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Table 2.2: Posterior probability for the difference in the impulse responses
to a monetary policy shock at different time periods
Horizon 1 Q (%) 4 Q (%) 8 Q (%) 12 Q (%)
GDP
1996/2000 12.9 39.8 64.9 65.2
1996/2012 12.4 43.3 64.1 52.3
2000/2012 12.8 53.9 50.6 36.6
HICP
1996/2000 43.7 55.9 52.4 53.3
1996/2012 43.5 71.3 82.7 73.1
2000/2012 44.5 68.7 90.6 77.2
IR
1996/2000 52.6 43.4 42.9 43.4
1996/2012 49.0 40.8 62.9 41.0
2000/2012 45.6 47.1 74.4 46.8
ExR
1996/2000 54.9 55.5 47.5 46.0
1996/2012 58.4 34.4 33.7 41.1
2000/2012 54.5 26.8 35.4 45.8
Note: Difference in impulse responses at the time periods 1996Q3, 2000Q1 and
2012Q1 for one, four, eight and 12 quarters ahead.
analysis on the posterior probability for the difference in the impulse responses.
We consider the statistical difference in the impulse responses between different time
periods by calculating the ratio of the MCMC draws of the responses between two time
periods. More specifically, we estimate the posterior probability that the response at
one given time period (first considered response) is smaller than at another given time
period (second considered response). We consider again the three time periods referred to
above and present the differences in the impulse responses to the monetary policy shock in
Table 2.2. Posterior probability values close to 50% indicate a weak difference between the
two periods. Values above (below) 50% imply that the first response is smaller (bigger)
than the second response. The posterior difference for GDP to a monetary policy shock
between the three considered time periods is stronger for one-quarter ahead and becomes
weaker for the other quarters ahead. Regarding prices, we estimate a strong difference in
responses between 1996Q3 and 2012Q1 as well as between 2000Q1 and 2012Q1 for the 8th
quarter and 12th quarter ahead. The evidence for the exchange rate responses is rather
strong between 1996Q3 and 2012Q1 as well as 2000Q1 and 2012Q1 for the 4th quarter
and 8th quarter ahead while the responses between 1996Q3 and 2000Q1 is weaker.
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Figure 2.2: Responses at Different Time Periods to a Monetary Policy Shock
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Median impulse responses to a 100 BPs monetary policy shock at 1996Q3, 2000Q1 and 2010Q3.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Median impulse responses (solid line) to a 100 BPs monetary policy shock with 16-th and 84-th
percentiles (dashed line) of the posterior distribution at 2000Q1 (blue) and 2012Q1 (green).
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2.5.2 Impulse Responses to Exchange Rate Shocks
In this section, we analyse the median impulse responses to a 1% appreciation in the
nominal effective exchange rate over time (17 quarters, time period: 1996:1-2012:3) (see
Figure 2.3). The estimated pass-through of an exchange rate shock is in line with the
theory and highlights the importance to account for time variation.
Figure 2.3: Time-Varying Impulse Responses to an Exchange Rate Shock
(a) GDP (b) Prices
(c) Interest Rate (d) Exchange Rate
Median impulse responses to a 1% exchange rate appreciation.
Regarding the effect of the exchange rate shock on output, it can be a mixed one depending
on whether the expenditure-switching channel (negative effect on output, since exports
decline due to appreciation) or the interest rate channel (positive effect on output, since
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interest rates decline following an appreciation) dominates. Our empirical findings suggest
that the expenditure-switching channel prevails from 1996 until 2000 (Figure 2.3a), albeit
its effect seems to be insignificant (Figures C.2c, C.2d). Since 2000, however, it appears
to become less costly to absorb exchange rate shocks with respect to output. A possible
explanation for this time variation is that at the beginning of the sample, Poland did
not have a free floating exchange rate. In such a context, the interest rate channel is
less important since domestic money market rates follow foreign interest rates (Cevik
and Teksoz (2012)). As for the positive impact since 2000, the rise in GDP may not
only result from the stimulating impact of decreasing interest rates after an exchange
rate appreciation in a flexible exchange rate regime, but it may also indicate economic
convergence which is not captured by the model. To ensure that the positive effect on
output is not driven by the lag of foreign variables, we follow Franta et al. (2011) and
estimate a quarterly VAR with exogenous foreign variables.17 Also in this specification,
GDP increases after an exchange rate shock, confirming the robustness of our results.
Concerning prices, our results confirm the general finding in the literature of decreasing
inflation following an appreciation of the zloty (Figure 2.3b). However, our findings
suggest that prices respond with a slightly decreasing pass-through to an exchange rate
shock, with the median impulse response declining to about 0.2% in 1996Q4 and to about
0.1% in 2012Q1 after six quarters.18 We also investigate the time-varying effect of an
exchange rate pass-through on import and producer prices. To our knowledge, this has
not been attempted in the economic literature yet. As expected, import prices reveal
a stronger decline than consumer or producer prices (Appendix D, Figures D.3, D.4
and D.5). Furthermore, both import and producer prices converge faster to zero than
consumer prices. Concerning import prices, it seems that the pass-through is strongest
between 1996 and 2000 (Figures D.3b, D.5a and D.5b), whereas for producer prices, the
pass-through appears to have increased since 2000 (Figure D.4b). This decline across the
pricing chain is well documented in the literature and also estimated by other studies on
Poland (Bitans (2004), Ca’Zorzi et al. (2007), McCarthy (2007)).
Regarding the impact on the interest rate, exchange rate shocks seem to be accommodated
17Specifically, we add the following four variables: EA GDP at market price, chain linked volumes,
2005=100, seasonally adjusted; EA Commodity Price Index; EA Euribor 3-month, average of observations
through period; EA HICP, overall monthly index, seasonally adjusted.
18A similar result is estimated by Bitans (2004). He uses a recursive VAR - however, with constant
coefficients - and accounts for two subsamples (1993-1999 and 2000-2003).
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by interest rate decreases (in the range of roughly -20 basis points within the first year,
see Figure 2.3c). As illustrated above, this in turn might also stimulate output. The
impact converges to zero after about two years. Finally, the impact of the exchange rate
shock on the exchange rate itself dies out quickly, approximately after one year (Figure
2.3d).
Comparison of impulse responses at different horizons and points in time
A comparison of the responses at the 4th and 8th quarter is given in Appendix C, Figures
C.2c and C.2d. Consumer prices seem to respond significantly negative to an exchange
rate shock, but the effect on GDP is only significant after two years between the period
2000 and 2008 (Figures C.2c and C.2d).
Table 2.3: Posterior probability for the difference in the impulse responses
to an exchange rate shock at different time periods
Horizon 1 Q (%) 4 Q (%) 8 Q (%) 12 Q (%)
GDP
1996/2000 13.0 77.3 73.5 72.8
1996/2012 12.3 79.4 80.9 80.0
2000/2012 12.4 60.7 68.5 68.7
HICP
1996/2000 44.1 56.0 52.4 59.8
1996/2012 44.1 69.2 57.9 60.6
2000/2012 45.6 70.1 58.0 51.6
IR
1996/2000 46.1 47.5 35.6 50.8
1996/2012 45.2 47.6 32.6 42.4
2000/2012 49.4 51.5 43.4 40.8
ExR
1996/2000 53.9 50.6 44.7 47.7
1996/2012 51.5 61.1 61.1 57.8
2000/2012 48.1 62.1 68.3 61.2
Note: Difference in impulse responses at the time periods 1996Q3, 2000Q1 and
2012Q1 for one, four, eight and 12 quarters ahead.
As before, for a better illustration of the difference in the impulse responses across time,
we plot the median impulse responses at 1996Q3, 2000Q1 and 2012Q1 (see Figure 2.4a).
Figure 2.4b plots the impulse responses at 1996Q3 and 2012Q1 with their percentiles.
Especially for GDP, there seems to be a difference between the impulse responses at
1996Q3 and 2012Q1.
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We also evaluate the statistical difference in the impulse responses to the exchange rate
shock at different time periods. The estimates of the posterior probability indicate time
variation between those periods as well. As shown in Table 2.3, the responses for GDP be-
tween 1996Q3 and 2000Q1 as well as between 1996Q3 and 2012Q1 reveal a clear difference.
The differences in responses for prices and the interest rate are weaker. Concerning the
exchange rate, we estimate a slightly stronger difference in the impulse response between
2000Q1 and 2012Q1.
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Figure 2.4: Responses at Different Time Periods to an Exchange Rate Shock
(a) Responses without Percentiles
Median impulse responses to a 1% exchange rate appreciation at 1996Q3, 2000Q1 and 2012Q1.
(b) Responses with Percentiles
Median impulse responses (solid line) to a 1% exchange rate appreciation with 16-th and 84-th
percentile (dashed line) of the posterior distribution at 1996Q3 (black) and 2012Q1 (green).
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2.6 Robustness Checks on Priors
Since data for Poland are only available with a short time horizon, calibrating the priors
is a challenge. For a robustness check, we estimate the priors on a subset of the sample
(1996Q1 - 2007Q4) and obtained results that support those presented in this paper. We
also extend our dataset with data for GDP and prices constructed by Darvas (2009)19 and
estimate the priors on two different training samples. Both are based on data from 1993Q1
until 2007Q4, whereas for the second training sample the initial years (1993Q1-1995Q4)
are dropped. The results also confirm the findings presented in this paper.
As a final robustness check, we change the prior for B0 to a hierarchical prior which
combines the Minnesota prior and the TVP-prior. This is because the TVP-prior could
suffer from over-parameterization and the risk of over-fitting increases with a short time
horizon. Mitigating these issues is possible with the help of the Minnesota prior that
provides for a shrinkage. The results obtained confirm those presented in this paper.20
2.7 Conclusion
By applying the TVP-VAR developed by Primiceri (2005), this paper represents the first
attempt at analysing the impact of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks in a fully
time-varying model in Poland. Our findings show that the reaction of macroeconomic
variables in the Polish economy to monetary policy and exchange rate shocks has, indeed,
varied across time. Next to the exchange rate, prices and output reveal considerable time-
varying effects across our sample from 1996 until 2012. Overall, our results suggest that
the Polish economy has become more resilient to these shocks over time.
More specifically, a monetary policy shock (tightening) - which does affect negatively and
significantly GDP after around two years - seems to have a stronger impact on output at
the end of the 90s (maximum decrease of about 1%) than between 2000 and 2008 (decrease
of about 0.5%). Since the financial crisis in 2008, output seems to react somewhat stronger
again. Following the same monetary policy shock on prices, we estimate a strong decline
until 2001 (maximum decline of about 1.4%). From 2004 onwards, the effect on prices
19He constructs quarterly GDP data based on mainly annual GDP series. The price index is a core
inflation measure as in Darvas (2001). These data are used for the period from 1993Q1 until 1995Q4.
20We gladly provide all our robustness checks upon request.
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has become weaker. Interestingly, interest rate responses are rather stable across time
and the effect on the nominal effective exchange rate converges much faster to zero after
2004.
The exchange rate shock, defined as an appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate,
has a considerable time-varying effect on output. From 1996 to 2000, the expenditure-
switching channel prevails. Thereafter, the interest rate channel seems to dominate, lead-
ing to a positive effect on output. Following an exchange rate appreciation, consumer
prices appear to decline, although it seems that this pass-through is somewhat decreasing
across time (in 1996Q4 −0.2%, in 2012Q1 −0.1% after six quarters). Among the three
price indices considered, import prices show the strongest reaction to an exchange rate
shock.
We would like to stress the different robustness checks conducted for testing the consis-
tency of our results. The various checks, inter alia in the prior specifications and in the
data sample, confirm the findings presented in this paper. The use of the TVP-VAR with
stochastic volatility is also supported by a marginal likelihood estimation based on the
harmonic mean estimator that compares the TVP-VAR with a constant BVAR. Moreover,
a sophisticated model selection algorithm is used to ensure the correct specification of the
prior beliefs about the amount of time variation.
For future work on Poland, provided data availability allows, it would be interesting
to apply the time-varying factor augmented VAR framework (TVP-FAVAR, Koop and
Korobilis (2010)). This would allow to compare our results with those found on the
basis of a richer dataset. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare the effects of
monetary policy and exchange rate shocks in Poland with those in other CEE countries
and the Euro Area.
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A Data sources
This paper uses quarterly data on Poland and covers a time horizon between 1996:1 and
2012:3. We estimate the model in levels. Like Sims et al. (1990) state, this accounts
for possible discrepancy which may arise in case of incorrectly assumed cointegration
restrictions. Also, if there are unit roots in the data, it will not influence the likelihood
function, since nonstationarity is of no concern in a Bayesian framework. In the following,
the used time series are described:
Gross domestic product (GDP): Log of gross domestic product at market prices,
chain linked volumes, reference year 2005, in million zloty, working day and seasonally
adjusted by TRAMO/SEATS, quarterly series. Source: European Central Bank.
Consumer price (CPI): Log of HICP, overall index (2005=100), monthly index con-
verted to a quarterly series (averaging over three respective months), neither seasonally
nor working day adjusted. Source: Eurostat.
Short-term interest rate (IR): Money market interest rate, deposit liabilities, 3
months (80-100 days) maturity, in percent, denominated in Polish zloty. Source: Eu-
rostat.
Exchange rate (ExR): Log of ECB nominal effective exchange rate, Euro area-17 coun-
tries vis-a-vis the EER-40 group of trading partners (AU, CA, DK, HK, JP, NO, SG, KR,
SE, CH, GB, US, BG, CZ, LV, LT, HU, PL, RO, CN, DZ, AR, BR, CL, HR, IS, IN, ID,
IL, MY, MX, MA, NZ, PH, RU, ZA, TW, TH, TR and VE) against Polish zloty. Monthly
index (reference period: 99Q1=100) converted to a quarterly series (averaging over three
respective months). Source: European Central Bank.
Import price (ImpP): Log of import prices of goods and services, overall index, quar-
terly series (reference year 2000), in national currency, seasonally and working day ad-
justed. Source: Eurostat.
Producer price (ProdP): Log of industry producer prices, overall index, total output
prices (industry [except construction, sewage, waste management and remediation activ-
ities]), quarterly series (reference year 2005), in national currency, gross data. Source:
Eurostat.
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Figure A.1: Quarterly Data, Poland
(a) GDP in levels (b) GDP, yearly growth rate
(c) CPI in levels (d) CPI, annual rate of change
(e) IR in percent (f) ExR in levels
(g) Import Price Index in ln levels
(h) Import Price Index, annual rate of
change
(i) Producer Price Index in ln levels
(j) Producer Price Index, annual rate
of change
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B Posterior Probability Estimates for kQ, kW and kS
Table 2.4: Posterior Probability Estimates for kQ, kW and kS based on
the RJMCMC Method
Model kQ kW kS Posterior probability
1 0.0100 0.0100 0.0010 0
2 0.0500 0.0100 0.0010 0
3 0.1000 0.0100 0.0010 0.001
4 0.0100 0.0250 0.0010 0
5 0.0100 0.0250 0.0100 0.001
6 0.0100 0.1000 0.0010 0
7 0.0100 0.1000 0.0100 0.0859
8 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0
9 0.0500 0.0250 0.0010 0
10 0.0500 0.0250 0.0100 0.003
11 0.0500 0.0100 0.0100 0
12 0.0500 0.1000 0.0010 0
13 0.0500 0.1000 0.0100 0.9091
14 0.1000 0.0250 0.0010 0
15 0.1000 0.1000 0.0010 0
16 0.1000 0.1000 0.0100 0
17 0.1000 0.0250 0.0100 0
18 0.1000 0.0100 0.0100 0
Note: Posterior probability estimates are based on the reversible jump Markov
chain Monte Carlo method for the set of 18 models. These are constructed from
all possible combinations of kQ = {0.01; 0.05; 0.1} , kW = {0.001; 0.01} and kS =
{0.01; 0.025; 0.1}.
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C Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy and Ex-
change Rate Shock at the Fourth and Eighth Quar-
ter with Consumer Prices
Figure C.2: Impulse Responses at Different Horizons with Consumer Prices
(a) Responses at the 4th quarter to a Mon-
etary Policy Shock
(b) Responses at the 8th quarter to a Mon-
etary Policy Shock
(c) Responses at the 4th quarter to an Ex-
change Rate Shock
(d) Responses at the 8th quarter to an Ex-
change Rate Shock
Median impulse responses (blue solid line) to a 100 BPs monetary policy shock or 1% ex-
change rate shock with 16-th and 84-th percentiles (grey area) of the posterior distribution
of the responses at the 4th and 8th quarter, respectively.
The Impact of Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Shocks in Poland:
Evidence from a Time-Varying VAR 93
D Impact of an Exchange Rate Shock with Import-
and Producer Prices
D.1 Estimation of the Exchange Rate Shock with Import Prices
Figure D.3: Time-Varying Impulse Responses to an Exchange Rate Shock with Import
Prices
(a) GDP (b) Import Prices
(c) Interest Rate (d) Exchange Rate
Median impulse responses to a 1% exchange rate appreciation.
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D.2 Estimation of the Exchange Rate Shock with Producer
Prices




(c) Interest Rate (d) Exchange Rate
Median impulse responses to a 1% exchange rate appreciation.
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D.3 Estimation at the Fourth and Eighth Quarter to an Ex-
change Rate Shock with Import and Producer Prices
.
Figure D.5: Impulse Responses at the 4th and 8th Quarter to an Exchange Rate Shock
(a) Responses at the 4th quarter with Im-
port Prices
(b) Responses at the 8th quarter with Im-
port Prices
(c) Responses at the 4th quarter with Pro-
ducer Prices
(d) Responses at the 8th quarter with Pro-
ducer Prices
Median impulse responses (blue solid line) to a 1% exchange rate appreciation with 16-th
and 84-th percentiles (grey area) of the posterior distribution of the responses at the 4th
and 8th quarter, respectively.
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E Time-Varying Posterior Estimates of the Stochas-
tic Covariance
The stochastic covariance matrix of the residuals comprises two matrices. First, the time-
varying diagonal matrix Σt which denotes the stochastic volatility of the structural shock.
The second matrix, the time-varying lower triangular matrix At captures the size of the
simultaneous impact on the other variables of the variable which is shocked.
Concerning Σt, not much time variation is visible. Figure E.6 below shows the estimated
stochastic volatility of the structural shock on GDP, prices, the interest rate and the
exchange rate. It plots the posterior mean and the 16th and 84th percentile of the standard
deviation of the shock. The second matrix, the time-varying simultaneous relations are
plotted in Figure E.7. The simultaneous effect on the interest rate of the price shock is
clearly time varying.
Figure E.6: Volatility of Structural Shock
(a) Volatility of the Structural Shock to a
Monetary Policy Shock
(b) Volatility of the Structural Shock to an
Exchange Rate Shock
Posterior mean (solid line), 16-th and 84-th percentiles (in grey) of the standard deviation
of residuals of the GDP, price, interest rate and exchange rate equation.
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Figure E.7: Posterior Estimates for the Simultaneous Relation α˜it
Posterior estimates for the simultaneous relations. Posterior mean (solid line),
16-th and 84-th percentiles (in grey).
F Convergence Diagnostics
This section gives convergence diagnostics of the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm.
We follow Primiceri (2005) to calculate the convergence diagnostics. These autocorre-
lations measures are based on the Econometric Toolbox illustrated by LeSage (1999).
For space reasons, the convergence diagnostics are only given for estimates of the point
2012Q1.21
We refer to three measures of convergence diagnostics: (i) 10-th-order sample autocor-
relation of the draws; (ii) inefficiency factors (IFs) for the posterior estimates of the
parameters, it is an estimate of (1 + 2∑∞k=1 ρk), with ρk as the k-th-order autocorrelation
of the chain, adequate estimates are below or above the value of 20; (iii) and the Raftery
and Lewis (1992) diagnostics, calculating the necessary number of runs to obtain a certain
precision (the desired precision = 0.025, necessary probability for obtaining this precision
= 0.95, calculated for the 0.025 quantile of the marginal posterior distribution).
21Compared to other points in time, the respective estimates are very similar.
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F.1 Convergence Diagnostics of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Algorithm
The (a) panel of Figure F.8 refers on the horizontal axis throughout the points 1-36 to
B (time varying coefficients), points 37-42 correspond to A (time varying simultaneous
relations), and points 43-46 refer to Σ (time varying volatilities). Respectively, the hy-
perparameter panels (b), (c) and (d) of Figure F.8, relate throughout the points 1-1296
to Q, points 1297-1332 to S and points 1233-1348 to W .
We start with a short summary of the 10-th-order autocorrelation. It is useful to scrutinise
the autocorrelation function of the draws, to evaluate how well the randomly selected chain
mixes. For an efficient algorithm, the draws need to be independent from each other. This
is verified by low values of the autocorrelation function (see Figure F.8a and F.8b). The
autocorrelation estimates for Σ exhibit some correlation indicating inefficiency (see below
for discussion).
The diagnostics concerning the inefficiency factors (IFs) calculates values very much below
20, thus suggesting efficiency. An overview is also given in Table 2.5 below. Concerning
the IFs of A and B, the statistics show very low estimates. However, the IFs referring
to Σ indicate some inefficiency. Considering the higher dimensionality of our problem,
however, these results seem satisfactory (Kirchner et al. (2010)). Also Franta et al. (2011)
illustrate that some inefficiency should be of a minor concern when the total number of
runs required by the Raftery and Lewis (1992) statistics is well below the actual number
used in this study. As can be seen in Figures F.8a and F.8d, the suggested number
of iterations is below the actual number used. Furthermore, the impulse responses are
calculated with respect to normalised shocks, hence, the inefficiency problem should not
matter (Franta et al. (2011)).
To sum up, the total number of suggested iterations is far below the number used in
this paper and, on average, we obtain satisfying IFs as well as autocorrelation estimates.
Hence, the convergence diagnostics are sufficient.
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Table 2.5: Distribution of the Inefficiency Factors
Median Mean Min Max 10-th Percentile 90-th Percentile
A 1.2355 1.4926 0.7585 3.5888 0.7605 3.3658
B 1.3324 1.5356 0.5428 3.7816 0.8969 2.5113
Σ 146.1012 146.5849 145.2834 148.8536 145.2834 148.5536
Overview of the inefficiency factors (IFs) for the posterior estimates of different sets of time varying
parameters. A: time varying simultaneous relations; B: time varying coefficients; Σ: time varying
volatilities.
Figure F.8: Convergence Diagnostics
(a) Summary of Convergence Diagnostics for A,
B and Σ
(b) 10-th-order Autocorrelation for Q, S and
W
(c) IFs for Q, S and W
(d) Raftery and Lewis total number of runs for
Q, S and W
Panel (a) refers on the horizontal axis throughout the points 1-36 to B (time varying
coefficients), points 37-42 to A (time varying simultaneous relations), and points 43-46
to Σ (time varying volatilities). The hyperparameters in panels (b), (c) and (d) relate
throughout the points 1-1296 to Q, points 1297-1332 to S and points 1233-1348 to W .
Chapter 3
Monetary Policy Transmission
before and after the Financial Crisis:
A nonlinear VAR model for the Euro
Area
3.1 Introduction
The interest rate for main refinancing operations (MRO) is one of the most publicised and
forecasted economic indicators in the Euro Area. Interest rate changes influence economic
development and are of great importance for financial markets. Especially against the
background of the recent Euro crisis and thus the resulting challenges for a successful
conduct of monetary policy, central banks must have an accurate assessment of how its
policy decisions are transmitted through the economy. This requires a sound knowledge
on how monetary policy unfolds.
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy in the Euro Area. I analyse whether there are possible differences in the trans-
mission mechanism before and after the occurrence of the financial crisis. Furthermore, I
provide new empirical evidence on the Euro Area transmission mechanisms by employing
a nonlinear VAR model. In contrast to the linear VAR, the nonlinear VAR model al-
lows to distinguish between the effects of expected and unexpected policy changes, which
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have a very different effect on the economy. It is especially important, for an accurate
assessment of monetary policy effectiveness, to differentiate between these expectations.
Previous research mostly focused on standard VAR approaches using synthetic Euro Area
data to trace the effect of monetary policy in the Euro Area (see Van Aarle et al. (2003)
and Peersman and Smets (2003) among others). Furthermore, based on a VAR framework,
there is surprisingly little research which investigates possible differences in the Euro Area
transmission mechanism before and after the financial crisis. Since the influence of this
crisis is likely to have impaired the central banks reaction function as well as changed
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the data in this analysis is divided into
two samples ranging from January 1999 to September 2008 and from October 2008 to
December 2014.1 This allows to investigate whether there are possible differences in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy before and after the financial crisis in 2008.
To address these questions, I follow the empirical framework of Hamilton and Jorda
(2002). The estimation is based on two steps. In the first step, the short-term policy
rate is predicted via the autoregressive conditional hazard model (ACH) and the ordered
probit model (OP). This allows to capture both when and how the central bank changes
its interest rate. In the second step, the nonlinear VAR model, build on the ACH and
OP model, studies the impact of unexpected and expected monetary policy changes on
key macroeconomic variables such as output and prices. The results obtained deliver new
and more thorough insights on the Euro Area monetary policy transmission, emphasising
the importance of this approach. More specifically, I investigate the effects of monetary
policy on industrial production, prices, money growth and the exchange rate by using
a linear VAR as well as the nonlinear VAR model. My estimates show that monetary
policy shocks can have different results compared to previous results based on the stan-
dard VAR approach for the Euro Area. Especially for the pre financial crisis sample, an
unexpected increase in the policy interest rate leads to much larger effects on industrial
production, consumer prices, money growth and the exchange rate than a standard VAR
or an expected interest rate decrease which is not implemented. For both samples, the
expected but not implemented change has only a small effect on e.g. industrial produc-
tion or prices, as the market simply seems to expect a decrease at the next monetary
1Against the background of a rather short time horizon from October 2008 until January 2014, it
is necessary for the VAR estimation to extend the data series in the post financial crisis sample until
December 2014. This step provides a sufficient sample length for a time series investigation. For further
details please refer to section 3.7.1.
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policy meeting. Consequently, the nonlinear VAR model allows to distinguish and anal-
yse the influence of these two different effects where a usual linear VAR mixes these two
expectations. Compared to the pre financial crisis sample the post financial crisis impulse
responses seem to be generally less significant. This could be either due to a shorter time
horizon or it indicates a less effective monetary policy during the post crisis sample. One
can argue that the policy interest rate is close to the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) for some
parts of that period. Under such circumstances, the central bank’s ability to reduce its
short-term policy rate meaningfully ended.
I contribute to the literature in two aspects. First, recent empirical evidence on the possi-
ble influence of the financial crisis as well as evidence based on aggregated Euro Area data
following a monetary policy shock is rather scarce. Therefore, it is important to shed more
light on these issues. I address this by investigating whether there are possible changes
in the monetary transmission mechanism which may have occurred with the beginning
of the global financial crisis. To this end I split the data in September 2008, the time of
the outbreak of the financial turmoil. Hence, the pre financial crisis sample starts with
the introduction of the Euro in January 1999 and spans until September 2008. The post
financial crisis sample lasts from October 2008 until December 2014. This allows me to
shed light on whether the financial crisis led to changes in the Euro Area monetary policy
transmission mechanism. To do this, I am interested in the effects of a standard VAR as
one can argue that this is one of the most common tools to investigate monetary policy
in the Euro Area. To my knowledge, this is the first work estimating a standard VAR
for the post financial crisis period on aggregated Euro Area data. Second, by following
Hamilton and Jorda (2002), I allow for an important differentiation among an unexpected
tightening and an expected not implemented decrease in the policy rate. As pointed out,
the usual VAR response mixes the effects of these two very different expectations. My re-
sults show that taking these into account lead to very different implications of the ECB’s
monetary policy. Hence, I deliver new and more thorough insights on its effects on the
overall economy. Moreover, in contrast to Hamilton and Jorda (2002), I implement ex-
ogenous variables into the VAR specification of the nonlinear VAR model. This controls
for changes in world demand and inflation.
The structure of my paper is as follows: section 3.2 outlines previous work on interest
rate modeling, forecasting and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy effects.
Section 3.3 briefly introduces the ACH and OP model. The following two sections give
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details on the data and empirical specification. Section 3.6 presents the estimation results
of the ACH and OP model. Section 3.7 refers to the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy shocks. It is divided into five subsections: Subsection 3.7.1 outlines the VAR and
nonlinear forecasting method, subsections 3.7.2 to 3.7.4 describe the three different policy
shocks for the pre and post financial crisis sample as well as their possible differences.
Subsection 3.7.5 briefly summarises the effect of monetary policy at the ZLB within the IS-
LM framework and it provides a theoretical link between my results and the effectiveness
of monetary policy when the economy is in the liquidity trap. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Survey of Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on interest rate setting and forecasting as well as
on monetary policy transmission. Therefore, the literature overview is divided into two
subsections. First, I briefly summarise related literature on econometric models of interest
rate setting and forecasting. Second, related literature on monetary policy transmission
is outlined.
3.2.1 Interest Rate Setting and Forecasting
Abundant research is carried out to model interest rate changes. Early work was based on
the classical regression model for estimating the size of an interest rate change (compare
Froyen (1975), Lombra and Torto (1977) and Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) among others).2
Note that these approaches disregard the discreteness of interest rate changes as they
are based on the assumption that the policy interest rate follows a linear and continuous
process. Central banks announce whether interest rates change during their regular (often
monthly) meetings, defining somewhat an upper limit on possible changes during a year.
Adjustments usually occur in a series of small 25 basis point steps instead of fewer rather
2A further vital economic approach is the estimation via the ‘Taylor rule’. Taylor (1993) illustrates
that central bank behavior can be described by means of a policy reaction function. The interest rate is
the policy instrument, depending on both inflation and current output gap. However, as Svensson (1999)
states, the reaction function of central banks is usually not a Taylor-type reaction function, instead,
it is influenced by much more information. In particular, the more open the economy is, the more
potential variables have an impact. A further issue: by applying the Taylor rule, one needs information
of future inflation or current output gap which is not known at the time of the central bank’s decision on
monetary policy (Carstensen (2006)). Using information published before the meeting is more credible
and additionally serve as indicators for future inflation.
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larger ones. This emphasises the importance of a discrete choice model such as the
ordered probit model (OP). It captures such characteristics and served useful in other
studies analysing discrete variables and asymmetrical changes. For example, Hausman
et al. (1992) examine an OP model on transaction stock prices, and Dueker (1999) whether
US prime rate changes are asymmetric. By means of an OP model, the Bank of England’s
monetary policy is studied by Eichengreen et al. (1985) and Davutyan and Parke (1995).
The ECB’s policy reaction function is estimated by Carstensen (2006) and Gerlach (2007)
and Choi (1999) look at the Federal Reserve’s reaction function.
Also Hamilton and Jorda (2002) develop a model for the federal funds rate target. Their
approach is the first to consider the asymmetries in range as well as the discrete changes.
More specifically, this approach accounts for two characteristics: first, based on today’s
information there is insecurity about the next interest rate change, since the intervals
between interest rate changes are not equal in length. Their autoregressive conditional
hazard model (ACH) captures the length between interest rate changes and thus calculates
the probability of an interest rate change during the upcoming week. Second, based on an
interest rate change, the size of this change is estimated by means of the OP model. To
investigate the transmission of a monetary policy shock, a nonlinear forecasting model,
based on the ACH and OP results, is developed.3 Their contribution marks a forecast
improvement and significantly enhances VAR predictions. In contrast to a standard linear
VAR, it differentiates between an expected interest decrease not implemented and an
unexpected increase in the policy rate. They find that these two expectations lead to
very different implications of a monetary policy shock. As a result, it is important to
take it for an accurate assessment of the monetary policy transmission into account (for
further details, see below in section 3.2.2). I use their seminal framework to examine the
ECB’s monetary policy and its implications for the Euro Area.
3A lot of literature is concentrating on discrete event forecasts. It is based on a given information set,
establishing nonlinear functions which require numerically intensive methods (see e.g. Cargnoni et al.
(1997), Piazzesi (2001), Lunde and Timmermann (2004), Dueker (2005)). However, Hamilton and Jorda
(2002) propose an easier calculation based on the model of Engle and Russell (1998). Compare 3.3.1
for a detailed description on developing a data generating process where the nonlinear function becomes
simpler, not requiring extensive numerical calculations.
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3.2.2 Monetary Policy Transmission
In monetary policy analysis, VAR models have been for some decades time a very popular
tool for analysing monetary policy transmission. There is extensive literature concentrat-
ing on the US monetary transmission mechanism (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992),
Sims (1992) and Evans and Marshall (1998)). Regarding the Euro Area, most of the
research on monetary policy transmission is on cross-country differences.4 In contrast,
the monetary transmission on the aggregate level is not as large. In terms of a structural
VAR refer to Monticelli and Tristani (1999), Van Aarle et al. (2003) and Peersman and
Smets (2003).5 Cecioni et al. (2011) use a Bayesian VAR for analysing the European
monetary transmission mechanism. However, so far most of the Euro Area analyses rely
on synthetic data from 1980 onwards.6 During this time a common central bank and
hence a common monetary policy was not yet established. Studies using actual Euro
Area data are Weber et al. (2009), Cecioni et al. (2011) and Fahr et al. (2013). Weber
et al. (2009) analyse whether the creation of the Euro Area changed the transmission
mechanism by means of a standard VAR with a Cholesky decomposition. Their time
horizon ranges from 1999Q1 until 2006Q4. Following a monetary policy tightening, GDP
temporarily declines and prices have a delayed response and then remain permanently at
a lower level. Cecioni et al. (2011) and Fahr et al. (2013) estimate a Bayesian VAR. More
specifically, Fahr’s et al. (2013) estimation is based on recursive identification with 12
variables from January 1999 until December 2011 at monthly frequency.7 Cecioni et al.
(2011) use an identification based on recursive identification or sign restrictions for the
period from January 1999 to July 2007 or to August 2009. According to previous findings
in the literature, Cecioni et al. (2011) estimate a temporary fall in output and a perma-
nent decline in prices following a monetary tightening. The difference between the two
sample periods (until 2007 or 2009) is not large. By comparing these two samples, they
4A structural VAR is, e.g., used by Mojon and Peersman (2001) and Peersman (2004) and more
recently Barigozzi et al. (2013) apply a dynamic factor model. A detailed overview on the country
specific effects as well as on aggregated Euro Area level is given by Angeloni et al. (2002).
5Generally these studies find a temporarily reduction in output, with the peak effect occurring after
about one year. Prices respond with a delayed decrease and then stay permanently at a lower level.
6Studies using synthetic European data are for example Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), Peersman and
Smets (2003), Smets and Wouters (2003), Andrés et al. (2006), Sousa and Zaghini (2008), Barigozzi et al.
(2013) and Castelnuovo (2013). The synthetic data is generated by aggregating the national data of 11
national countries which first adopted the Euro. For further information of the aggregation method, see
Fagan et al. (2005)
7Following a standard policy shock in Fahr et al. (2013), output is only slightly and temporarily
influenced, whereas the effect on prices is insignificant.
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investigate whether there are possible differences in the transmission mechanism occur-
ring from the financial crisis in 2008. However, as generally argued in the literature, the
financial crisis has led to a rethinking of monetary policy frameworks. Concerning the
ECB, Gerlach and Lewis (2010) provide evidence on a policy shift after the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. This highlights the importance of a sample split
in September 2008. Therefore, Cecioni’s et al. (2011) approach does not fully capture the
influence of the financial crisis on the transmission mechanism.
Against this background, recent empirical evidence on the possible influence of the finan-
cial crisis as well as evidence based on aggregated Euro Area data following a monetary
policy shock is rather scarce. I address this by analysing whether there are possible dif-
ferences in the transmission mechanism due to the occurrence of the financial crisis by
means of a standard VAR and the nonlinear VAR. My results show that taking these
into account lead to very different implications of the ECB’s monetary policy. Therefore,
this paper gives new and more thorough insights on monetary policy effects in the Euro
Area.
3.3 The Model
To model the interest rate setting of the ECB, I follow Hamilton and Jorda (2002). In
what follows I briefly summarise in section 3.3.1 the ACH model and in section 3.3.2 the
OP model.
3.3.1 The Autoregressive Conditional Hazard Model
Based on today’s information, there is insecurity about the next interest rate change,
since the intervals between these changes are not equal in length. The autoregressive
conditional hazard model (ACH) captures the duration and thus the dynamics of the
intervals by calculating the probability of an interest rate change during the next period.
For estimating this probability of an interest rate change during the next period, the
autoregressive conditional duration model (ACD) of Engle and Russell (1998) is extended
to the ACH model.8 The ACD model is designed to explain the dynamics of events
8Engle and Russell (1998) construct a new statistical model, able to deal with data arriving at
asymmetrical intervals. Since the model evaluates the expected time between events - the average interval
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occurring as well as the average interval of time between events.
The duration between events is denoted by un. It summarises the length between the nth
and the (n+1)th point in time the central bank changed the interest rate. The expectation
of un conditional on past durations un−1, un−2, . . . is described by ψn. The ACD(r,m) is
then written as:9







With the help of recursion one can write u1−j = u¯, where u¯ describes the average length
between interest rate changes; and ψ1−j = ψ¯, with ψ¯ denoting the average expected




1−∑rj=1 βj . (3.2)
Every event ‘interest rate change’ leads to a new value in equation (3.1). In case of no
event, ψn stays the same. To explain this, let N(t) describe the cumulative amount of
changes in the interest rate at month t. Hence, N(t) is a counting process since the events
‘interest rate change’ generate a discrete time series. In case of an interest rate change
in the interval (0, t], N(t) counts further. For example, N(0) = 0, N(t) = N(t− 1) if no
change occurs in the interval (t − 1, t], and N(t) = N(t − 1) + 1 if the interest rate is
changed at time t.10 Equation 3.1 can then be rewritten in terms of the counting process
and thus in calender time with ψN(t) for expected duration or respectively uN(t) for the
- it is referred to as the autoregressive conditional duration model (ACD). The duration between events
is viewed as a random process and the approach introduces a new class of point processes with dependent
arrival rates.
9Equation (3.1) is reminiscent of ARMA models, where ψn - the expected duration - is a function
of past durations of lag order r and expected durations of lag order m. Equation (3.1) can therefore be





j=1 βj < 1 has to hold.
10For illustrative purpose, assume that the first change occurs in month three and the second in month
seven. Then N(t) has the following structure:
N(t) =

0 for t = 1, 2
1 for t = 3, 4, 5, 6
2 for t = 7, 8, . . .
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This also allows to incorporate updated information, which is crucial for forecasting the
occurrence of the next interest rate change.
The hazard rate ht denotes the conditional probability of an interest rate change based
on the information set Υt−1 known at time t - 1. The hazard rate can be written as:
ht = Pr[N(t) 6= N(t− 1)|Υt−1]. (3.4)
Note that the hazard rate can also be written in terms of expected duration ψN(t−1) which





The term zt−1 characterises the vector of explanatory variables. It describes the infor-
mation set known at time t − 1, and δ denotes its parameter vector.11 The function λ
assures a proper estimation of the hazard rate. More specifically, it may occur that the
denominator takes on a value that is too small and hence ht may lie outside of (0, 1). In
this case, ht is specified to a constant just below unity. It therefore provides a smooth
transfer and ensures 0 < h < 1.12
It is now straight forward to estimate the log likelihood function. If the ECB changes its
interest rate during month t, then xt = 1 and zero otherwise. As denoted in equation (3.4),
the likelihood function is the probability of observing xt conditional on the information
set Υt−1:
g(xt|Υt−1; θ1) = (ht)xt(1− ht)1−xt , (3.6)





1.0001 v ≤ 1
1.0001 + 2∆0(v−1)
2
∆20+(v−1)2 1 < v ≤ 1 + ∆0
0.0001 + v v ≥ 1 + ∆0,
with ∆0 = 0.1.
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[xtlog(ht) + (1− xt)log(1− ht)], (3.7)
which is maximised with respect to the unknown parameters (θ1). Additionally, it is
necessary for the numerical optimisation algorithms to restrict αj ≥ 0, βj ≥ 0, and
0 ≤ β1 + . . .+ βr ≤ 1.
As mentioned, I assess different combinations of explanatory variables. For evaluating
their respective performance, the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria are used (for
further details, see section 3.3.2).
It is important to clarify the underlying frequency for result interpretation. The time units
affect the magnitude of ψ, the expected duration. For example, if the chosen time interval
is very short, the probability of a change during an interval becomes small. The probability
rises in case of a longer interval. But, one has to ensure that no more than one event occurs
during each interval; this would lead to an invalid estimation of equation (3.5). I take a
monthly frequency for two reasons: (1) the Governing Council of the ECB meets every
four weeks to decide upon their monetary policy and (2) for the Euro Area most data
is published on a monthly frequency. Using weekly data is therefore meaningless since
there is not enough updated information in between that may contribute to a change.13
Regarding the ECB, using a monthly model is hence a proper assumption.14
3.3.2 The Ordered Probit Model
So far the focus was whether the ECB intends to alter the interest rate on MROs next
month or if it is to stay constant. As a next step, I examine the size of the interest rate
change conditional on a change. This is done with the help of the ordered probit model
(OP).15
13In contrast, Hamilton and Jorda (2002) use a weekly frequency for their US-estimation as they have
enough data on a weekly frequency available.
14Note, this ensure that the hazard rate h is specified between (0 < h < 1).
15The literature characterises such a time series as a marked point process, whereas the point process
describes the probability of an interest rate change at time t. ‘Marks’ refer to the magnitude by which
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Since the policy interest rate changes in discrete fixed amounts, usually in multiples of
25 basis points, there are only k different discrete amounts by which the ECB changes
the policy rate (see section 3.5 for the specification of the exact number of states k). The
OP model is designed to model discrete changes, therefore it is a suitable approach to
estimate the magnitude of a change given the information set Υt−1 and conditional on a
change.
I assume that there is an unobserved variable y∗t which is related to the observed interest
rate changes yt. y∗t depends on a vector of exogenous variables wt−1, characterising the
available information at period t− 1 such that
y∗t = w′t−1pi + t, (3.8)
where t|wt−1 i.i.d N(0, 1). The k possible interest rate changes by which the ECB im-
plements a change can be denoted by s1 < s2 < . . . < sk. The relationship between




s1 if y∗t ∈ (−∞, c1]
s2 if y∗t ∈ (c1, c2]
...
sk if y∗t ∈ (ck−1,∞),
(3.9)
where the partition boundaries c have the structure c1 < c2 < . . . < ck and c0 = −∞, ck =
∞. They define the interval boundaries of y∗t . The conditional probability of an interest
rate change by the amount sj in period t is given by:
Pr(yt = sj|wt−1, xt = 1) = Pr(cj−1 < w′t−1pi +  ≤ cj),
where j = 1, 2, . . . , k. It is conditioned on a change (xt = 1) as well as on w′t−1.16 This
probability is described by means of the standard normal cumulative distribution function
Φ(z). It is then possible to rewrite these conditional probabilities. Note that xt = 1 in
the ECB decreases or increases the interest rate.
16These probabilities are mainly based on the partition boundaries c and the particular distribution
of . As assumed in equation (3.8), the error term is normally distributed.
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case of a change and zero otherwise:
Pr(yt = sj|wt−1, xt = 1) =

Φ(c1 − w′t−1pi) for j = 1
Φ(cj − w′t−1pi)− Φ(cj−1 − w′t−1pi) for j = 2, 3, . . . , k − 1
1− Φ(ck−1 − w′t−1pi) for j = k.
(3.10)
The exogenous variables, wt−1, influence the size of an interest rate change. More specif-
ically, a ‘higher’ interval becomes more likely the larger the value of wt−1pi (vector of
exogenous variables multiplied by the respective coefficient). For example, a rise in the
exogenous variable GDP induces the ECB to increase its interest rate, leading to a positive
OP-coefficient of this exogenous variable.
The maximum likelihood estimation calculates the parameters of the OP model. The log
of equation (3.10) is taken and l(yt|wt−1) denotes the log of the probability of observing
yt given xt = 1 and wt−1:
l(yt|wt−1; θ2) =

log [Φ(c1 − w′t−1pi)] if yt = s1
log [Φ(cj − w′t−1pi)− Φ(cj−1 − w′t−1pi] if yt = s2, . . . , sk−1
log [1− Φ(ck−1 − w′t−1pi)] if yt = sk,
(3.11)






which is maximised with respect to θ2 and cj > cj−1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
The following equation gives the joint log likelihood of the ACH and OP model. More
specifically, it describes when and how the interest rate is changed by the ECB. The
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log f(xt, yt|Υt−1; θ1, θ2) = L1(θ1) + L2(θ2). (3.13)
The respective additive terms are given in equation (3.7) and (3.12).18
As mentioned before, by means of the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, I evalu-
ate the performance of different combinations of explanatory variables. These are stan-
dard tools in the literature for assessing the performance of different explanatory variable
combinations. I employ these criteria to find a suitable model specification which best
characterises the setting of the interest rate on MROs. More specifically, I search for
the combination of explanatory variables which yields the best model for explaining the
interest rate setting. These criteria provide a valuation of finite samples and comprise the
trade-off between including more explanatory variables and the overall goodness of fit.19
3.4 Data
Next to the editorials of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, also Hamilton and Jorda (2002) and
Gerlach (2007) serve as a guideline for variable selection. As discussed in section 3.3.1,
I use monthly data. Earlier research papers, such as Gerlach (2007) and Chevapatrakul
et al. (2007), which focus on analysing monetary policy strategies, also use monthly data.
According to the ECB’s two pillar strategy, I broadly classify the examined variables into
two groups. The first group of explanatory variables relates to macroeconomic develop-
ments (second pillar of the ECB) while the second group includes variables on financial
17The unknown parameters in the ACH model comprise the explanatory variables as well as α. Re-
garding the OP model, I estimate in addition to the explanatory variables the partition boundaries (see
section 3.5 for a detailed description).
18Like Engle (2003) illustrates, if θ1 and θ2 have no parameters in common it is the same as if
equation (3.13) is maximised or if one calculates a separate maximisation of equation (3.7) and (3.12)
respectively. Even if θ1 and θ2 have common parameters, consistent but inefficient estimates are obtained
by calculating the joint likelihood function in equation (3.13) separately.
19The general objective is to minimise them and thus find a specification which describes the underlying
data the best. The Akaike and Schwarz information criteria are defined as follows:
AIC = −2LT + 2 kT
SBC = −2LT + log(T ) kT ,
(3.14)
where k denotes the number of estimated parameters, L depicts the maximised log likelihood value and
T refers to the number of observations.
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and monetary aggregates (first and second pillar of the ECB).
Variables belonging to the first group are inflation-, output- and employment measures. A
detailed overview on the considered variables is given in Table 3.1. I use a core inflation
indicator20, a 12-month expected inflation forecast to account for the forward looking
behavior of the ECB, a GDP deflater and a unit labour cost index to examine to which
extent labour market earnings put pressure on prices.
Regarding the output measures, I use industrial production, output-gap and the Euro
Stoxx (50).21 Further, the consumer and economic sentiment indicators are used since
the ECB discusses them in their monthly editorials. It is sensible for them to use these
indices as a proxy for the actual state of the economy.22
To take the developments on labor markets into account, I refer to a unemployment rate
forecast.
Next to these inflation and output measure, the ECB also focuses on money and credit
growth indicators. I use M3 as money growth is an important measure for the Council
to decide upon possible monetary policy changes. It emphasises inflationary pressure
arising from monetary sources. For the Council this variable is the single most important
indicator of monetary developments. I also consider the previous change of the interest
rate on MROs.23 The 6-month spread between the Bubill (non-interest-bearing treasury
bill) and the interbank Eonia rate (overnight interbank interest rate) is also taken into
account. Expectations in short-term market rates of a change in the official interest rate
can hence be captured in changes of the Bubill spread (compare Goodhart (1996), Sack
(2000) and Rudebusch (2002)). I also investigate the Council’s reaction towards changes
in the real effective exchange rate.24
One can divide the suggested explanatory variables into two information sets regarding
20It seems suitable to apply the common Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) as an inflation
measure for the Euro Area. However, world inflation rates were to some extent influenced by international
price level shocks. These arose in particular in the energy sector during the last decades. But, these shocks
may be viewed as temporary effects on prices and can thus can be ignored by central banks. Therefore,
the core inflation measure provides an appropriate indicator.
21The output gap variable is considered e.g. by Chevapatrakul et al. (2007) and Svensson (1999).
22Note, these time series are non-reversible, that is they are not due to revisions. Compare Gerlach
(2007) for further details.
23An overview of the dates and magnitude of the changes in the interest rate on MROs is given in
Appendix A Table 3.6.
24This indicator is defined such that a negative growth rate implies a depreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis
the rest of the world.
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their ability to predict changes in the policy interest rate. The narrower information set
incorporates measures such as future expected values of inflation, changes in the Bubill
spread and M3 growth, whereas the wider information set contains variables ahead of
this. Nevertheless, it is crucial to analyse the influence of the latter category as in practice
pressure to raise interest rates arise from various sources.25 Basically one can expect that
variables belonging to the wider information set reveal a lower significance.
In general, final revised figures are used because forecast-series of past decades are not
available anymore. This is due to the fact that they are regularly updated and revised.
Most of the considered explanatory variables are lagged by one month, unless otherwise
stated, accounting for the respective availability of information. For example, inflation
for the month of January is not released before the middle of February.26
25Such sources encompass money, financial and labor markets, demand and output, prices as well as
monetary policy (compare Chevapatrakul et al. (2007)).
26For simplification, the value of January is still used even if the ECB meets at the beginning of
February.
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3.5 The ECB’s MRO’s Interest Rate
One focus of my paper is to characterise the setting of the ECB’s main policy interest rate,
the main refinancing operations interest rate (MROs). This interest rate provides the bulk
of liquidity to the banking system. It is therefore useful to look at its development across
time. The considered time period of this study ranges from January 1999, when the ECB
started to undertake the common monetary policy for the Euro Area, up to December
2014.27 From January 1999 until June 2000 the ECB conducted its main refinancing
Figure 3.1: Development of the Policy Interest Rate
Interest Rate on MROs: Fixed Rate/ Minimum Bid Rate in percent from January 1999 through December
2014 (monthly data). The forecast for the policy rate from January 2014 onwards is obtained from Feri
Euro Rating GmbH. Grey areas mark official recession periods in the Euro Area (source: OECD recession
indicator for the Euro Area from the peak through the period preceding the trough).
operations on the basis of a fixed-rate tender procedure. During the period from June
2000 until October 2008 a variable rate tender system, also called minimum bid rate, was
used. The minimum bid rate refers to the minimum interest rate at which counterparties
may place their bids. In October 2008, the ECB reinstated to the fixed-rate tender
procedure.
In order to test whether there are significant differences in the monetary policy trans-
mission before and after the financial crisis, the analysis of this paper is divided into two
samples ranging from January 1999 until September 2008 and from October 2008 until
December 2014. During the pre financial crisis sample the interest rate changed 38 times
27To have a sufficient length for estimating the second sample, an extension of the data set from
February 2014 until December 2014 becomes necessary. See section 3.7.1 for further details.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 117
and during the post financial crisis sample 14 changes were implemented (Figure 3.2).
From the development of the interest rate on MROs, one can see that its pattern seems
to be related to the development of economic activity (Figure 3.1). Interest rates are
adjusted upwards during periods of high economic growth and vice versa during a time
of recession.28 This pattern is in particular apparent for the latest financial crisis which
started in mid 2008 and induced the central bank to quickly lower their key interest rates.
The step-wise pattern of the interest rate changes arises because it is set in multiples of
25 basis points. The ECB seems to follow a policy based on small interest rate changes.
If a change occurred, it was mostly a 25 basis point change (Figure 3.2). As explained
Figure 3.2: Magnitude of Interest Rate Changes on MROs (in %)
Pre Financial Crisis Sample: Jan 1999 - Sep
2008
Post Financial Crisis Sample: Oct 2008 -
Dec 2014
above, I need to specify the number of states k which are used in the estimation of the
OP model. k denotes the different discrete amounts by which the ECB may change the
interest rate. Figure 3.2 shows that they did not alter the interest rate by more than 75
basis points in absolute value. Based on this information, I define five states for the pre
crisis sample and four states for the post crisis sample, as it is important to guarantee
that each state consists of at least one observation.29 Hence, the possible interest changes
sk are defined as follows:
Pre crisis sample: s1 = −0.5 and less; s2 = −0.25; s3 = 0; s4 = 0.25; s5 = 0.5 and more
Post crisis sample: s1 = −0.5 and less; s2 = −0.25; s3 = 0; s4 = 0.25 and more
28For example, inflationary pressure might be high during boom periods, whereas a slump is in general
characterised by lower inflation rates. Since the crucial aim of the ECB is to achieve and maintain price
stability, they accordingly adjust their main monetary policy steering tool, the interest rate on MROs.
29Therefore, four or three interval boundaries are respectively estimated for the pre financial crisis
sample or the post crisis sample.
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3.6 Empirical Results
In the subsequent two sections the estimates of the ACH and OP model are outlined.
3.6.1 Estimates of the ACH Model
The objective of the ACH model is to calculate the probability of the ECB changing
the interest rate on MROs during any given month. Since the decisions are presumably
influenced by the development and outlook of economic conditions, I incorporate a set of
exogenous variables zt−1 in the estimation of the hazard rate (compare equation 3.5).
Besides the exogenous variables, the specifications additionally comprise a constant c
and the variable τN(t−1)−1 denotes the duration in months between the last interest rate
changes as of month t− 1.30
I expect negative coefficients of the explanatory variables since they are specified to be
in the denominator of the hazard rate (compare equation (3.5)). This implicates that
negative and significant coefficients contribute to an increase in the probability of an
interest rate change in period t.
For the specific task of forecasting whether the ECB changes its interest rate on MROs
during the pre financial crisis sample, the absolute value of the spread between the six-
month Bubill rate and the Eonia rate and the inflation forecast prove to be very useful
(Table 3.2). According to the ECB statements, the inflation forecast delivers a much
better performance than other macro indicators. For forecasting an interest rate change
during the post crisis sample, a specification without the inflation forecast but with the
Bubill spread yields the best performance. This finding may indicate that the aggregated
inflation development seems to be of minor importance for the interest rate setting during
the post crisis sample. Generally, one can argue that the Euro Area is close to a liquidity
trap during some parts of this period.31 Under such circumstances interest rates are close
to zero since inflation rates are very low (refer to section 3.7.5 for a brief discussion of
monetary policy at the ZLB as well as for a possible linkage of my results to monetary
30I exclude the expected lagged duration (ψN(t−1)−1) as of month t− 1 from equation 3.5 because the
underlying data did not provide the necessary dynamic for receiving feasible estimates. Possible reasons:
the available time horizon and the monthly frequency do not yet provide the sufficient dynamic.
31In the middle of 2009 the interest rate has been decreased to 1% and since August 2013, the interest
rate on MROs is at 0.5% or below.
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Table 3.2: ACH Parameter Estimates for the Pre Financial Crisis Sample
(Jan 1999 - Sep 2008)
Parameter Variable Estimate Standard Error
α uN(t−1)−1 0.2548* 0.1306
δ1 Constant 38.1140*** 13.4075
δ2 |InflF12t−1| -16.5658*** 5.8118
δ3 |SPt−1| -13.8801*** 4.7037
Note: Dependent variable: probability of an interest rate change; number of obser-
vations: 117. Log likelihood is -50.3768. Variable definitions: |InflF12t−1| is the
absolute value of the 12-month ahead average of the inflation forecast at time t − 1.
|SPt−1| is the absolute value of the spread between the six-month Bubill rate and the
Eonia rate (overnight interbank interest rate).
policy in a liquidity trap). Table 3.3 summarises the estimates on the post financial crisis
sample.
The hazard rate of the pre financial crisis sample reveals about a one in seven chance of
an interest rate change during the next month (h = 0.1306).32 The hazard rate of the
post financial crisis sample is 0.123.
Regarding explanatory variables on inflation, output, money growth and the exchange
rate, I receive, as expected, negative and also significant coefficients for the pre financial
crisis sample. For the post financial crisis sample, I still obtain negative coefficients but
the significance is somewhat less pronounced. This finding may also mirror the fact that
the Euro Area is close to or at the ZLB during some parts of the post crisis sample (see
below in section 3.7.5 for a more detailed discussion).
As a robustness check, the post crisis sample is also estimated on data from October 2008
until January 2014. This excludes the forecast horizon from February 2014 until December
2014. The estimated coefficients and their significance confirm those presented.
32The hazard rate during the pre financial crisis sample is calculated as follows:
1
(0.2548)(4.1538) + 38.114 + (−16.5658)(1.7447) + (−13.8801)(0.1883) =
1
7.6564 = 0.1306. (3.15)
with the two explanatory variables on the absolute value of the inflation forecast and the spread. The
average absolute spread is 0.1883, the average inflation forecast equals 1.7447 and the mean duration u¯
is 4.1538. The coefficient estimates are given in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.3: ACH Parameter Estimates for the Post Financial Crisis Sam-
ple (Oct 2008 - Dec 2014)
Parameter Variable Estimate Standard Error
α uN(t−1)−1 0.9671** 0.4487
δ1 Constant 5.4495** 2.1641
δ2 |SPt−1| -8.4437*** 3.1430
Note: Dependent variable: probability of an interest rate change; number of obser-
vations: 75. Log likelihood is -28.408. Variable definitions: |SPt−1| is the absolute
value of the spread between the six-month Bubill rate and the Eonia rate (overnight
interbank interest rate).
3.6.2 Empirical Estimates of the OP Model
Next, I summarise the results of the OP model, which estimates the size of a change given
an interest rate change occurs.
The crucial point of the OP model is to determine the possible categories by which the
Governing Council may change the interest rate on MROs. Four partition boundaries
for the pre financial crisis sample and three for the post crisis sample are estimated (see
section 3.5).
For both samples, the OP results reveal the expected signs and significance on the used
explanatory variables. More specifically, measures on money growth, economic outcome
(industrial production, GDP, economic sentiment, Euro Stoxx) have the expected positive
sign and are significant. This implicates that a stronger performance of such variables
increases the probability of an increase in the interest rate on MROs. Furthermore,
estimated coefficients on the unemployment rate, its forecast as well as the real effective
exchange rate have negative coefficients and are less significant. This is in line with
economic theory. More specifically, these results suggest a higher probability of a decrease
in the ECB’s policy interest rate following an appreciation of the Euro and an increase in
the unemployment rate. However, the explanatory power of the employment indicators
and the exchange is not very strong. This mirrors that the development of these variables
generally have a less important impact on the ECB’s decision of an interest rate change.
For the specific task of estimating the size of an interest rate change during the pre and
post financial crisis sample, the previous change in the interest rate, denoted by ytN(t−1) ,
serves very useful. The positive value reveals that a previous rise in the policy rate
increases the probability of an increase within the current month. An according strong
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Table 3.4: OP Parameter Estimates for the Pre Financial Crisis Sample
(Jan 1999 - Sep 2008)
Parameter Variable Estimate Standard Error
pi1 ytN(t−1) 0.6560* 0.4078





Note: Dependent variable: size of interest rate change; number of observations: 117.
Log likelihood is -62.0857. Variable definitions: ytN(t−1) is the magnitude of the last
target change as of date t − 1. SPt−1 is the value of the the six-month Bubill rate
minus the Eonia rate.
Table 3.5: Parameter Estimates for the Post Financial Crisis Sample
(Oct 2008 - Dec 2014) of the OP-Model
Parameter Variable Estimate Standard Error
pi1 ytN(t−1) 3.7908*** 0.3361





Note: Dependent variable: size of interest rate change; number of observations: 75.
Log likelihood is -28.5913. Variable definitions: ytN(t−1) is the magnitude of the last
target change as of date t − 1. SPt−1 is the value of the the six-month Bubill rate
minus the Eonia rate.
explanatory power is also estimated for the spread between the six-month Bubill rate and
the Eonia rate, SPt−1 for both samples. This spread captures the expectation in short-
term market rates of a change in the policy interest rate. If the six-month Bubill rate is
above the Eonia rate, the ECB is more likely to raise the interest rate. Tables 3.4 and 3.5
summarise the estimates for the pre and post financial crisis samples respectively.
To check whether my OP results are sensitive to an extension until December 2014, I
reestimate the post financial crisis sample also on data from October 2008 until January
2014. The results confirm those presented.
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3.7 Monetary Policy Shocks
The method used by this paper allows to compare impulse responses between the linear
VAR and the nonlinear VAR model. Based on linear VARs, a large amount of work is
carried out on calculating the influence of monetary policy. But, the linear VAR mixes
the effects of two expectations: impulse responses based on (a) an expected interest rate
decrease which is not implemented by the central bank and (b) an unexpected increase
in the policy interest rate. In contrast, the nonlinear VAR model differentiates between
the influence of these two very different effects. Section 3.7.1 briefly summarises the used
VAR model as well as the non-linear VAR model. For more details on the estimation of
the non-linear model refer to section D in the Appendix. Sections 3.7.2 to 3.7.4 describe
the results obtained for the pre and post financial crisis samples as well as their possible
differences. Section 3.7.5 briefly discusses the effect of monetary policy at the ZLB and
provides a theoretical link between my results and the influence of monetary policy in a
liquidity trap.
3.7.1 Specification of the VAR set up
I extend Hamilton and Jorda’s (2002) model and additionally incorporate exogenous vari-
ables. Thus, I estimate the VAR model based on two groups of variables. The first group
of variables, xt, denotes a vector of exogenous foreign variables for month t. It contains
monthly data on the log of an oil price index (oilt), the log of US IP (yUSt ) and a US
short-term nominal interest rate (sUSt ).33 By including these variables, I capture changes
in world demand and inflation and avoid a potential price puzzle.34
xt = (oilt, yUSt , sUSt )′ (3.16)
The exogenous variables are determined outside the VAR system. More specifically, these
variables influence the second group of variables, the endogenous variables, contempo-
raneously. But the endogenous variables have no feedback on the exogenous variables.
33Crude Oil-Brent, FOB, in USD, per barrel; US IP, total index volumes, 2007=100 prices, seasonally
adjusted, in USD; US T-Bill, secondary market, 3 month, middle rate. See Appendix B for more details.
34The price puzzle is a widespread empirical finding in the VAR literature arising from the issue
that monetary policy makers consider information on inflation which is not included in the set of VAR
variables. This may lead to price increases following an interest rate tightening. For further details see
Sims (1992).
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The endogenous variables are specified by yt which denotes a vector of observable macro
variables.
yt = (IPt,Pt,MROt,M3t,ExRt)′ (3.17)
The VAR-model is estimated in levels. More precisely, I use monthly data on the log of
industrial production (IP), log consumer prices (P), the interest rate on main refinancing
operations (MRO) in levels, the log money aggregate M3 (M3) and the log of the real
effective exchange rate (ExR).35 An estimation based on levels allows for implicit co-
integrating relationships in the data, and still have consistent estimates of the parameters
(Sims et al. (1990)). Standard information criteria specify the lag length of the VAR.
Based on the Likelihood Ratio (LR) and the Akaike criterion (AIC), 6 lags are used for the
pre and post crisis samples. The pre crisis sample covers the time period between January
1999 and September 2008, whereas the post crisis sample ranges from October 2008 until
December 2014. From February 2014 onwards forecasted data on the endogenous and
exogenous variables is used.36
The ordering of the variables is the same as in equation (3.17). In general, this choice
is motivated by Peersman and Smets (2003), Kim and Roubini (2000), Sims (1992) and
Christiano et al. (1999). This ordering implies that a Euro Area monetary policy shock
has no contemporaneous influence on IP and prices. This feedback rule is based on
the assumption that firms do not immediately change output and prices following an
unexpected change in the policy interest rate.37 Furthermore, it is more realistic to
assume that output and prices do not simultaneously respond to policy shocks within a
month than within a quarter. Since I use a monthly frequency, this assumption should
be not as restrictive. IP and consumer prices are summarised in a vector of variables
which come before MROt and is given by y1t = (IPt,Pt). Instead, the monetary policy
shock may have an impact on M3 and the exchange rate. Hence, the ordering suggests
35Euro Area IP, excluding construction, 2010=100, seasonally adjusted; Euro Area 17 harmonised
index of consumer prices, all items, 2005 = 100, not seasonally adjusted; Euro area money supply M3,
current account, amount outstanding, seasonally adjusted; Euro Area real effective exchange rate, CPI
deflated, broad group (40 partners).
36For detailed information on the data, see Appendix SectionB. Feri Euro Rating provided the monthly
forecasts on IP, HICP, MRO, M3, ExR, oil price index, short term US interest rate and the forecast for
US IP. As pointed out, the extension of the second sample is necessary since a sample until January 2014
does not provide a sufficient sample length for estimation of the monthly nonlinear VAR model.
37Adjustment costs and planning delays may hinder firms to act within the same month (Kim and
Roubini (2000)).
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that the interest rate on MROs is not simultaneously influenced by ExR and money stock
changes. The respective vector of variables is y2t = (M3t,ExRt).38 For robustness, I
also change the ordering of the endogenous variables. This does not significantly affect
my results presented in sections 3.7.2 to 3.7.4. To identify a monetary policy shock, a
standard Cholesky-decomposition is used. The impulse response functions are given by:
∂E(yt+s|xt,MROt, y1t, yt−1, yt−2, . . .)
∂MROt
.
Similarly, it is possible to write the effects for yt+s of new information aboutMROt which is
by definition an orthogonalised shock. The corresponding definition of an orthogonalised
shock is given by
uMROt = MROt − E(MROt|xt, y1t, yt−1, yt−2, . . .),
which can be rewritten as
uMROt = MROt −MROt−1 − [E(MROt|xt, y1t, yt−1, . . .)−MROt−1]. (3.18)
Two situations lead to a positive uMROt in equation 3.18. First, the ECB increased the
interest rate on MROs (MROt − MROt−1 > 0), while the market did not anticipate a
change (E(MROt|xt, y1t, yt−1, . . .) − MROt−1 = 0). Second, the ECB kept its interest
rate constant (MROt − MROt−1 = 0), whereas the market anticipated a decrease in
the interest rate (E(MROt|xt, y1t, yt−1, . . .) − MROt−1 < 0). For further details on the
nonlinear forecasting model and its estimation, refer to Appendix D.
3.7.2 Pre Financial Crisis Results on Monetary Policy Trans-
mission
Figure 3.3 plots the influence of the three monetary policy shocks for the pre crisis sample
and in Figure E.2, E.3 and E.4 in Appendix E the respective impulse responses with
38The assumption that the ExR does not simultaneous influence the policy rate is suitable for large
and relatively closed economies such as the Euro Area as a whole. This is, in addition to Peersman
(2004), also stated by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) regarding the US economy. Additionally, the ExR
is an arbitrage equation. It depicts the financial market equilibrium and it is a forward-looking asset
price which comprises all information available today (Kim and Roubini (2000)).
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confidence bands are given. Note that the responses of each shock are normalised to a
100 basis point (BP) shock in the interest rate. The length of the impulse responses
is set to 18 months. The linear VAR impulse response functions are displayed via the
solid lines and estimate the influence of a 100 BP increase in MROt. They show that a
temporary tightening of the interest rate on MROs seems to be followed by a decrease
in money stock (M3). However, this effect is insignificant (see Figure E.2 in Appendix
E). The ExR seems to significantly depreciate on impact and during the first month
following the shock.39 Both IP and consumer prices follow with a delayed decrease. The
effect on output is slightly significant between 12 and 13 months (see Appendix E Figure
E.2). This may reflect that a more credible central bank is generally assumed to obtain
its monetary policy goal at lower output costs (Clements et al. (2001)). For prices, I
estimate an insignificant decrease. In contrast to an earlier study on European data by
Peersman and Smets (2003), who use a similar approach but a different data horizon
with synthetic Euro Area data, my VAR result reveal an insignificant and non-permanent
decline in prices.
Impulse response functions following the unexpected increase in the interest rate are on
average comparable to the VAR impulses but quantitatively much larger. They are sum-
marised via the dashed line in Figure 3.3. Figure E.3 in Appendix E reports the responses
with confidence bands. Numerically my results are comparable to the US-results of Hamil-
ton and Jorda (2002). Compared to the linear VAR responses, the unexpected shock seems
to imply much larger and more long lasting effects on IP, prices, M3 and the ExR. More
specifically, following the unexpected shock, both IP and prices significantly decrease. The
significant decline in IP occurs after 12 months and prices fall significantly between three
and six months and again between 11 and 13 months. Furthermore, the fall in prices,
following the unexpected shock, leads to a larger decline in prices than based on the linear
VAR shock. Based on the unexpected shock, prices decline by about −0.7% after four
months. The respective decline in the linear VAR model seems to stand at about −0.4%.
In contrast to the linear VAR, the unexpected shock seems to lead to a significant and
permanent decline in M3. Also for the ExR, the unexpected shock confirms a constantly
larger depreciation compared to the linear VAR. The effect is significant except for the
period between three and 13 months after the unexpected tightening.
39Note that an increase of the ExR responses specifies an appreciation of the Euro vis-a`-vis the other
currencys.
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The expected decrease in the interest rate which is not implemented by the ECB is given
by the dotted line in Figure 3.3. Figure E.4 in Appendix E gives the responses with
confidence bands. As expected, these seem to have few lasting consequences for the
interest rate forecasting as well as for the prediction of the other variables. The market
then simply expects a decrease at the next meeting of the monetary authority.
The different results of these two effects, (a) the unexpected increase and (b) the expected
decrease which is not implemented, highlights the necessity to treat them separately.
My results therefore deliver an important contribution for a better understanding of the
different monetary policy shocks and their respective transmission mechanisms in the
Euro Area.
Figure 3.3: Pre Financial Crisis Responses to Different Shocks in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure 3.3 plots the influence of the three monetary policy shocks on yt+j for months
j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for the respective variables of y. The shocks are normalised to 100-
basis-points. Solid black line: VAR impulses. Dashed red line: impulses based on an
unexpected interest rate increase by the ECB. Dotted green line: impulses based on
an expected interest rate decrease which is not implemented by the ECB.
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3.7.3 Post Financial Crisis Results on Monetary Policy Trans-
mission
Figure 3.4 shows the impulse responses for the post crisis sample of the three monetary
policy shocks. The respective impulse responses with confidence bands are given in Figure
F.5, F.6 and F.7 in Appendix F.
The impulse responses in Figure 3.4 indicate again that an unexpected shock leads to a
larger effect on all endogenous variables than a linear VAR shock. Following a monetary
policy tightening, the linear VAR responses seem to be insignificant for all endogenous
variables except for a slight significant depreciation of the ExR after five months (Figure
F.5). In contrast, impulse responses based on the unexpected shock reveal a significant
decline in output between 12 and 15 months. The effect on prices and M3 is insignificant.
The ExR seems to depreciate significantly between nine and 14 months (Figure F.6). As
for the pre crisis sample, the effect of an expected decrease in the policy rate which is not
implemented seems to have only a minor and insignificant impact during the post crisis
period.
As a robustness check, I reestimate the post crisis sample on quarterly data based on
two lags.40 This allows for a shorter estimation horizon which is not based on forecasted
data. The time horizon lasts from 2008Q4 until 2013Q4. Further, I substitute IP with
GDP. In contrast to IP, GDP captures the developments of the whole economy and may
therefore give a more thorough overview on output. The results following a linear VAR
shock and the unexpected shock are given in Figure F.8 and F.9 respectively in Appendix
F.1. They confirm the insignificant effect following the linear VAR shock during the post
crisis sample. The effect of the unexpected shock also yields insignificant effects on IP,
prices, M3 and the ExR.
3.7.4 Difference in Monetary Policy Transmission between the
First and Second Sample
Figure 3.5 compares the linear VAR responses for the pre and post financial crisis sample.
The black responses refer to the pre crisis sample and the light blue responses to the post
40Standard information criteria suggest a lag length of two quarters.
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Figure 3.4: Post Financial Crisis Responses to Different Shocks in the Policy Interest
Rate
Figure 3.4 plots the influence of the three monetary policy shocks on yt+j for months
j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for the respective variables of y. The shocks are normalised to 100-
basis-points. Solid black line: VAR impulses. Dashed red line: impulses based on an
unexpected interest rate increase by the ECB. Dotted green line: impulses based on
an expected interest rate decrease which is not implemented by the ECB.
crisis period. In contrast to the impulses for the pre crisis, the impulse responses for the
post crisis sample seem to be broadly insignificant.
Compare Figure 3.6 for the responses based on the unexpected shock. The red lines depict
the pre crisis responses and the light blue lines refer to the post crisis sample. Generally,
the impulse responses during the pre crisis sample appear to have a more persistent effect
than those estimated for the post crisis sample. More specifically, IP seems to significantly
contract after 12 months onwards during the pre crisis period and for the post crisis, a
significant decline is estimated between 12 and 15 months. Regarding prices, I estimate
a significant decline for the pre crisis sample. This is in contrast to the post crisis sample
where the response is insignificant. M3 seems to decline permanently significant during
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Figure 3.5: VAR Shock: Difference between the Pre and Post Financial Crisis Sample
Figure 3.5 plots linear VAR responses for the pre and post crisis sample. The red lines
refer to the pre crisis sample and the light blue lines to the post crisis sample. Solid lines:
VAR impulses. Dashed lines: respective two-standard error bounds.
the pre crisis sample, whereas the post crisis response also reveals an insignificant decline.
The ExR significantly depreciates on impact and from 13 months onwards during the pre
crisis. In contrast, during the post financial crisis sample the response only depreciates
between nine and 14 months.
Overall, compared to the pre crisis, the post crisis responses seem to be less significant.
This implies that monetary policy may be less effective during the post financial crisis
sample (see section 3.7.5 for a detailed discussion). However, note that a smaller sample
may also induce the estimation of wider confidence bands. It will be interesting for future
research to see whether the size of the confidence bands shrinks with a longer time horizon
available. Thus, my results should be seen as a tentative and preliminary evaluation on
the Euro Area monetary transmission mechanism since the occurrence of the financial
turmoil in 2008.
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Figure 3.6: Unexpected Shock: Difference between the Pre and Post Financial Crisis
Sample
Figure 3.6 plots unexpected monetary policy shock responses for the pre and post crisis
sample. The red lines refer to the pre crisis sample and the light blue lines to the
post crisis sample. Solid lines: impulses based on the unexpected shock. Dashed lines:
respective two-standard error bounds.
3.7.5 Why do the pre and post financial crisis results differ?
The following subsections briefly describe the theoretical effect of monetary policy when
the economy is at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). Subsection 3.7.5 discusses the effect
based on the IS-LM model and subsection 3.7.5 draws a possible link between the obtained
results in this paper and the effectiveness of monetary policy at the ZLB.
A brief description of the liquidity trap: the IS-LM view
Monetary policy works mainly through influencing prices and yields of financial assets,
which in turn influence economic decisions and thus economic development. When the
short-term policy rate is at or near the ZLB it becomes infeasible to use it for providing
monetary ease as it can not go below zero. Under such circumstances, investors are
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indifferent between holding bonds and money,41 and as a consequence, monetary policy
is ineffective at boosting demand (see Krugman (2000) for a detailed discussion). This
situation is known as a liquidity trap. In ‘normal’ times, monetary policy is neutral in
the long run. But since prices are to some extent sticky, in the short run a monetary
easing may stimulate output and lead to an equiproportional increase in prices. However,
when nominal interest rates are close to zero or at the ZLB, so that the economy is in a
liquidity trap, monetary policy is ineffective to rise output and prices.
For illustrative purpose, I consider the IS-LM paradigm. In a liquidity trap, money
demand becomes more or less infinitely elastic. This implies that the left most part of the
LM curve is horizontal at an interest rate near zero. Assume that the IS curve intersects
the LM curve in that flat area, as it is shown in Figure 3.7. Then, an expansive monetary
policy, which moves the LM curve from LM to LM’, has no effect on output and interest
rates. Note that the intersection of IS with LM’ is still at the same level of output y
as the intersection of IS with LM (Figure 3.7). Hence, conventional monetary policy is
powerless as the economy is in a liquidity trap. For a more detailed discussion refer to
Krugman (2000).
Figure 3.7: IS-LM Model and the Liquidity Trap
Figure 3.7 describes the liquidity trap in the IS-LM model. The vertical axis denotes the
nominal interest rate and the horizontal axis depicts the output level.
41Bonds and money become equivalent assets, since both yield the same nominal interest which is
essentially zero at the ZLB.
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Hypothetical Link between my Results and Monetary Policy in a Liquidity
Trap
My results may mirror these circumstances of a liquidity trap in the Euro Area.42 More
specifically, in the wake of the global financial crisis, Euro Area GDP and inflation de-
creased substantially (compare Figures F.10 and F.11 in Appendix F.2). At the same
time, the short-term interest rate on MROs has been lowered from 4.25% in August 2008
to 0.25% in November 2013 (compare Figure 3.1). According to the theory, conventional
monetary policy is ineffective when the economy is at the ZLB and thus in a liquidity
trap. Since the ECB’s policy rate is very low, at most, for the last five years of my
post financial crisis sample, my findings may be explained by the liquidity trap. More
specifically, the short-term interest rate reached 1% in the middle of 2009. Following a
short-lived recovery in 2011, the policy rate temporarily increased to 1.5%. Already at
the end of 2011 the policy rate was again gradually reduced. Since November 2013, it
remains at an historically low level of 0.25%. With the nominal interest rate being close
to the ZLB during some parts of the post crisis sample, the Euro Area economy seems
to be for this timeframe in a liquidity trap or close to it. Under such circumstances,
the central bank’s ability to reduce its short-term policy rate meaningfully ended and
as described above, monetary policy is ineffective to increase output and prices. The
estimated insignificant effect on output and prices following the monetary policy shock
during the post crisis sample might reflect the ineffectiveness of monetary policy at the
ZLB. However, it should be stressed that it may still be too early to conclusively judge
on the monetary policy transmission in the Euro Area after the financial crisis. When a
sample split is implemented with the occurrence of the financial turmoil in 2008, it allows
for an overall timeframe of just about five years. For a VAR estimation this is still a
rather short time horizon.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on how monetary policy is transmitted in the Euro
Area and whether it has changed with the occurrence of the financial crisis in 2008.
42Note, although section 3.7 analyses the transmission of an increase in the policy rate, the same
mechanisms holds for a decrease in the respective interest rate. The impulse responses just have the
opposite sign.
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I am in particular interested in the VAR framework and its explanation on how a mon-
etary policy shock influences key macroeconomic variables. More specifically, I use the
approach by Hamilton and Jorda (2002). They developed a non-linear forecasting tool
which significantly enhances VAR predictions. It allows to differentiate between an unex-
pected policy interest rate increase and an expected but not implemented decrease. The
usual linear VAR fails to account for this difference which leads to statistically different
impulse response functions. Moreover, by means of a VAR setting there is very little evi-
dence on possible differences in the transmission mechanism before and after the financial
crisis in 2008. Since it is reasonable to suspect that the financial turmoil impaired the
ECB’s reaction function, I split the data into two samples. I use monthly data ranging
from January 1999 through September 2008 and from October 2008 until December 2014.
Four results of my analysis stand out: (1) it is important to differentiate between an
unexpected increase and an expected decrease not implemented as these responses have
very different implications for the transmission mechanism whereas the usual linear VAR
mixes these effects. (2) Generally, compared to the linear VAR, an unexpected tightening
reveals much larger and more long lasting effects on industrial production, consumer
prices, money growth and the exchange rate. This result is especially pronounced for
the pre crisis sample. 3) Regarding the expected decrease which is not implemented, I
observe for both samples rather minor and insignificant impacts. The market might then
simply expect a decrease of the policy interest rate at the next central bank’s meeting. (4)
Tracing a monetary policy shock in the post financial crisis sample generally verifies a less
significant effect. The insignificance could indicate that monetary policy is less effective
during the second sample.
Given my results, this work contributes to a better understanding of the ECB’s monetary
policy. It delivers new insights into the possibility of modeling the ECB’s interest rate and
it contributes to a better understanding of the influence of monetary policy on the overall
economy. My results thus underline the importance of this methodology, in particular for
the evaluation of monetary policy effects.
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A Changes in the Interest Rate on MROs
Table 3.6: Dates of Interest Rate Changes on MROs
Meeting Dates Date of Change Interest Rate Interest Rate Level
Main Refinancing Operations
Change Fixed Rate Tender Variable Rate Tender
[Minimum Bid Rate]
01.07.1999 3
04.08.1999 04.09.1999 -0.5 2.5
11.04.1999 11.05.1999 0.5 3
02.03.2000 02.04.2000 0.25 3.25
03.16.2000 03.17.2000 0.25 3.5
04.27.2000 04.28.2000 0.25 3.75
06.08.2000 06.09.2000 0.5 4.25
06.21.2000 06.28.2000 4.25
08.31.2000 09.01.2000 0.25 4.5
10.18.2000 10.06.2000 0.25 4.75
05.10.2001 05.11.2001 -0.25 4.5
08.30.2001 08.31.2001 -0.25 4.25
09.17.2001 09.18.2001 -0.5 3.75
11.08.2001 11.09.2001 -0.5 3.25
12.05.2002 12.06.2002 -0.5 2.75
03.06.2003 03.07.2003 -0.25 2.5
06.05.2003 06.06.2003 -0.5 2
12.01.2005 12.06.2005 0.25 2.25
03.02.2006 03.08.2006 0.25 2.5
06.08.2006 06.15.2006 0.25 2.75
08.03.2006 08.09.2006 0.25 3
10.10.2006 10.11.2006 0.25 3.25
12.07.2006 12.13.2006 0.25 3.5
03.08.2007 03.14.2007 0.25 3.75
06.06.2007 06.13.2007 0.25 4
07.03.2008 07.09.2008 0.25 4.25
10.08.2008 10.15.2008 -0.5 3.75
11.06.2008 11.12.2008 -0.5 3.25
12.04.2008 12.10.2008 -0.75 2.5
01.15.2009 01.21.2009 -0.5 2.0
03.05.2009 03.11.2009 -0.5 1.5
04.02.2009 04.08.2009 -0.25 1.25
05.07.2009 05.13.2009 -0.25 1.0
04.07.2011 04.13.2011 0.25 1.25
07.07.2011 07.13.2011 0.25 1.5
11.09.2011 11.09.2011 -0.25 1.25
12.14.2011 12.14.2011 -0.25 1.0
07.11.2012 07.11.2012 -0.25 0.75
05.08.2013 05.08.2013 -0.25 0.5
11.13.2013 11.13.2013 -0.25 0.25
Source: ECB
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B Data Sources
This paper uses monthly data on the Euro Area for the time horizon between 1999:01
and 2014:01. The model ist estimated in levels. Like Sims et al. (1990) state, this ac-
counts for possible discrepancy that may arise in case of incorrectly assumed cointegration
restrictions. The following time series are used in the VAR estimation:
Industrial Production (IP): Log of industrial production (excluding construction),
volumes, 2010 = 100, Euro area-17, monthly series. Source: Eurostat.
Consumer price (CPI): Log of HICP, all items, 2005=100, Euro area-17, neither sea-
sonally nor working day adjusted, monthly series. Source: Eurostat.
Main refinancing rate (MRO):Main refinancing interest rate, middle rate, Euro Area,
in percent. Source: European Central Bank.
M3 (M3): Log of money supply M3, outstanding amounts, sa Euro Area. Source:
European Central Bank.
Exchange rate (ExR): Log of ECB real effective exchange rate, Euro area-17 countries
vis-a-vis the EER-40 group of trading partners (AU, CA, DK, HK, JP, NO, SG, KR, SE,
CH, GB, US, BG, CZ, LV, LT, HU, PL, RO, CN, DZ, AR, BR, CL, HR, IS, IN, ID, IL,
MY, MX, MA, NZ, PH, RU, ZA, TW, TH, TR and VE) against Polish zloty. Monthly
index (reference period: 99Q1=100) monthly series Source: European Central Bank.
Gross domestic product (GDP): Log of gross domestic product at market prices,
chain linked volumes, reference year 2005, working day and seasonally adjusted by
TRAMO/SEATS, quarterly series. Source: Eurostat.
Crude oil-WTI (Oil): Log of crude oil-WTI Spot Cushing, USD/BBL. Source: Datas-
tream.
US industrial production (US_IP): Log of US industrial production, total index, sa,
2007=100. Source: Datastream.
US T-Bill (US T-Bill): Log of US T-Bill rate, secondary market, 3 months, middle
rate. Source: Datastream.
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Figure B.1: Monthly Data, Euro Area
(a) IP in levels (b) IP, yearly growth rate
(c) CPI in levels (d) CPI, annual rate of change
(e) M3 in levels (f) M3, annual rate of change
(g) ExR in levels (h) ExR, annual rate of change
C Forecasting with the ACH Framework
As Hamilton and Jorda (2002) illustrate, the ACH framework allows calculating the one-
period-ahead forecast of the policy interest rate it+1. This is a closed-form and based on
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information Υt available at time t. The respective forecasting equation is given by:




×[Φ(cj − w′tpi)− Φ(cj−1 − w′tpi)], (3.19)
where wt = (ytN(t) , zt)′ with zt = SPt; the hazard rate ht+1 is estimated from equation
3.5; sj = (0.25)(j − 3), cj are the respective OP parameter estimates and summarised in
Table 3.4 and 3.5.43
To generate further forecast values of the policy interest rate, four steps are necessary:
First, with the help of a VAR, containing information of the interest rate it, its lag, the
lag of the spread or the lag inflation forecast, the forecasts of the SPt or InflF12t are
calculated.44 Second, since the forecasting equation 3.19 is due to the information set
Υt+j nonlinear, simulation is required. Equation 3.19 is based on a discrete probability
distribution for it+1|Υt, from this distribution it is possible to calculate a value for the one-
period-ahead forecast i(1)t+1. Given this value and assuming a Gaussian error in equation
3.20, it is possible to calculate a one-period-ahead forecast of the explanatory variable
z
(1)
t+1 from equation 3.20. This value is a draw from the respective distribution zt+1|Υt.
The discrete probability distribution for it+1|Υt and the just generated forecast value z(1)t+1
are used to calculate the two-step-ahead forecast of the policy interest rate i(1)t+2, which
is a draw from the discrete probability distribution it+2|Υt. These steps are repeated to
generate a sequence of these single forecast values up to i(1)t+j. Third, since this is a sequence
of single values, it is necessary to repeat these steps from the beginning for generating m
simulations of these values i(m)t+j from the distribution f(it+j|Υt). Fourth, the final forecast
E(it+j|Υt) is calculated as an average of these M simulations, M−1∑Mm=1 i(m)t+j .
43For example, for the pre crisis sample w′tpi = 0.656ytN(t) + 3.4959SPt
44The respective equations for the pre financial crisis sample with standard errors in parentheses are:
InflF12t = 0.0346 + 0.0378it − 0.0307it−1 + 0.9758InflF12t−1.
(0.0089) (0.0115) (0.0089) (0.0069) (3.20)
SPt = 0.6656 + 0.0406it − 0.6851it−1 + 0.3719SPt−1.
(0.1258) (0.0644) (0.1263) (0.0763)
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D Further Details on the Estimation of the Nonlinear
Forecasting Model
For example, consider the following linear VAR
yt = c+ θxt + Φ1yt−1 + Φ2yt−2 + . . .+ Φ6yt−6 + t,
with t i.i.d. N(0,Ω). OLS regressions provide the maximum likelihood estimates of
the parameters (c, θxt,Φ1yt−1,Φ2yt−2, . . . ,Φyt−6) of a VAR. In addition, it is necessary to
forecast the macro vector of variables y2t that comes after MROt given y1t and it which
is the hypothesised value of the interest rate. This system of equations is estimated via
OLS and can be collected and written in vector form as
y2t = d+ d1it +D0y1t + θxt +B1yt−1 +B2yt−2 + . . .+B1yt−6 + u2t. (3.21)
45 The next step is to estimate the forecast of y˜2t|t(it) based on equation 3.21 with the
hypothesised value it and the values for y1t, yt−1, yt−2, . . .. The following vector comprises
these forecasts as well as the hypothesized value it and y1t
y˜t|t(it) = (y′1t, it, xt, y˜′2t|t(it))′. (3.22)
For the following system of equations it is then possible to calculate the one-step-ahead
VAR forecast based on it
Eˆ(yt+1|it, xt, y1t, yt−1, yt−2, . . .) = c+ θxt+
Φ1y˜t|t(it) + Φ2yt−1 + . . .+ Φ6yt−5.
(3.23)
Before in Appendix section C, the forecast of the interest rate on MROs (it+1), based on
the ACH model is calculated. This forecast is used to replace the third row of the vector
of conditional forecasts in equation 3.23, relating to the VAR forecast value MROt+1.
y˜t+1|t(it) is then the respective vector comprising these forecasts. For calculating the
45Since y2t consists of two macro variables, M3 and ExR, d1 is a 2× 1 vector, D0 a 2× 3 matrix, and
Bj are 2× 5 matrices.
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two-step-ahead forecasts conditioned on it, the parameters of the VAR are used
Eˆ(yt+2|it, xt, y1t, yt−1, yt−2, . . .) = c+ θxt+
Φ1y˜t+1|t(it) + Φ2yt|t(it) + . . .+ Φ6yt−4.
(3.24)
As above in equation 3.23, the third row in equation 3.24 is replaced with the respective
forecast it+2. The vector collecting these forecasts is y˜t+2|t(it). I repeat these steps to
estimate the dynamic influences on the macro variables of the forecasts for it, it+1, . . ..
The resulting vector, collecting the dynamic influences, is called y˜t+j|t(it).
Now, I address the question regarding the ECB’s influence of an interest rate increase
by 25 basis points during month t (it = it−1 + 0.25) in contrast to the case of no change
(it = it−1). The respective answer is then normalized in units of a derivative
(0.25)−1[y˜t+j|t(it)|it=it−1+0.25 − y˜t+j|t(it)|it=it−1+0.25]. (3.25)
By replacing the corresponding third row of 3.23 and 3.24 at each repetition in the ACH
forecast, I obtain values in 3.25 which are based on t and it−1. Consequently, these values
differ numerically to the standard VAR impulse response function. For computational
purpose, equation 3.25 is then averaged over the time span t = 1, . . . , T and y1, . . . , yT .
The next question addresses the predicted interest rate change which is not implemented
by the ECB. This refers to the second term in 3.23. The respective answer is modeled as




(it−1 − iˆt|t−1)−1 if|it−1 − iˆt|t−1| > 0.05
0 otherwise.
The interest rate forecast on MROs iˆt|t−1 for month t is estimated based on the information
set t− 1. ωt denotes the weight, which respectively drops the no-change-events, since no
change was expected. Additionally, positive or negative forecast errors are also rescaled
by ωt into unites similar to equation 3.25. As above, the substitution of the estimated
ACH forecasts it+j for the VAR forecasts MROt+j induces equation 3.26 to depend on t
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and not to be numerically identical to the VAR impulse-response function.
E Pre Financial Crisis Monetary Policy Shocks
Figure E.2: VAR Responses to a Shock in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure E.2 plots the influence of the monetary policy shock based on the linear VAR
on yt+j for months j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for the respective variables of y. Solid lines: VAR
impulses. Dashed lines: respective two-standard error bounds.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 141
Figure E.3: Unexpected Shock in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure E.3 plots the influence of the unexpected monetary policy shock on yt+j for
months j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for the respective variables of y. Dashed lines: impulses of the
unexpected interest rate increase. Solid lines: respective two-standard error bounds.
Figure E.4: Expected, Not Implemented Shock in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure E.4 plots the influence of the expected, not implemented monetary policy shock on
yt+j for months j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for the respective variables of y. Dotted lines: impulses
of an expected interest rate decrease, not implemented. Dashed line: respective two-
standard error bounds.
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F Post Financial Crisis Monetary Policy Shocks
Figure F.5: VAR Responses to a Shock in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure F.5 plots the influence of the monetary policy shock based on the linear VAR
on yt+j for months j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for the respective variables of y. Solid lines: VAR
impulses. Dashed lines: respective two-standard error bounds.
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Figure F.6: Unexpected Shock in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure F.6 plots the influence of the unexpected monetary policy shock on yt+j for
months j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for the respective variables of y. Dashed lines: impulses of the
unexpected interest rate increase. Solid lines: respective two-standard error bounds.
Figure F.7: Expected, Not Implemented Shock in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure F.7 plots the influence of the expected, not implemented monetary policy shock on
yt+j for months j = 0, 1, . . . , 17 for the respective variables of y. Dotted lines: impulses
of an expected interest rate decrease, not implemented. Dashed lines: respective two-
standard error bounds.
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F.1 Robustness Check with Quarterly Data - Post Financial
Crisis Sample
Figure F.8: VAR Responses to a Shock in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure F.8 plots the influence of the monetary policy shock based on the linear VAR on
yt+j for quarters j = 0, 1, . . . , 7 for the respective variables of y based on quarterly data.
Solid lines: VAR impulses. Dashed lines: respective two-standard error bounds.
Figure F.9: Unexpected Shock in the Policy Interest Rate
Figure F.9 plots the influence of the unexpected monetary policy shock on yt+j for
quarters j = 0, 1, . . . , 7 for the respective variables of y based on quarterly data. Dashed
lines: impulses of the unexpected interest rate increase. Solid lines: respective two-
standard error bounds.
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F.2 Development of Euro Area GDP and CPI
Figure F.10: Euro Area GDP
GDP and main components, at 2005 constant Prices, sa, source:
Eurostat
Figure F.11: Euro Area Consumer Prices
CPI, all items, harmonised, not sa, source: Eurostat; CPI, exclud-
ing energy, food, alcohol and tobacco, not sa, source: Eurostat
Bibliography
An, L. and Wang, J. 2011. Exchange Rate Pass-Through: Evidence Based on Vector
Autoregression with Sign Restrictions. Open Economies Review pp. 1–22.
Andrés, J., David López-Salido, J., and Vallés, J. 2006. Money in an Estimated
Business Cycle Model of the Euro Area. The Economic Journal 116:457–477.
Angeloni, I., Kashyap, A. K., Mojon, B., and Terlizzese, D. 2002. Monetary
Transmission in the Euro Area: Where do we Stand?
Artis, M. and Ehrmann, M. 2006. The Exchange Rate - A Shock-Absorber or Source
of Shocks? A Study of four open Economies. Journal of International Money and
Finance 25:874–893.
Barigozzi, M., Conti, A. M., and Luciani, M. 2013. Do Euro Area Countries Re-
spond Asymmetrically to the Common Monetary Policy? Oxford bulletin of economics
and statistics .
Bauer, M. D., Rudebusch, G. D., and Wu, J. C. 2012. Correcting Estimation
Bias in Dynamic Term Structure Models. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
30:454–467.
Baumeister, C., Durinck, E., and Peersman, G. 2008. Liquidity, Inflation and
Asset Prices in a Time-Varying Framework for the Euro Area. Available at SSRN
1290842 .
Baumeister, C. and Peersman, G. 2008. Time-Varying Effects of Oil Supply Shocks
on the US Economy. Manuscript, Ghent University .
Benati, L. and Mumtaz, H. 2005. The Great Stability in the UK: Good Policy or
Good Luck? manuscript, Research Department, Bank of England .
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 147
Bernanke, B., Boivin, J., and Eliasz, P. 2005. Measuring the Effects of Monetary
Policy: A Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 120:387–422.
Bernanke, B., Reinhart, V., and Sack, B. 2004. Monetary Policy Alternatives
at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment. Brookings papers on economic activity
2004:1–100.
Bernanke, B. S. and Blinder, A. S. 1992. The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels
of Monetary Transmission. American economic review 82:901–921.
Bernanke, B. S. and Reinhart, V. R. 2004. Conducting Monetary Policy at Very
Low Short-Term Interest Rates. American Economic Review pp. 85–90.
Bitans, M. 2004. Pass-Through of Exchange Rates to Domestic Prices in East European
Countries and the Role of Economic Enviroment. Technical report.
Canova, F. 2007. Methods for Applied Macroeconomic Research, volume 13. Princeton
University Press.
Canova, F. and Ciccarelli, M. 2009. Estimating Multicountry VAR Models. Inter-
national Economic Review 50:929–959.
Canova, F. and de Nicoló, G. 2002. Monetary Disturbances Matter for Business
Fluctuations in the G-7. Journal of Monetary Economics 49:1131–1159.
Canova, F. and Pires Pina, J. 2000. Monetary Policy Misspecification in VAR
Models. Economics and Business Working Paper .
Cargnoni, C., Muller, P., and West, M. 1997. Bayesian Forecasting of Multinomial
Time Series through Conditional Gaussian Dynamic Models. Journal of the American
Statistical Association pp. 640–647.
Carstensen, K. 2006. Estimating the ECB Policy Reaction Function. German Eco-
nomic Review 7:1–34.
Castelnuovo, E. 2013. Monetary Policy Shocks and Cholesky# VARs: An Assessment
for the Euro Area!
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 148
Ca’Zorzi, M., Hahn, E., and Sánchez, M. 2007. Exchange Rate Pass-Through in
Emerging Markets.
Cecioni, M., Neri, S., and d’Italia, B. 2011. The Monetary Transmission Mecha-
nism in the Euro Area: Has it Changed and Why? Banca d’Italia.
Cevik, S. and Teksoz, K. 2012. Lost in Transmission? The Effectiveness of Monetary
Policy Transmission Channels in the GCC Countries. Working Paper, No. WP/12/191
.
Chen, H., Curdia, V., and Ferrero, A. 2012. The Macroeconomic Effects of Large-
scale Asset Purchase Programmes. The economic journal 122:F289–F315.
Chevapatrakul, T., Kim, T.-H., and Mizen, P. 2007. Forecasting Changes in
UK Interest Rates. Discussion paper series, Department of Economics, Loughborough
University.
Choi, W. 1999. Estimating the Discount Rate Policy Reaction Function of the Monetary
Authority. Journal of Applied Econometrics 14:379–401.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, C. L. 1999. Monetary Policy
Shocks: What Have We Learned and to What End? Handbook of macroeconomics
1:65–148.
Chung, H., Laforte, J.-p., Reifschneider, D., and Williams, J. C. 2012. Have
we Underestimated the Likelihood and Severity of Zero Lower Bound Events? Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 44:47–82.
Clements, B. J., Kontolemis, Z. G., and Levy, J. V. F. 2001. Monetary Policy
Under EMU: Differences in the Transition Mechanism? Number 102. International
Monetary Fund.
Cogley, T. 2005. How Fast Can the New Economy Grow? A Bayesian Analysis of the
Evolution of Trend Growth. Journal of macroeconomics 27:179–207.
Cogley, T. and Sargent, T. 2001. Evolving Post-World War II US Inflation Dynam-
ics, pp. 331–388. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001, Volume 16. MIT Press.
Cogley, T. and Sargent, T. 2005. Drifts and Volatilities: Monetary Policies and
Outcomes in the Post WWII US. Review of Economic Dynamics 8:262–302.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 149
Coricelli, F., Jazbec, B., and Masten, I. 2006. Exchange Rate Pass-Through
in EMU Acceding Countries: Empirical Analysis and Policy Implications. Journal of
Banking & Finance 30:1375–1391.
Creel, J. and Levasseur, S. 2005. Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanisms in the
CEECs: How Important are the Differences with the Euro Area? Available at SSRN
826284 .
Darvas, Z. 2001. Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Real Exchange Rate in EU Can-
didate Countries. Technical report, Discussion Paper Series 1/Volkswirtschaftliches
Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank.
Darvas, Z. 2009. Monetary Transmission in three Central European Economies: Evi-
dence from Time-Varying Coefficient Vector Autoregressions. Empirica pp. 1–28.
Davutyan, N. and Parke, W. 1995. The Operations of the Bank of England, 1890-
1908: A Dynamic Probit Approach. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking 27.
Dueker, M. 1999. Conditional Heteroscedasticity in Qualitative Response Models of
Time Series: A Gibbs-Sampling Approach to the Bank Prime Rate. Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics pp. 466–472.
Dueker, M. 2005. Dynamic Forecasts of Qualitative Variables. Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics 23:96–104.
Égert, B. and MacDonald, R. 2009. Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Central
and Eastern Europe: Surveying the Surveyable. Journal of Economic Surveys 23:277–
327.
Eggertsson, G. B. 2011. What Fiscal Policy is Efective at Zero Interest Rates?, pp.
59–112. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, Volume 25. University of Chicago
Press.
Eichenbaum, M. and Evans, C. 1995. Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of
Shocks to Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
pp. 975–1009.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 150
Eichengreen, B., Watson, M., and Grossman, R. 1985. Bank Rate Policy under
the Interwar Gold Standard: A Dynamic Probit Model. The Economic Journal pp.
725–745.
Engle, R. 2003. The Econometrics of Ultra-High-Frequency Data. Econometrica 68:1–
22.
Engle, R. and Russell, J. 1998. Autoregressive Conditional Duration: A New Model
for Irregularly Spaced Transaction Data. Econometrica 66:1127–1162.
Evans, C. and Marshall, D. 1998. Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of
Nominal Interest Rates: Evidence and Theory. Carnegie-Rochester Confer. Series on
Public Policy 49:53–111.
Fagan, G., Henry, J., and Mestre, R. 2005. An Area-Wide Model for the Euro
Area. Economic Modelling 22:39–59.
Fahr, S., Motto, R., Rostagno, M., Smets, F., and Tristani, O. 2013. A
Monetary Policy Strategy in Good and Bad Times: Lessons from the Recent Past.
Economic Policy 28:243–288.
Farrant, K. and Peersman, G. 2006. Is the Exchange Rate a Shock Absorber or
a Source of Shocks? New Empirical Evidence. Journal of Money Credit and Banking
38:939.
Faust, J. 1998. The Robustness of Identified VAR Conclusions about Money. In
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, volume 49, pp. 207–244. El-
sevier.
Franta, M. 2011. Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks in Japan using Sign Restric-
tions within the TVP-VAR Framework. Technical report, Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
Franta, M., Horvath, R., and Rusnák, M. 2011. Evaluating Changes in the Mon-
etary Transmission Mechanism in the Czech Republic. Working Papers .
Froyen, R. 1975. The Determination of the Federal Reserve Discount Rate Policy.
Southern Economic Journal 42:193–200.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 151
Fujiwara, I. 2006. Evaluating Monetary Policy when Nominal Interest Rates are Almost
Zero. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 20:434–453.
Gagnon, J., Raskin, M., Remache, J., and Sack, B. 2011. The Financial Market
Effects of the Federal Reserves Large-Scale Asset Purchases. International Journal of
Central Banking 7:3–43.
Gerlach, S. 2007. Interest Rate Setting by the ECB, 1999-2006: Words and Deeds.
International Journal of Central Banking 3:1–46.
Gerlach, S. and Lewis, J. 2010. Zero Lower Bound, ECB Interest Rate Policy and
the Financial Crisis. Empirical Economics pp. 1–22.
Gerlach, S. and Schnabel, G. 2000. The Taylor Rule and Interest Rates in the EMU
Area. Economics Letters 67:165–171.
Geweke, J. 1999. Using Simulation Methods for Bayesian Econometric Models: Infer-
ence, Development, and Communication. Econometric Reviews 18:1–73.
Goodhart, C. 1996. Why do the Monetary Authorities Smooth Interest Rates? ESRC
Research Centre Special Paper Series, 81 .
Hamilton, J. and Jorda, O. 2002. A Model of the Federal Funds Rate Target. Journal
of Political Economy 110:1135–1167.
Hamilton, J. D. and Wu, J. C. 2012. The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary
Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 44:3–46.
Hausman, J., Lo, A., and MacKinlay, A. 1992. An Ordered Probit Analysis of
Transaction Stock Prices. Journal of financial economics 31:319–379.
Hausman, J. K. and Wieland, J. F. 2014. Abenomics: Preliminary Analysis and
Outlook. Technical report, mimeo.
Hayashi, F. and Koeda, J. 2014. Exiting from QE. CARF F-Series CARF-F-322,
Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of
Tokyo 12.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 152
Iwata, S. and Wu, S. 2006. Estimating Monetary Policy Effects when Interest Rates
are Close to Zero. Journal of Monetary Economics 53:1395–1408.
Jarociński, M. 2010. Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks in the East and the West
of Europe: A Comparison. Journal of Applied Econometrics 25:833–868.
Jinushi, T., Kuroki, Y., and Miyao, R. 2000. Monetary Policy in Japan since the
late 1980s: Delayed Policy Actions and some Explanations. Japan’s Financial Crisis
and Its Parallels to US Experience pp. 115–48.
Joyce, M., Lasaosa, A., Stevens, I., and Tong, M. 2011. The Financial Market
Impact of Quantitative Easing in the United Kingdom. International Journal of Central
Banking 7:113–161.
Joyce, M., Miles, D., Scott, A., and Vayanos, D. 2012. Quantitative Easing and
Unconventional Monetary Policy - An Introduction. The Economic Journal 122:F271–
F288.
Kamada, K. and Sugo, T. 2006. Evaluating Japanese Monetary Policy under the
Nonnegativity Constraint on Nominal Short-Term Interest Rates. The Bank of Japan
Working Paper Series p. 17.
Kiley, M. 2012. The Aggregate Demand Effects of Short-and Long-Term Interest Rates.
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 54.
Kim, S. and Roubini, N. 2000. Exchange Rate Anomalies in the Industrial Countries:
A Solution with a Structural VAR Approach. Journal of Monetary Economics 45:561–
586.
Kimura, T., Kobayashi, H., Muranaga, J., and Ugai, H. 2003. The Effect of the
Increase in the Monetary Base of Japan’s Economy at Zero Interest Rates: An Empirical
Analysis, pp. 276–312. In B. for International Settlements (ed.), Monetary policy in
a changing environment, volume 19 of BIS Papers chapters. Bank for International
Settlements.
Kimura, T. and Nakajima, J. 2013. Identifying Conventional and Unconventional
Monetary Policy Shocks: A Latent Threshold Approach. Bank of Japan.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 153
Kimura, T. and Small, D. H. 2006. Quantitative Monetary Easing and Risk in
Financial Asset Markets. Topics in Macroeconomics 6:1–54.
Kirchner, M., Cimadomo, J., and Hauptmeier, S. 2010. Transmission of Govern-
ment Spending Shocks in the Euro Area: Time Variation and Driving Forces. Tinbergen
Institute.
Koop, G. and Korobilis, D. 2010. Bayesian Multivariate Time Series Methods for
Empirical Macroeconomics. Now Publishers Inc.
Koop, G. and Potter, S. 2006. The Vector Floor and Ceiling Model. Contributions
to Economic Analysis 276:97–131.
Krugman, P. 1998. It’s Baaack: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:137–205.
Krugman, P. 2000. Thinking about the Liquidity Trap. Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies 14:221–237.
Lenza, M., Pill, H., and Reichlin, L. 2010. Monetary Policy in Exceptional Times.
Economic Policy 25:295–339.
LeSage, J. 1999. Applied Econometrics using MATLAB. Manuscript, Dept. of Eco-
nomics, University of Toronto .
Lombra, R. and Torto, R. 1977. Discount Rate Changes and Announcement Effects.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 91:171–176.
Lunde, A. and Timmermann, A. 2004. Duration Dependence in Stock Prices. Journal
of Business and Economic Statistics 22:253–273.
Lyziak, T., Demchuk, O., Przystupa, J., Sznajderska, A., and Wróbel, E.
2012. Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism in Poland - What Do We Know in
2011? National Bank of Poland Working Paper No. 116 .
McCarthy, J. 2007. Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Import Prices to Domestic
Inflation in some Industrialized Economies. Eastern Economic Journal 33:511.
Meier, A. 2009. Panacea, Curse, or Nonevent? Unconventional Monetary Policy in the
United Kingdom. International Monetary Fund.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 154
Mikitani, R. and Posen, A. S. 2000. Japan’s Financial Crisis and its Parallels to US
Experience, volume 13. Peterson Institute.
Miyao, R. 2002. The Effects of Monetary Policy in Japan. Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking 34:376–392.
Mojon, B. and Peersman, G. 2001. A VAR Description of the Effects of Monetary
Policy in the Individual Countries of the Euro Area.
Monticelli, C. and Tristani, O. 1999. What does the Single Monetary Policy Do?:
A SVAR Benchmark for the European Central Bank. Number 2. European Central
Bank.
Mumtaz, H. and Sunder-Plassmann, L. 2010. Time-Varying Dynamics of the Real
Exchange Rate: A Structural VAR Analysis.
Nakajima, J. 2011. Time-Varying Parameter VAR Model with Stochastic Volatility:
An Overview of Methodology and Empirical Applications. Technical report, Institute
for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
Nakajima, J. and Ginko¯, N. 2011. Monetary Policy Transmission under Zero In-
terest Rates: An Extended Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregression Approach.
Technical report, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
Nakajima, J., Kasuya, M., and Watanabe, T. 2011. Bayesian Analysis of Time-
Varying Parameter Vector Autoregressive Model for the Japanese Economy and Mon-
etary Policy. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 25:225–245.
Nakajima, J. and West, M. 2013. Bayesian Analysis of Latent Threshold Dynamic
Models. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 31:151–164.
Paap, R. and Van Dijk, H. K. 2003. Bayes Estimates of Markov Trends in Possi-
bly Cointegrated Series: An Application to US Consumption and Income. Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics 21:547–563.
Peersman, G. 2004. The Transmission of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area: Are
the Effects Different Across Countries? Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
66:285–308.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 155
Peersman, G. and Smets, F. 2003. The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the
Euro Area: More Evidence from VAR Analysis. Monetary policy transmission in the
Euro Area pp. 36–55.
Peersman, G. and Straub, R. 2006. Putting the New Keynesian Model to a Test.
IMF Working Paper Series 6.
Pereira, M. and Lopes, A. 2010. Time-Varying Fiscal Policy in the US. Banco de
Portugal, Working Paper 21.
Piazzesi, M. 2001. An Econometric Model of the Yield Curve with Macroeconomic
Jump Effects. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Primiceri, G. 2005. Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary
Policy. Review of Economic Studies 72:821–852.
Raftery, A. and Lewis, S. 1992. How Many Iterations in the Gibbs Sampler. Bayesian
statistics 4:763–773.
Rudebusch, G. 2002. Term Structure Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing and Mon-
etary Policy Inertia. Journal of Monetary Economics 49:1161–1187.
Sack, B. 2000. Does the Fed Act Gradually? A VAR Analysis. Journal of Monetary
Economics 46:229–256.
Schenkelberg, H. and Watzka, S. 2013. Real Effects of Quantitative Easing at the
Zero Lower Bound: Structural VAR-based Evidence from Japan. Journal of Interna-
tional Money and Finance .
Sims, C., Stock, J., and Watson, M. 1990. Inference in Linear Time Series Models
with Some Unit Roots. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 113–144.
Sims, C. A. 1972. Money, Income, and Causality. The American Economic Review pp.
540–552.
Sims, C. A. 1980. Comparison of Interwar and Postwar Business Cycles: Monetarism
Reconsidered.
Sims, C. A. 1986. Are Forecasting Models Usable for Policy Analysis? Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 10:2–16.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 156
Sims, C. A. 1992. Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts: The Effects of
Monetary Policy. European Economic Review 36:975–1000.
Sims, C. A. and Uhlig, H. 1991. Understanding unit rooters: A helicopter tour.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 1591–1599.
Sims, C. A. and Zha, T. 2006. Were there Regime Switches in US Monetary Policy?
The American Economic Review pp. 54–81.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. 2003. An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium Model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European economic association 1:1123–
1175.
Smirlock, M. and Yawitz, J. 1985. Asset Returns, Discount Rate Changes, and
Market Efficiency. The Journal of Finance 40:1141–1158.
Sousa, J. and Zaghini, A. 2008. Monetary Policy Shocks in the Euro Area and Global
Liquidity Spillovers. International journal of finance & Economics 13:205–218.
Stein, J. C. 2012. Evaluating Large-Scale Asset Purchases. Remarks, Federal Reserve
Board .
Svensson, L. 1999. Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule. Journal of Monetary
Economics 43:607–654.
Taylor, J. 1993. Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. In Carnegie-Rochester
conference series on public policy, volume 39, pp. 195–214.
Teräsvirta, T. 1994. Specification, Estimation, and Evaluation of Smooth Transition
Autoregressive Models. Journal of the American Statistical Association 89:208–218.
Ueda, K. 2012. The Effectiveness of Non-Traditional Monetary Policy Measures: The
Case of the Bank of Japan. Japanese Economic Review 63:1–22.
Ugai, H. 2007. Effects of the Quantitative Easing Policy: A Survey of Empirical Anal-
yses. Monetary and Economic Studies-Bank of Japan 25:1.
Uhlig, H. 1997. Bayesian Vector Autoregressions with Stochastic Volatility. Economet-
rica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 59–73.
Monetary Policy Transmission before and after the Financial Crisis: A
nonlinear VAR model for the Euro Area 157
Uhlig, H. 2005. What are the Effects of Monetary Policy on Output? Results from an
Agnostic Identification Procedure. Journal of Monetary Economics 52:381–419.
Van Aarle, B., Garretsen, H., and Gobbin, N. 2003. Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Transmission in the Euro-Area: Evidence from a Structural VAR Analysis. Journal of
Economics and Business 55:609–638.
Weber, A. A., Gerke, R., and Worms, A. 2009. Has the Monetary Transmission
Process in the Euro Area Changed?: Evidence based on VAR Estimates. Number 276.
Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department.
Wright, J. H. 2012. What does Monetary Policy do to Long-term Interest Rates at the
Zero Lower Bound? The Economic Journal 122:F447–F466.
